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Abstract: The health care market deviates from other markets in at least two important ways: First,
in addition to the usual buyers and sellers, important market players include third party payers and
government agencies. Second, information asymmetries exist between all market players. This disserta-
tion analyzes some information assymetries and their consequences on incentives. Chapter 2 analyzes a
market where the regulator wishes to offset private insurers’ incentives to select good risks by paying out
risk-adjusted premium subsidies. How- ever, the regulator can neither perfectly observe an insurer’s risk
pool nor does he know the cost of offering coverage efficiently. Nevertheless, our calculations show how
risk adjustment schemes can be designed in a way to substantially reduce incentives for risk selection.
Chapter 3 contains an estimation of how demand-side and supply-side cost sharing can be used as a
corrective for moral hazard. It is found that both types of cost shar- ing can reduce health care expendi-
ture. However, when the trade-off between moral hazard reduction and risk selection effects is considered,
supply-side cost sharing is somewhat more effective. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the impact of financial
incentives on physician decision making and physician agency using the fact that some Swiss physicians
have the right to dispense drugs on their own account, while other physicians prescribe drugs only. The
former group has financial interests attached to the type and quantities of drugs sold, while the latter
group does not. In Chapter 4, a prescribing physician’s dispensing status is related to her choice of generic
versus brand-name drugs. It is found that physicians who dispense on their own account are more likely
to prescribe generic drugs compared to physicians who do not. In Chapter 5, a general practitioner’s
(GP) dispensing status is related to her incentives (1) to prescribe drugs, (2) to provide treatments, or
(3) to make referrals to hospitals. From a theoretical model, it is expected that a dispensing GP would
prescribe more drugs, but provide less GP services and make less referrals than a non-dispensing GP. In
the empirical estimation, only the last hypothesis could be confirmed. 2 Der Gesundheitsmarkt unter-
scheidet sich von anderen Märkten in mindestens zwei wichtigen Aspekten: Erstens, es treten neben den
Käufern und Verkäufern, auch externe Zahler (Versicherer) und staatliche Institutionen (Regulatoren)
als wichtige Marktteilnehmer auf. Zweitens, es existieren beachtliche Informationsasymmetrien zwischen
den Marktteilnehmern. In dieser Arbeit werden wichtige Informationsasym- metrien und ihre Konse-
quenzen auf die Marktteilnehmer untersucht. In Kapitel 2 wird ein Versicherungswettbewerb analysiert.
Der Regulator will die Anreize zur Risikoselektion mindern, in dem er risikoadjustierte Subventionen
an die Versicherer ausbezahlt. Er kann jedoch das vom Versicherer getragene Risiko nur unvollständig
beobachten. Trotz dieser fehlenden Information können Risikoausgleichsformeln so gestaltet werden, dass
der Anreiz zur Selektion substantiell reduziert wird. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Wirkung von nachfrage- und
angebotsseitiger Kosten- beteiligung auf die Gesundheitsausgaben. Beide Formen von Kostenbeteiligung
führen auch nach Risikobereinigung zu reduzierten Ausgaben, wobei die nachfrageseitige Kostenbeteili-
gung gleichzeitig zu erheblicher Risikoselektion führt. In Kapitel 4 und 5 werden finanzielle Anreize für
Ärzte untersucht. Dabei wird die Tatsache analysiert, dass gewisse Schweizer Ärzte selbst Medikamente
verkaufen, während andere Ärzte lediglich verschreiben. Erstere haben daher finanzielle Interessen an
der Medikamentenverschreibung. In Kapitel 4 wird gezeigt, dass Ärzte mit dem Recht zum Medika-
mentenverkauf erheblich mehr Generikas abgeben als Apotheken. Dies wird einerseits auf die höhere
Marge für Generikas, andererseits auf Rücksicht auf den (teil-)selbstzahlenden Patienten zurückgeführt.
In Kapitel 5 werden die Auswirkungen des Medikamentenverkaufs auf die Anreize des Arztes untersucht,
Medikamente zu verschreiben, Behandlungen vorzunehmen und Überweisungen zu tätigen. Aus einem
theoretischen Modell wird hergeleitet, dass die Medikamentenausgaben ansteigen, während medizinis-
che Leistungen und Überweisungen eher zurückgehen. In der empirischen Überprüfung wird nur eine
Reduktion der Krankenhauseinweisungen bestätigt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This collection of essays explores issues related to asymmetric information in health
care markets. Prominent topics are (1) the structural characteristics that have
emerged in health care markets in response to information asymmetries, (2) the
incentives of market players and, (3) their responses to these incentives.
A rst salient feature in health care markets is that - in addition to the usual sellers
(physicians) and buyers (patients) - important players include third-party payers
(insurers) and government agencies (regulators). The case for insurance is undisputed
because individual demand for health care services is highly unpredictable. Indeed,
an individual might wish to spend nothing on health care on one day and an amount
exceeding her total wealth on the next, an incidence that is not observed for other
commodities [Newhouse (2002)]. The case for government involvement is made for
several reasons, which are listed by Zweifel et al. (2009). Three of them will be briey
mentioned here. First, patients might be unable to make rational decisions regarding
their consumption of medical care because of their insucient information about
treatment possibilities. Second, private markets for health insurance might fail to
provide the desired amount of coverage to all citizens due to problems of adverse
selection and premium risk (denoting the risk that individuals face premium hikes
after falling ill). Third, medical care is a good with high `altruism', meaning that
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many members of society wish to make medical care available to all their fellow
citizens.
Information asymmetries occur between all players in health care markets. Three
examples are analyzed in this dissertation. In Chapter 2, the regulator wishes to oset
incentives for risk selection, but has an information disadvantage vis-à-vis health
insurers. In Chapter 3, health insurers are confronted with moral hazard because
they cannot fully observe the actions of patients and physicians. In Chapters 4 and 5,
physicians are better informed about optimal treatment paths than patients and
therefore take decisions on their behalf (physician agency).
Chapter 2 analyzes a market with `managed competition' between health insurers
[Van de Ven et al. (2007)]. The regulator wishes to oset insurers' incentives to select
good risks by paying out risk-adjusted premium subsidies. However, the regulator
can neither perfectly observe an insurer's risk pool nor does he know the cost of
oering coverage eciently. Nevertheless, calculations in Chapter 2 show how risk
adjustment schemes can be designed in a way to substantially reduce incentives for
risk selection, even with imperfect information. Moreover, the proposed schemes can
turn elderly or even chronically ill individuals into favorable risks from the insurers'
point of view. In that way, health-based risk adjustment might spur investments
away from risk selection activities towards eciency improvements [Van de Ven and
Ellis (2000)]. Examples of such investments are contracts with increased cost sharing,
which are analyzed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 contains an empirical estimation of how demand-side and supply-side
cost sharing can be used as a corrective for moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs because
health insurers can neither observe their clients' eorts to prevent losses ex-ante, nor
verify the size of the loss ex-post. Therefore, they base payments on the consumption
of medical care. If patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, the
desired quantities of medical care exceed the ecient level. Both demand-side cost
sharing plans (in the guise of higher deductibles) and supply-side cost sharing plans
(in the guise of capitated independent practice associations (IPA)) are oered by
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Swiss health insurers in exchange for a premium rebate. It is found that both types
of cost sharing can reduce health care expenditure. However, when the trade-o
between moral hazard reduction and risk selection eects is considered, supply-side
cost sharing is somewhat more eective. One reason why supply-side cost sharing
is applied is the fact that physicians are better informed about the possibilities and
consequences of treatment, and therefore they are delegated a great deal of decision
making authority. This agency relationship is analyzed in more detail in Chapters 4
and 5.
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the impact of nancial incentives on physician decision
making and physician agency using the fact that some Swiss physicians have the
right to dispense drugs on their own account, while other physicians prescribe drugs
only. The former group has nancial interests attached to the type and quantities of
drugs sold, while the latter group does not.
In Chapter 4, a prescribing physician's dispensing status is related to her choice of
generic versus brand-name drugs. It is found that physicians who dispense on their
own account are more likely to prescribe generic drugs compared to physicians who
do not. This is likely due to higher contributions to income from generic drugs. While
this points to imperfect agency, no distinct evidence was found for the expectation
that physician agency for the patients is reduced if she dispenses on her own account
compared to a situation where she does not. Physicians in managed-care type ar-
rangements are more likely to prescribe generic drugs than other physicians, which
might well be one of the reasons for the reduced expenditure observed in the IPA
plan in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, a general practitioner's (GP) dispensing status is related to her
incentives (1) to prescribe drugs, (2) to provide treatments, or (3) to make referrals
to hospitals. From a theoretical model, it is expected that a dispensing GP would
prescribe more drugs, but provide less GP services and make less referrals than a
non-dispensing GP. However, in the empirical estimation, only the last hypothesis
could be conrmed. In particular, it is found that patients who buy drugs from
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their physicians have slightly lower drug expenditure than patients who buy at the
pharmacy, which is in line with their increased use of generic drugs that was found
by in Chapter 4. Referral rates to hospitals were found to be lower among dispensing
physicians, maybe due to their higher incentives to keep their patients.
These four essays discuss examples where - in spite of considerable information
asymmetries - market mechanisms might be useful to achieve society's goals in health
care markets. Results in Chapter 2 imply that health-based risk adjustment can be
designed in a way to ensure equal access for high risk in competitive health insurance
markets, while at the same time increasing incentives for investments in eciency
improvements. The demand- and supply-side cost sharing options discussed in Chap-
ter 3 attenuate moral hazard while being voluntary chosen by insured individuals in
exchange for a premium rebate. In Chapter 4, it was found that the nancial incen-
tives of dispensing physicians might foster rather than undermine generic substitu-
tion. Last but not least, results in Chapter 5 imply that physicians with dispensing
rights might reduce referral rates to hospitals in response to nancial incentives.
Note that Prof. Dr. Peter Zweifel co-authored Chapters 2, 3 and 4, Prof. Dr.
Konstantin Beck co-authored Chapters 2 and 3, and Maurus Rischatsch co-authored
Chapter 4. Chapter 2 is published in the Journal of Health Economics. Chapter 3
has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Health Economics. Chapter 4 has
been submitted to the International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics,
and Chapter 5 has been submitted to the European Journal of Health Economics.
This introduction is concluded with a note concerning the structure of this disser-
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Chapter 2
Risk Adjustment in Health Insurance
and its Long-term Eectiveness
2.1 Introduction
Enthoven's proposal for regulated competition between social health insurers [En-
thoven (1978)] has been used as a blueprint for reform in several countries [see Van de
Ven et al. (2007)]. One example is Switzerland with its comprehensive mandatory
coverage for all citizens, oered by some 80 competing nonprot health insurers. The
new law of 1994 calls for semiannual open enrollment and community-rated premi-
ums within the same fund. Premium reductions for adults within a given fund are
only possible for contractual dierences such as a higher deductible. However, with
every adult paying the same premium - within a given fund for the same type of con-
tract - but expected health care expenditure (HCE) varying widely, strong incentives
for risk selection are created in the absence of an adequate risk adjustment scheme.
Although risk selection is illegal, its prevalence in Swiss social health insurance has
been reported repeatedly [Beck and Zweifel (1998), Beck et al. (2003)]. As Van de
Ven and Ellis (2000) argue, risk selection produces no benets to society (unless a
dynamic view is adopted, where the threat of being classied as an unfavorable risk
in the future helps to reduce moral hazard).
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The objective of risk adjustment is to mitigate incentives for risk selection. To this
end, insurers with a below-average share of female and elderly consumers have to
contribute to the risk adjustment fund, while insurers with an above-average share
receive a payment from the fund. So far, the dierent schemes have been judged
mainly in terms of their ability to predict individual HCE one year ahead [Newhouse
et al. (1989), Van Barneveld et al. (2000), Holly et al. (2003)].
This criterion is subject to at least two criticisms. First, risk selection is not costless
to insurers. As pointed out by Van Barneveld et al. (2000) as well as Zweifel and
Breuer (2006), this means that they will invest in this activity only if expected prots
exceed the cost. However, the regression criterion of minimizing squared prediction
error with regard to HCE fails to take cost considerations into account. In our model,
we address the problem of costly risk selection activities by restricting attention to
selection prots and losses exceeding a given annual threshold. Second, Zweifel and
Breuer (2006) argue that insurers who want to stay in business must have an eye on
present values rather than one-period prots.
This paper, then, follows the lead of Shen and Ellis (2002) by estimating expected
prots attainable from risk selection, given the information available to the insurer.
It therefore only models the classication of risk types, neglecting the problem of how
to attract or deter types. However, if prots are large enough, strategies to perform
risk selection will most certainly be developed by crafty insurers.
However, unlike Shen and Ellis (2002), the present analysis assesses the impact
of risk adjustment if insurers' planning horizon exceeds one year. In an attempt to
reect longer planning horizons (which agree with insurers' preference for long-run
contracts and guaranteed renewability unless prevented by regulation [Pauly et al.
(1998)]), the period of observation for expected prots is extended to ve years in
the body of the paper. This permits to take into account the fact that a currently
favorable risk may develop into an unfavorable one, switch to a competitor, or die.
Conversely, an unfavorable risk may recover to become a favorable one in the future.
In the theory of statistics, these eects are known as `regression towards the mean'
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[Welch (1985); Beck (2004)]. The empirical relevance of the regression towards the
mean eect is assessed by varying the planning horizon from one to ve years. This
is possible thanks to a panel data set covering some 180,000 individuals over eight
years.
The reminder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, a model of the
insurer's decision to select risks is formulated, which subsequently permits to calcu-
late the nancial reward from this activity. After a description of the risk adjustment
schemes and the database in Section 2.3, the details of the empirical estimation are
explained in Section 2.4. Results are presented in Section 2.5. They indicate that
even a crude adjustment in the risk adjustment formula to take future HCE into
account serves to neutralize incentives for risk selection to a substantial extent also
over a longer planning horizon. The nal Section 2.6 is devoted to a summary and
conclusions.
2.2 Modeling Risk Selection
2.2.1 What Risks to Attract or Deter?
The objective of this section is to model a health insurer's decision to attract or deter
certain risk types. This decision is assumed to reect insurers' expected prots or
losses (E[i;j]) pertaining to customer (i), taking into account the risk adjustment
formula (j) applied by the regulator. To estimate this quantity, ve elements must
be considered; viz. (1) the expected fair community-rated premium (E[Pi;t;j]), (2)
expected health care expenditure (E[HCEi;t]), (3) the expected contribution to the
risk adjustment scheme (E[RAi;t;j]), a positive quantity for favorable risks, a negative
one for unfavorable ones, its value depending on the risk adjustment formula (j),1 and
(4) the probability of an individual dying (pdeathi;h ) or (5) switching to a competitor
1All formulas are constructed in a way to guarantee that the sum of contributions to risk adjustment
paid by low risks is exactly balanced out by the sum of subsidies paid out for high risks.
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(pswitchi;k ). This all boils down to Expression (2.1), with the interest rate r (set to 0.06
throughout this paper) used to discount future payments,
E[i;j] =
2004X
t=2000
(E[Pi;t;j]  E[HCEi;t] + E[RAi;t;j])
tY
h=2000
(1  pdeathi;h )
tY
k=2001
(1  pswitchi;k )
1
(1 + r)(t 2000)
: (2.1)
Loadings for administrative expenses are neglected, because they are part of
(E[Pi;t;j]) and (E[HCEi;t]) but do not enter (E[RAi;t;j]). Note that HCE does not
depend on the type of risk adjustment imposed, although insurers' incentives to
combat moral hazard (by launching product innovations) may well be weakened
by risk adjustment [Zweifel (2007)]. The assumed planning horizon comprises
the years 2000 (dened as `current') to 2004. Insurers' actual planning horizons
might be even longer; however, data availability dictates one of no more than ve
years. This should be sucient to at least approximate expected long-term prots.
Following the approach proposed by Van Barneveld et al. (2000), only `suciently
large' prots or losses are assumed to cause risk selection activities. Prots in
principle are `suciently large' if returns to risk selection exceed its total cost, which
not only comprises the expenses for product development, marketing, and actual
administration of the risk portfolio but also the loss of reputation if found out by
the media or the regulator. Clearly, information to estimate this quantity is not
publicly accessible. Therefore, it is simply assumed that expected prots from risk
selection must exceed CHF 1,000 (= $800 at 2006 exchange rates) per annum and
individual in present value to trigger selection activities. In a sensitivity analysis,
results changed surprisingly little when the threshold was lowered to CHF 400 and
increased to CHF 1,200 p.a. The impact of this ad hoc assumption is therefore limited.
According to Table 2.1, all customers are divided into four mutually exclusive
subsets. Group A contains all individuals with expected prots in excess of CHF
Risk Adjustment in Health Insurance and its Long-term Eectiveness 11
Table 2.1: Assumed Risk Selection Strategies, 1 CHF  0.8$.
Risk type Characterization Strategy
A Expected prot Attract
> 1,000 CHF p.a.
B Expected prot Passive
1,000 CHF p.a.
C Expected loss Passive
1,000 CHF p.a.
D Expected loss Deter
> 1,000 CHF p.a.
1000 p.a., while B has those with expected prots up to CHF 1,000 p.a. Conversely,
C contains all individuals with expected losses up to CHF 1,000 p.a. and D those
with losses beyond CHF 1,000 p.a. Therefore, A is the set of risks the insurer seeks
to attract, D contains the risks it wants to deter, while B and C are the risks that do
not call for any risk selection eort. It is important to note that risk selection does
not describe a `young-and-healthy-people-only' strategy under all circumstances. As
shown in Section 2.5.2, risk adjustment can turn elderly and even chronically ill
individuals into favorable risks.
2.2.2 Prots Due to Risk Selection
In order to assess the eectiveness of risk adjustment, the insurer's prots are cal-
culated under the assumption that it had successfully applied the selection strategy
described by Table 2.1. The ex-post or realized prots generated by individual i and
associated with risk adjustment scheme j are specied as follows,
i;j =
2004X
t=2000
(Pi;t;j  HCEi;t +RAi;t;j)
1
(1 + r)t 2000
1

(2.2)
with
t =
P
iHCEi;t=
P
imi;tP
iHCEi;2000=
P
mi;2000
:
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Here t is a deator and mi;t is the number of months individual i is enrolled during
a given year. Since t reects the general development of HCE since 2000, real prots
are dened in terms of the cost of health care. Transformation to real terms facilitates
the comparison of ex-post prots with ex-ante expectations. The latter [see Equation
(2.1)] are calculated in real terms for simplicity since risk classication is not aected
by general ination. Considering rst the strategy of deterring unfavorable risks, the
nancial benet attainable, , is dened as prots contributed by the remaining risk
types (i.e. A, B, and C) relative to their total (deated) premium revenue:
[deterD] =
P
ifA;B;Cg i;jP
ifA;B;Cg
P2004
t=2000 Pi;t;j(1=t)(1=(1 + r)
(t 2000))
: (2.3)
Note that while labels A, B, C denote those individuals the insurer expects to be
preferred or neutral risks (according to Table 2.1), Formula (2.3) calculates realized
prots from A, B and C-type customers. The same is true for Formula (2.4) below.
Realized gures serve to simulate the future prots associated with the choice of a
risk-deterring strategy in the year 2000.
The other strategy, attracting good risks, has to be dened dierently because
it is inconceivable that the population insured consist of subset A only. Rather, let
x > 1 be the factor by which the size of A is increased (for example by strategically
promoting high-deductible plans known in social health insurance in the Netherlands
or Switzerland to provoke self-selection by low risks). Then, realized nancial benet
is given by:
[attractA]
=
(x  1)
P
iA i;j
(x  1)
P
iA
P2004
t=2000 Pi;t;j(1=t)(1=(1 + r)
t 2000) +
P
i
P2004
t=2000 Pi;t;j(1=t)(1=(1 + r)
t 2000)
:
(2.4)
If, for example, an insurer is able to triple its share of preferred A-type
customers, its realized prots will increase by 2
P
iA i;j relative to a pre-
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mium volume that itself increases by the rst term in the denominator, i.e.
2
P
iA
P2004
t=2000 Pi;t;j (1=t)(1=(1 + r)
t 2000). The more eective the risk adjustment,
the smaller are these prots. As Beck and Zweifel (1998) point out, however, risk
selection is a risky business. Some customers who are expected to be protable will
in eect turn out to be unfavorable risks, while some who are deemed unfavorable
will in fact contribute to prots. As will be seen in Section 2.5.3, this uncertainty
increases when the risk adjustment formula is rened.
2.3 Policy Setting and Data
2.3.1 Risk Adjustment Schemes Considered
The prots of risk selection are assessed in four dierent scenarios. The RAi;t;j values
appearing in Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are calculated according to the four risk
adjustment schemes. They are retrospective rather than prospective, as in current
Swiss regulation.
(0) No risk adjustment
The rst scenario is a benchmark with no risk adjustment scheme in place.
(1) Demographic risk adjustment
Current Swiss risk adjustment uses 28 age and gender groups (26-30, 31-35 ... 91+),
as in Table 2.4. While these age groups are purely arbitrary, they are established in
the market. The possibility of optimizing them for risk adjustment will therefore not
be considered here. Also, payments are calculated regionally. To avoid small sample
problems in the top age groups of small cantons, this detail is neglected by treating
Switzerland as one region.
(2) Demographic risk adjustment augmented by prior hospitalization
This formula is part of a reform passed by Swiss parliament in 2007. Retaining cur-
14 Information Asymmetries and Incentives in Health Care Markets
rent age and gender groups, it includes a dummy variable indicating hospitalization
during the previous year. Empirical evidence presented by Beck (1998) and Holly
et al. (2003) shows HCE to be substantially higher for individuals with hospital
stays2 during the previous year. However, insurers might have an incentive to
encourage short-term hospitalizations with the mere aim of receiving payments from
the risk adjustment scheme. Therefore, only inpatient stays of three or more days
are considered to be a hospitalization. Note that it is not the cost of the inpatient
stay itself that is taken into account but the increased predicted HCE during the
year following the stay. Therefore any manipulation of this adjuster would pay o
only if this extra HCE were to exceed the cost of the hospitalization itself, which is
very unlikely in the case of long stays.
(3) Demographic risk adjustment augmented by prior hospitalization and PCGs
The nal alternative to be considered is to augment existing demographic risk
adjustment by both the indicator for prior hospitalization and Pharmaceutical Cost
Groups (PCGs). There are 13 PCGs which are similar to those developed by Lamers
and Van Vliet (2003). They were adapted to Swiss data by a team at CSS [Beck
et al. (2006)].
As with all patient classication systems, the issue of how to deal with patients
belonging to more than one class has to be addressed. Here, the sorting algorithm
used by Pope et al. (2000) is employed by rst calculating mean HCE by PCG
for the entire sample and assigning the PCG with the highest value rank one and
excluding its members from further calculations. Next, mean HCE is recalculated for
the reduced sample, assigning the PCG with the highest value rank two, and so on.
Finally, patients with more than one condition are assigned to the PCG with the
highest rank (Table 2.2).
2Inpatient stays related to maternity are excluded.
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Table 2.2: Ranking of Pharmaceutical Cost Groups in Terms of HCE.
Rank PCG Population share, Average excess HCE,
in percent in CHF per month
1 Renal disease, ESRD 0.06 3,484
2 HIV / AIDS 0.11 1,529
3 Transplantations 0.15 1,291
4 Malignancies 0.13 970
5 Diabetes, insulin-dependent 0.75 558
6 Morbus Parkinson 0.38 440
7 Epilepsy 0.89 280
8 Respiratory illness & Asthma 2.16 248
9 Morbus Crohn, Colitis ulcerosa 0.23 215
10 Diabetes, non insulin-dependent 2.4 180
11 Rheumatologic conditions 2.85 165
12 Acid peptic disease 0.59 142
13 Cardiac disease 3.96 114
0 None 85.33 -
1 CHF  0.8 US$
The predictive power of the four risk adjustment formulas is shown in Table 2.3.
The R2 values are high, mainly for two reasons. First, Swiss health insurers only pay
roughly one-half of inpatient HCE, in keeping with the Law of Health Insurance of
1994. One half of the bill is funded by cantonal governments, who heavily subsidize
public hospitals. Since very high HCE are almost always due to hospitalization,
outliers do not fully show in the data, causing goodness of t to increase. Second, the
marked increase in R2 from variant (2) to variant (3) can be explained by the fact
that little prediction is involved because the observations on PCGs pertain to the
same year as those on HCE. Table 2.3 also shows that even with PCG information
included, the regulator (who has to disregard prior HCE for maintaining health
insurers' incentive to control cost) cannot catch up with the health insurers, who
dispose of a good deal of additional information which can be used to increase R2 to
0.48 (see Section 2.4.2 for details).
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Table 2.3: The Four Risk Adjustment Formulas Compared.
Risk adjustment formula No. R2, Year: 2000
(0) None -
(1) Age, gender 0.11
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 0.21
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 0.30
Benchmark: Insurer's own model 0.48
2.3.2 The Data
The sample contains individual data from 182,529 adults (aged 26+) enrolled by
CSS, the leading sickness fund of Switzerland, during the full year of 1999 and not
enrolled in a Managed Care plan during the period of observation. For data quality
reasons, only residents of the French and Italian speaking parts of Switzerland are
included.3 Individuals were observed from 1997 to 2004, with 1997 to 1999 used for
prediction. The insurer is assumed to undertake its risk selection eort once and for
all at the beginning of the year 2000. The data from 2000 to 2004 serve for calculating
the present value of prots it would have made by pursuing the respective strategy.
2.4 Calculating the Components of Prots and Losses
To calculate expected prots from risk selection according to expression (1), all com-
ponents such as expected premiums, expected HCE, expected payments into and
from the risk adjustment fund as well as probabilities of death and of switching to a
competitor need to be determined. This section is devoted to these issues.
3Due to dierent billing modalities, detailed information on drug expenditure is of good quality
only in the French and Italian speaking parts of the country. Except for the Pharmaceutical Cost
Group variant of risk adjustment, the analysis presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 was repeated using
a larger sample containing 250,000 insured from all parts of the country. Results were very similar to
those presented here.
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2.4.1 Expected Premiums
In a competitive market with entry and exit, total premium revenue equals total ex-
pected cost, the latter made up of expected HCE plus a loading. Since the admissible
loading (of about 5 percent) is part of premium revenue as well as of cost, it does
not aect individual contributions to prot and is therefore neglected.4 Premiums
must be community-rated for all adults within the same fund, region, and cover-
age option (e.g. deductible level). Premium reductions for high-deductible plans are
possible, but - due to regulation - fall short of their risk-rated amounts. Contracts
with high deductibles are especially attractive to low risks, causing them to be an
eective means for risk selection. Perfect risk adjustment would neutralize these in-
centives; however, given imperfect adjustment formulas - and all formulas analyzed
in this study are imperfect - dierences in expected prots across deductible op-
tions remain. As a consequence, high-deductible plans cross-subsidize low-deductible
plans. Therefore consumers choosing high-deductible plans become preferred risks to
insurers.
In order to be able to use observed values, the insurer considered is assumed to have
predicted total HCE of the benchmark year 2000 with perfect precision. Moreover, to
simplify calculations, ination during the forecasting period 2001 - 2004 is neglected.
In fact, as long as ination aects all components of Equation (2.1) in the same way
(including payments to/from the risk adjustment scheme), real prots do not change.
Therefore, calculated premiums E[Pi;t;j] are constant over these 4 years.
2.4.2 Expected Health Care Expenditure
Predicted individual HCE is derived from prior experience, covering the years 1997
- 1999. The year 1999 was complete, while missing entries from 1997 to 1998 were
replaced by the average values pertaining to their demographic group. Insurers know
past individual HCE for existing enrollees. For new enrollees, they can predict HCE
4A detailed analysis of administrative expenses might show dierent loadings for dierent risk
groups; however, this goes beyond the scope of this study.
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using information from questionnaires that have to be lled by new applicants for
supplementary insurance (which is regulated dierently, by the Law on Insurance
Contracts). Only switchers having no more than compulsory coverage are not made to
declare their health status. Still, sales personnel obtains an (often visual) impression
of the customer's health. The choice of deductible for the compulsory part also helps
to predict HCE.
Future individual HCE is estimated in three steps. The rst is an OLS regression
with HCE in 2000 net of deductible and coinsurance as the dependent variable.
Despite the fact that about 30 percent of individuals did not consume health care
in excess of their deductible and the high skewness of positive HCE, untransformed
OLS estimation is the preferred method of estimation. In a comparison of alternative
models (e.g. a two-part logarithmic model with `smearing estimate' retransformation
[Duan et al. (1982)] and a GLM model with a log link and a gamma family [Manning
and Mullahy (2001)]), untransformed OLS was found to have the smallest mean
squared and smallest mean absolute prediction error. It performed particularly well
at predicting very high HCE, which is of crucial importance to the insurer. Similar
ndings have been reported by e.g. Pauly and Herring (1999), Holly et al. (2003),
and Ellis (2008). The explanatory variables are age classes interacted with gender,
deductibles as of year 2000, HCE in 1997, 1998, and 1999 (the latter split up in its
components, viz. physician's services, drugs dispensed by physicians, drugs dispensed
by pharmacies, inpatient care, home care, nursing home care, and other expenditure).
The regression results appear in Table 2.4, with its rst three columns showing
age and gender eects, while its last two columns contain the estimates pertaining
to the remaining regressors. Since the normality assumption does not hold in view
of skewness, distribution-free Tchebyche signicance levels are also reported.
Except for the constant which is negative, all coecients have the expected signs.
For women, HCE attains a maximum (ceteris paribus) in the 26-30 age group (due to
maternity), but rises consistently between age groups 41-45 and 86-90. Beyond age
90 (men 85) age coecients go down. Otherwise, men display a consistent increase
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Table 2.4: Individual HCE net of Deductible and Coinsurance, 2000.
Age groups Female Male Other Factors
Constant -354**
26 - 30 492** reference cat. HCE 97 0.109**
31 - 35 386** 28 HCE 98 0.080**
36 - 40 229* 102 Physician services 99 0.540**
41 - 45 181* 122 Drugs doctors 99 0.947**
46 - 50 227* 229* Drugs pharmacies 99 0.977**
51 - 55 321** 275** Inpatient care 99 0.347**
56 - 60 310** 424** Home care 99 0.936**
61 - 65 472** 592** Nursing home care 99 0.626**
66 - 70 643** 1,042** Other HCE 99 0.626**
71 - 75 1,108** 1,307** Deductible 230 589**
76 - 80 1,602** 1,725** Deductible 400 297**
81 - 85 2,156** 2,072** Deductible 600 86
86 - 90 2,886** 2,666** Deductible 1,200 79
91+ 2,580** 2,267** Deductible 1,500 reference cat.
R2 = 0.481, R2adj = 0.481, F(df=40) = 3,750**, n = 182,529, *p  0.05 , ** p  0.01,
Tchebyche
signicance level 10%
of HCE with age. In a second step, individual HCE in 2004 is predicted using the
1997-1999 values of explanatory variables (age as of 2004). Negative predicted values
(occurring among about 5 percent of insured) are replaced by zeroes. The third step
consists in interpolating between the predicted 2004 and the observed 1999 values,
in accordance with Equation (2.5). This procedure can be justied by noting that
observed HCE contains transitory components, while the predicted 2004 values are
purged of them. By smoothing HCE values prior to 2004 as well, interpolation serves
the accuracy of prediction. For the choice of the interpolation formula, a natural
assumption is that insurers increasingly discount the transitory component as time
goes by. Using exponential decay, the formula reads:
E[HCEi;t] = E[HCEi;2004]  (0:05)
t 1999E[HCEi;2004]  E[HCEi;1999] (2.5)
for t  f2000; 2001; :::; 2003g
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It amounts to moving average variant (MA) of Van Vliet (1992) and his implementa-
tion of the `regression to the mean hypothesis' by Welch (1985). All three variants (a
simple autoregressive (AR) model, an AR variance component model, and an ARMA
model) were tted to the residuals of a HCE regression using individual data of 33,987
Swiss insured from 1990 to 1997. The three specications yielded very similar AR
coecients, ranging between 0.491 and 0.521 [Beck (2004)]. These ndings support
the use of Formula (2.5).
2.4.3 Expected Payments from / to the Risk Adjustment Fund
The ex-post calculation of the dierent risk adjustment formulas is straightforward.
By way of contrast, modeling the insurer's expectations (E[RAi;t;j] in expression
(2.1)) raises a few issues. When applying the dierent risk adjustment schemes to
future years (20012004), age is known while gender and existing chronic illness can
be assumed to remain constant. Individuals who will develop chronic conditions are
aggregated with the low risks, assuming that they cannot be identied. By way of
contrast, knowing that about 12 percent of enrollees had at least one hospital stay
during the preceding year, the insurer associates by assumption the top 12 percent
in terms of total HCE with those that will have a hospital stay (relevant for risk
adjustment Schemes (2) and (3)).
2.4.4 Probability of Leaving the Insurer
As evidenced by Equation (2.1), two probabilities need to be distinguished here, the
probability of death, (pdeathi;h ) and the probability of switching to another insurer,
(pswitchi;k ). Estimating (p
death
i;h ) specically for this population turned out to be im-
possible because of the small number of deceased in the sample. Instead, life tables
provided by the Federal Statistical Oce were used, which are grouped by age and
gender. However, high HCE have been found to be strongly related to death by e.g.
Zweifel et al. (2004). The probability of death is therefore certainly underrated for
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high-cost individuals, since they are more likely than others to drop out of the sample
in the course of the forecasting period. This results in an overestimate of expected
HCE.
To estimate the probability of an insured switching to a competitor (pswitchi;k ), a
logistic regression model is used [Beck (2004)]. This probability is calculated each
year, applying the same, constant coecients [estimated by Beck (2004) on a dif-
ferent set of data]. The model comprises age, years of CSS membership, number of
supplementary insurance products, and premium relative to the market average as
explanatory variables. Age has a negative eect, accounting for the decreased mobil-
ity of older individuals. Duration of membership also has a negative eect because
loyal members tend to remain loyal. Insured with several supplementary insurance
products have more diculty switching because the open enrollment requirement
holds only for the compulsory component of coverage. Legally, it is possible to buy
compulsory and supplementary coverage from dierent insurers, but consumers are
afraid of insurers haggling over their obligation to pay, which easily results in delayed
reimbursement.5
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Risk Adjustment and the Distribution of Expected Individual
Prots
The choice of the risk adjustment scheme has a strong impact on the distribution
of predicted individual prots and losses. As prots are zero in a competitive mar-
ket, (1=n)
Pn
i=1E[i;j] is zero in all scenarios. Without risk adjustment (j = 0), the
distribution is heavily skewed to the right, and exhibiting a marked tail of very size-
able losses (Figure 2.1, tail cut at -20,000). With a risk adjustment scheme including
5Finally, a high CSS premium relative to the market average encourages consumers to switch. How-
ever, construction of this variable in the present context would have required modeling the premium
development of competitors (which in turn would depend also on payments into and from the risk
adjustment scheme). Therefore, this ratio is set equal to one to avoid this complication.
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prior hospitalization and PCGs (j = 3) the distribution of i;3 is almost symmetrically
centered at zero (Figure 2.2), with its median value equal to CHF 489, down from
CHF 5,985 with no risk adjustment. However, there is a heavy tail of very protable
consumers, who (in expectation) seem to be overpaid by the risk adjustment scheme.
Figure 2.1: Expected Individual Prots Without Risk Adjustment (0).
Figure 2.2: Expected Individual Prots With Risk Adjustment (3).
The objective of risk adjustment is to neutralize insurers' incentive for risk selec-
tion given that premiums are regulated not to reect true risk. It therefore should
aect the composition of the risk pool in terms of the subsets A through D distin-
guished in Section 2.2 above. Indeed, variant (3) causes the share of risks in subgroup
A (expected individual prot > CHF 1,000 p.a.) to drop from 56 percent (no risk
adjustment) to a minimum of 20 percent. Since the left tail is not thinned out com-
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pletely (compare Figures 2.1 and 2.2), the share of individuals in the unfavorable
group D decreases only slightly from 21 to 18 percent. Table 2.5 exhibits the full set
of estimates. However, as will be shown in the next section, risk adjustment causes
the composition of these groups to change completely.
Table 2.5: Eect of Risk Adjustment on the Size of the Four Subgroups A   D.a
Calculated population shares, in percent
Risk adjustment formula No. A B C D
(0) None 56 14 9 21
(1) Age, gender 40 27 14 18
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 26 34 23 17
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 20 35 27 18
aA: i;j >1,000; B: 0<i;j<1,000; C: 0>i;j> -1,000; D:< -1,000
2.5.2 Eect of Risk Adjustment on the Characteristics of Subgroups
Risk adjustment may have an important eect on the characteristics of the subgroups
making up the risk pool. This eect seems to have been largely neglected in the
literature. However, the political acceptance of a risk adjustment scheme strongly
depends on its distributional impacts. Since incomes are not known, the analysis of
this section is limited to age and two indicators of health status, viz. HCE prior to
risk adjustment and membership in one or more PCG.
Without risk adjustment (0), protable members (A) are pretty much the usual
suspects, viz. younger than average, low net HCE and rare PCG membership, in-
dicating absence of chronic illness (see Table 2.6). Unsurprisingly, demographic risk
adjustment (1) changes this picture strongly in terms of age, causing mean age in
subgroup A to increase from 46 to 62 years. Conversely, average age drops by as much
as 20 years in subgroups B and C while it still decreases by 11 years in subgroup
D. At the same time, HCE (net of cost sharing) more than doubles in subgroup A,
while membership in at least one PCG more than triples, reaching 11 percent (not
far below the overall share of 15 percent). This indicates that even mere demographic
risk adjustment can turn some chronically ill individuals into protable customers.
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However, the D subgroup continues to have by far the highest average HCE and share
of PCG members.
Table 2.6: Eect of Risk Adjustment (RA) on Characteristics of Subgroups.a
Risk Adjustment Mean age in HCE per month, Share of individuals
formula No. category, 2000 2000 in 1 PCG,
(CHF, prior to RA) 2000 (percent)
Overall mean: 54 Overall mean: 291 Overall mean: 15
A B C D A B C D A B C D
(0) None 46 59 64 67 77 211 320 910 3 16 27 40
(1) Age, gender 62 44 44 56 175 130 197 856 11 8 14 33
(2) Age, gender, prior 70 49 45 51 328 138 176 713 20 8 11 26
hospitalization
(3) Age, gender, prior 71 51 46 51 441 132 159 631 47 7 4 10
hospitalization, PCG
aA: i;j >1,000; B: 0<i;j<1,000; C: 0>i;j> - 1,000; D:< -1,000
When prior hospitalization is included in the Type (2) risk adjustment scheme,
characteristics of the subgroups change again. Average age in the A group even in-
creases to 70, exceeding the value implied by the demographic formula (1). Because
morbidity is higher among the elderly, they are more likely to get a morbidity related
subsidy, making them attractive risks to the insurer. The change in the composition
with regard to health status is even more striking. Average net HCE in the subgroup
A now is CHF 328, exceeding the overall mean of CHF 291 per month. Likewise, A
now contains 20 percent individuals who are in some PCG (overall mean, 15 percent).
Put the other way round, many ill people may now contribute to expected prot even
if their expected HCE is above average, while the very healthy are transformed into
average risks because they are loaded with payments to the risk adjustment scheme.
When PCGs are also included into the scheme (Type 3), average age remains
roughly the same in all subgroups. However, average net HCE in the A group in-
creases, while those of the unfavorable D group decrease once more, to CHF 631
per month (which is still more than twice the overall mean of CHF 291). The most
amazing change, however, is in PCG membership. The A subgroup now consists of
47 percent chronically ill.
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In sum, this analysis oers important insights into the workings of risk adjustment
Schemes (2) and (3). By collecting transfers from healthy people, they transform them
(on average) from very favorable into medium risks from the insurer's point of view.
The high risks on the other hand come with a subsidy, making some of them very
protable. These prots indicate an overpayment by the risk adjustment scheme,
which can be explained as follows. While the subsidy equalizes average expected
contributions across risk groups, a majority of individuals has HCE below group
average because the distribution of HCE is skewed to the right even within a risk
group, with a long tail towards high values.
Before turning to the nancial benets attainable by risk selection, two points
should be mentioned. First, a morbidity-based risk adjustment makes it more dicult
to recognize risks. With no or only demographic risk adjustment, it is sucient
for insurers to gather information about prior utilization and personal well being,
whereas with Schemes of Type (3), they will have to establish precisely those chronic
conditions that yield the highest contributions - a far more complex task. The second
point concerns risk selection through quality of services covered. As pointed out by
e.g. Newhouse (1982) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000), insurers may try to stave o
unfavorable risks by e.g. incorporating lower quality care for the chronically ill (always
on the premise of community rating combined with imperfect risk adjustment). This
form of selection hurts some of the weakest. Moreover, it is dicult to contain because
service quality cannot easily be regulated [Marchand et al. (2004)]. The authors cited
agree in their expectation that morbidity-related risk adjustment of the Types (2)
and (3) is a suitable tool to prevent this type of selection. The present analysis
supports this notion by showing that Scheme (3) causes the most favorable risk
group to contain a large number of chronically ill individuals, who are eschewed by
insurers who oer them benets of lower quality. Conversely, insurers with a small
market share (and therefore little inuence on mean HCE) may benet by attracting
the chronically ill through special programs. In the Netherlands, where morbidity
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indicators are included in the risk adjustment scheme, an insurer in fact developed
a disease management program for diabetes patients [Van de Ven et al. (2007)].
2.5.3 Estimating the Financial Incentive for Risk Selection
In this section, we derive an estimate of the nancial gains from risk selection by
calculating ex-post prots associated with the strategies described. According to
Equation (2.2), these prots are a function of the risk adjustment Schemes (0) to
(3). The nancial advantage due to risk selection is expressed as the ability to oer a
lower premium, which almost certainly leads to a favorable market position in view of
strong price competition. From the moment an insured in our sample dies or switches
to another insurer, her cash ow drops to zero, as in real life. All gures are in prices
of 2000.
Table 2.7: Premium Reduction Thanks to Deterring D-rated Risks, in Percent of
Average Premium.
Risk adjustment formula No. Possible premium reduction
(0) None 46
(1) Age, gender 32
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 19
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 16
First, the strategy of deterring expectedly unfavorable risks (D) is evaluated. An
insurer capable of getting rid of all expectedly unfavorable risks (D) could reduce its
average premium level by as much as 46 percent on expectation when there is no
risk adjustment at all (see Table 2.7). Introducing age and gender as risk adjusters
already serves to reduce the potential for premium reductions by one third. The most
elaborate variant (3) achieves a reduction of two thirds, to 16 percent.
The other strategy is to attract risks that are expected to be favorable (A). Let x
denote the factor by which the number of A-rated customers is increased, the number
of risks in all other subgroups held constant. If x goes to innity, the risk portfolio
consists to over 99 percent of A-rated customers. Because many Swiss insurers are
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rather small, 4x6 are considered realistic values. Without risk adjustment, this
strategy on expectation permits a lowering of the premium level by 48 percent (x=6,
in Table 2.8). Demographic adjustment (1) reduces this gure to 38 percent. However,
it takes Schemes (2) and (3) involving prior hospitalization and PCGs to largely
reduce the nancial gains associated with `chasing the good risks'.
The entries of Tables 2.7 and 2.8 indicate that even in the long-run, `regression to
the mean' does not equalize risk proles. Without risk adjustment, both deterring
unfavorable and attracting favorable risks are highly protable strategies. However,
adding the crude morbidity indicator `prior hospitalization' works surprisingly well
to neutralize these gains. A possible explanation is the fact that hospitalization is a
good proxy for HCE in earlier years, which are used for prediction by the insurers.6
It is well known that risk adjustment schemes work best if they predict cost to the
same degree as insurers themselves.
Table 2.8: Premium Reduction Thanks to Attracting A-rated Risks, in Percent of
Average Premium.a
Risk adjustment x = 2 x = 4 x = 6 x = 8
(0) None 23 41 48 66
(1) Age, gender 17 32 38 57
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 7 15 19 31
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 6 14 18 34
ax: Intensity of risk selection (x=2!number of A-rated risks is doubled)
The contribution of PCGs on the other hand is somewhat disappointing, raising
doubts whether the administrative expense for establishing them is worthwhile. How-
ever, Table 2.6 shows that the risk adjustment formula (3) including PCGs excels
in directing subsidies specically to individuals with consistently high HCE. The in-
centive to skimp on the quality of care for the chronically ill is certainly the weakest
with this formula.
As shown in Table 2.9, misclassication is likely to occur, its extent clearly de-
pending on the risk adjustment scheme implemented. For example, the fraction of
6We thank Erik Schokkaert for pointing this out.
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individuals rated A who ex-post generated losses is 7 percent without risk adjustment
but 25 percent with risk adjustment (3). In other words, with risk adjustment (3)
in place, as many as one-fourth of all seemingly very attractive customers were mis-
classied. For the D-rated customers, the frequency of misclassication is quite high
for all risk adjustment schemes. This likely reects the fact that  due to the lack of
diagnostic information  predictions were based on total prior cost, failing to distin-
guish between acute and chronic illnesses. Again, false classications occurred more
frequently with a morbidity-based risk adjustment scheme in place. These results
conrm our previous claim (Section 2.5.2) that a morbidity-based risk adjustment
scheme makes it more dicult to distinguish between protable and unprotable
risks. In the absence of risk adjustment, unprotable risks are simply all customers
with above-average HCE, for example all chronically ill individuals. By subsidizing
some conditions leading to high HCE, morbidity-based risk adjustment changes this,
turning some of the high risks into very protable customers (see Table 2.6). In sum,
morbidity-based risk adjustment requires a much more careful screening of individual
risk proles and health conditions by insurers seeking to pick protable risks.
Table 2.9: Frequency of Misclassication.
Risk adjustment formula No. Percentage of A-rated Percentage of D-rated
customers who ex post customers who ex post
turn out to generate losses turn out to generate gains
(0) None 7 24
(1) Age, gender 15 28
(2) Age, gender, 23 35
prior hospitalization
(3) Age, gender, 25 38
prior hospitalization, PCG
2.5.4 Variation of the Planning Horizon
As stated in the Introduction, it is reasonable to assume that insurers plan over a pe-
riod of several years. In order to assess the importance of this consideration, Equations
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(2.1) to (2.4) were recalculated assuming planning horizons of 4, 3, 2, and 1 year.7
The calculation of these models is straightforward. In expressions (1)  (4), the sum-
mation stops at the pertinent year prior to 2004. To estimate expected HCE, Formula
(2.5) is applied replacing E[HCEi;2004] by E[HCEi;t], with t  2000; 2001; :::; 2003.
Table 2.10: Size of Subgroups A and D with Dierent Planning Horizons.
Risk adjustment Percentage A-rated Percentage D-rated
formula No. 1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
(0) None 70 68 56 18 18 21
(1) Age, gender 52 49 40 19 19 18
(2) Age, gender, 44 39 26 18 18 17
prior hospitalization
(3) Age, gender, 40 34 20 18 18 18
prior hospitalization, PCG
With a shorter planning horizon, a considerably higher share of individuals were
classied as very protable A-types (see Table 2.10). For example, with a 1-year
planning horizon and risk adjustment (3), 40 percent of customers would have been
classied as A as opposed to 20 percent with a 5-year planning horizon. This is
likely due to the `regression to the mean' specication of the forecasting model. For
instance, let an elderly lady have small observed HCE in 1999. Then, her forecast
HCE for 2000 would be quite low as well according to Equation (2.5). Over the years,
however, predicted values approach the high (conditional) mean HCE of a person of
her type. The other components of Equation (2.1) being largely independent of the
planning horizon, her rating might well drop from A in the 1-year analysis to a B or
C in the longer term.
At the other end, however, the number of D-rated customers does not vary much
with the planning horizon (see Table 2.10). In fact, those who had high HCE in 1999
are mostly predicted to have high HCE in all subsequent years. This is especially true
for those with high drug or long-term care expenditure, which point to chronic illness
(see Table 2.4). Indeed, the entries of Table 2.4 suggest the existence of a basically
7We thank Mathias Kifmann, our discussant at the 19th annual meeting of the Health Economics
Working Party within the Verein für Socialpolitik, and an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Table 2.11: Frequency of Misclassication, Dierent Planning Horizons.
Percentage of A-rated Percentage of D-rated
customers who ex post customers who ex post
turn out to generate losses turn out to generate gains
Risk adjustment formula No. 1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
(0) None 10 11 7 33 31 24
(1) Age, gender 10 15 15 33 31 28
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 13 21 23 43 40 35
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, 15 21 25 45 41 38
PCG
healthy type (with a low autoregressive element in HCE) and a chronic type (with
a high element). This dierence has implications for the risk of misclassication as a
function of the planning horizon (see Table 2.11).
Table 2.12: Premium Reductions Thanks to Risk Selection, Dierent Planning Hori-
zons (Percent of Average Premium).
Risk adjustment Gains from attracting A, x= 4 Gains from deterring D
formula No. 1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
(0) None 37 35 41 45 40 46
(1) Age, gender 35 31 32 38 33 32
(2) Age, gender, 18 17 15 19 19 19
prior hospitalization
(3) Age, gender, 18 17 14 17 17 16
prior hospitalization, PCG
Considering A-rated customers rst, their low autoregressive element in HCE
causes predictability to decrease with length of planning horizon in principle [see
rows (1) through (3)]. The countervailing eect is regression to the conditional mean,
which may make for more accuracy of prediction if the insurer selects risk based on
observable characteristics unfettered by risk adjustment [see row (0)]. Turning to
D-rated individuals, their high HCE is the consequence of a whole host of causes,
resulting in a low degree of predictability and hence high frequency of misclassica-
tion. However, this group comprises an important share of chronically ill with their
marked element of autoregression in HCE. This may explain why the risk of misclas-
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sication, while high compared to A-rated customers, decreases with length of the
time horizon.
Finally, Table 2.12 displays the prots associated with risk selection as function of
the planning horizon. Starting with the strategy of attracting A-rated risks, the gains
tend to increase, which accords with the nding that the frequency of misclassication
decreases in the absence of risk adjustment [row (0) of Tables 2.11 and 2.12]. By way
of contrast, renements of the risk adjustment formula cause gains not only to be
lower but to decrease with the planning horizon [rows (1)(3), again in keeping with
Table 2.12]. In the case of D-rated customers, gains have a similar pattern [row (0) of
Table 2.12], likely reecting the tendency for predictability of HCE to improve [row
(0) of Table 2.11]. Again, these gains are reduced strongly by renements of the risk
adjustment formula.
Reading Table 2.12 vertically column by column, one sees that the gains from
attracting A-rated or deterring D-rated customers can be reduced by at least one-
half by the more rened risk adjustment formulas (2) and (3). Therefore, the relative
eectiveness of the risk adjustment formulas neither hinges on the insurer's choice of
planning horizon nor on the length of its planning horizon.
2.6 Conclusions
There is a broad consensus that given managed competition with community-rated
premiums, risk adjustment becomes a necessary regulation of health insurance mar-
kets. However, while a purely demographic risk adjustment formula has been recog-
nized as being insucient, its precise specication has remained controversial. Most
of the empirical literature describes and tests for the relationship between a set of
morbidity indicators and HCE of 1 year. This short time horizon is in accordance
with the fact that managed competition usually allows for annual open enrollment.
However, insurers have a strong interest in long-term customers in view of consid-
erable acquisition cost. Moreover, consumers likely would think twice before signing
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up with an insurer whose planning horizon is as short as 1 year. Given a longer term
perspective, insurers' strategies are inuenced by two empirical facts, viz. decreasing
precision of forecasts and regression to the (conditional) mean. The rst fact causes
the risk of misclassication to increase with a longer planning horizon. However, to
the extent that the regression is to the conditional rather than the grand mean of
HCE, the second fact may serve to increase the payos to risk selection when the
planning horizon is extended.
In this research, the eectiveness of risk adjustment schemes is assessed in the
light of these considerations. Purely demographic risk adjustment already increases
the likelihood of misclassication but does not suciently neutralize the longer term,
systematic dierences in HCE to decisively mitigate the incentives for risk selection.
For this, it takes a more rened formula that includes prior hospitalization and pos-
sibly Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs) as risk adjusters.
Gains from risk selection are estimated based on predicted HCE net of copayments,
premiums, and risk adjustment payments, discounted to present value and weighted
by the probabilities of death and of switching to a competitor to obtain expected
values. These calculations are performed for four dierent risk adjustment schemes,
viz. (0) no risk adjustment, (1) demographic risk adjustment, (2) demographic risk
adjustment, with prior hospitalization added as a simple morbidity indicator, and
(3) PCGs complementing Scheme (2).
For a sample of some 180,000 Swiss individuals, expected net present values con-
ditioned on the risk adjustment scheme were calculated. However, these values must
exceed the variable cost associated with risk selection eort in order to trigger action
on the part of the insurer. Since this cost is unknown, an arbitrary but not unrealistic
value of CHF 1000 p.a. ($ 800 as of 2007) serves as a threshold. Thus, the insurer is
assumed to be indierent with regard to risks whose contributions to expected prot
fall within this interval.
The risk adjustment schemes distinguished modify incentives for risk selection
according to expectations. The better they reect morbidity, the smaller the share of
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the insured population that constitutes favorable and unfavorable risks, respectively.
Adjustment using only age and sex (Type 1) causes the share of favorable risks to
drop from 56 to 40 percent, the share of unfavorable ones, from 21 to 18 percent.
With schemes of Type (2) and (3), the gures for the favorable risks drop to 26 and
20, and for the unfavorable risks, to 17 and 18 percent, respectively. It also should
be noted that the characteristics of the subgroups change dramatically with type of
risk adjustment. Average age of favorable customers increases from 46 (Type 0) to 71
years (Type 3), while the share of those belonging to one or more PCGs (an indicator
of chronic illness) increases from 3 to 47 percent.
The success of risk selection eorts is reected by the insurer's ability to lower
premiums and hence gain market share. In the absence of risk adjustment, deterring
all unprotable risks is estimated to result in a 46 percent premium reduction over
5 years. This longer term competitive advantage is reduced to 16 percent under
Type (3) risk adjustment, which takes into account both prior hospitalization and
membership in a PCG. Interestingly, this gure is in the same range as the premium
reductions that may be oered for participation in a managed care alternative, which
constitutes a product innovation.
Thus, it may be argued that Type (3) risk adjustment is eective enough to
redirect insurers' eorts from risk selection to product innovation. In addition, the
risk of misclassication is a mere 7 percent for an insurer `chasing the good risks' as
long as there is no risk adjustment but increases to 25 percent under Scheme (3).
Rened risk adjustment therefore becomes even more eective than indicated by the
expected contribution to prot because it exposes insurers to increased uncertainty.
In conclusion, this research suggests that risk adjustment can be designed in
a way as to be eective enough in the longer term to redirect insurers' eorts
away from risk selection in favor of product innovation while using easily available
information such as prior hospitalization and membership in pharmaceutical cost
groups.
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Chapter 3
Supply-side and Demand-side Cost
Sharing in Deregulated Social Health
Insurance: Which Is More Eective?
3.1 Introduction
One of the main goals of health care nancing systems is to promote ecient lev-
els and types of care [Ellis and McGuire (1993)]. If patients are fully insured and
providers are paid fee-for-service, they desire larger than optimal quantities of health
care services, connoted `moral hazard'. Zeckhauser (1970) and Zweifel and Manning
(2000) have analyzed how demand-side cost sharing (in the guise of deductibles or
co-payments) can be used as a corrective. However, demand-side cost sharing exposes
consumers to nancial risk, contradicting the very objective of insurance. Unless lim-
ited by a stop-loss, it also makes benecial procedures unaordable to some patients
[Nyman (1999)]. In addition, it might be considered unfair towards the chronically
ill.
These considerations have created interest in the alternative of supply-side cost
sharing (in the guise of capitation or prospective payment). Because of their informa-
tion advantage, providers of medical care can inuence the demand for their services
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to a greater extent than other professionals [Arrow (1963)]. Moreover, providers are
less vulnerable to risk than patients because they can pool treatment cases. However,
supply-side cost sharing might also promote a reduction in quality or the denial of
benecial but costly services, a phenomenon commonly termed stinting [Newhouse
(2002)].
Both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been empirically examined in
terms of their eectiveness. The novelty of this paper is that it directly compares the
expenditure eects of demand-side and supply-side cost sharing (and combinations
thereof), using contract variants oered by the same health insurer. This has the
advantage that many side conditions (underwriting policy, billing procedure) are
kept constant. Moreover, the paper complements Lehmann and Zweifel (2004), who
construct a proxy for unobserved health status from prior health care expenditure
(HCE), by the two-stage residual inclusion estimator [2SRI, Terza et al. (2008)]. In
this way, self-selection eects are more fully controlled for. Finally, it extends the
set of instruments inuencing choice of plan but not HCE by including the premium
for the baseline contract, the potential premium reduction for a restricted plan, the
individual's credit record, and years of membership with the same fund. For the
capitated plan, an additional instrument is a dummy indicating whether or not an
independent practice association (IPA) was operative in the individual's county of
residence.
The data comes from Switzerland, a country where consumers have annual free
choice of plan with no employer involvement. The chronically ill are not precluded
from switching due to open enrollment. Low-income individuals (about 30 percent of
the population) are eligible for premium subsidies. Receiving the subsidy, they are less
likely to chose high-deductible plans, because a reduction in the income transfer to the
sick state is particularly disadvantageous if the income eect on medical consumption
is strong [Nyman (1999)]. On the other hand, managed-care type plans that are too
restrictive compared to premium charged will not be chosen.
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains an
overview of the empirical literature. The policy setting is described in Section 3.3,
while Section 3.4 is devoted to a description of the data base. In Section 3.5, we
explain the econometric methods used to separate moral hazard from self-selection
eects and to deal with the very skewed distribution of the HCE data. The estimation
results are presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 discusses policy implications in view
of related literature, while the nal Section 3.8 contains a summary and conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
In order to keep this review concise, we focus on empirical papers that measure moral
hazard in health insurance. When individuals have a choice of plan, self-selection ef-
fects need to be accounted for because those who expect high future HCE are more
likely to opt for more comprehensive insurance. A small number of researchers have
avoided this selection problem by beneting from randomized experiments [the fa-
mous RAND study; Manning et al. (1987)] or natural experiments [Chiappori et al.
(1998), Eichner (1998), or Winkelmann (2004)]. Other papers have used econometric
techniques to address endogenous plan choice. Many econometric approaches require
for identication the availability of at least one variable that inuences contract choice
but not utilization (an `identifying instrument'). Pertinent studies from Switzerland
are Schellhorn (2001), Gern and Schellhorn (2006) and Gardiol et al. (2006). The
former two rely on premium level and supplementary hospital insurance as identi-
fying instruments, while the latter uses death as an indicator of morbidity which is
unaected by insurance. Using Australian data, Cameron et al. (1988) advocate in-
come as determinant of insurance coverage but not utilization. In the United States,
employers play a strong role in determining the individual's choice of plan, mak-
ing their characteristics potential identifying instruments. For example, Dowd et al.
(1991) and Cardon and Hendel (2001) exploit the fact that dierent employers of-
fer dierent premiums and copayment levels, while Deb and Trivedi (2009) use the
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employer's type (public or private), the size of the rm, and whether or not it oers
both HMO and non-HMO options.
Turning to estimation techniques, one notices that instrumental variable estima-
tors are rarely applied to non-linear frameworks with health data. An early exception
is Dowd et al. (1991), who estimate a Tobit model with a correction for selectivity
[Lee (1978)]. In addition, Deb and Trivedi (2009) and Deb et al. (2006) specify a
fully parametric model of both choice and utilization equations, which is jointly es-
timated by maximum simulated likelihood. However, these approaches depend upon
restrictive distributional assumptions. As HCE data is very skewed and the distri-
bution of the `tail' is dicult to specify correctly, Terza et al. (2008) advocate the
two-stage residual inclusion estimator. It yields consistent estimates in a wide range
of non-linear specications.
Studies that have addressed endogeneity in non-linear panel data models are even
more rare. Exemptions include Vella and Verbeek (1998) and Vella and Verbeek
(1999), who propose a decomposition of the reduced form residuals into a part that
drives the endogeneity and a random part. However, their approach requires strict
distributional assumptions and is computationally intensive so it might not be ap-
plicable to very large data sets.
An alternate approach of exploiting the information of panel data was pioneered
by Wolfe and Godderies (1991). It uses HCE from prior years to proxy unobserved
dierences between individuals which become predetermined in the year when the
comparison between plans is performed [Lehmann and Zweifel (2004), Van Kleef et al.
(2008)]. In this paper, a combination of the IV and the `health proxy' approach will
be applied.
3.3 Swiss Health Insurance
Swiss health insurance is of the `managed competition' type (see Kreier and Zweifel
(2010) for a comprehensive description). Coverage is mandatory for a rather compre-
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hensive `basic' basket of medical services and pharmaceuticals, written by some 80
private, not-for-prot insurers competing in a regulated market. Free consumer choice
of plan is a distinctive feature of the system. There is no pre-selection of plans by em-
ployers or government agencies. Insurers are obliged to accept all applicants during
annual open enrollment periods. Premium subsidies for low-income individuals are
funded out of general tax. Premiums can be dierentiated by area of residence but
not by health risk. Reductions are possible for young adults (19-25) and individuals
who receive accident coverage through the employer.
In the baseline contract, insured individuals enjoy unlimited access to all licensed
physicians and most hospitals in their region of residence. They face a minimum an-
nual deductible of CHF 300 (some EUR 200 as of 2006) and a copayment rate of 10
percent up to a cap of CHF 700 (EUR 470) per year. Physicians in independent prac-
tice are reimbursed fee-for-service (FFS) according to an administered fee schedule
that is collectively bargained between the providers' and the insurers' associations.
Hospitals receive per diems for patients treated (the nation-wide introduction of a
DRG system is scheduled for 2012). The cantons1 nance hospital investment and
one-half of operational cost. While this system is generally found to ensure access
to comprehensive health care to all citizens, it is criticized for high and rapidly in-
creasing HCE, lack of co-ordination between providers, and lack of information about
quality and eciency [OECD (2006)].
In response to these problems, insurers have been granted the right to oer
managed-care type options (since 1994) and higher deductibles (since 1996) in return
for lower premiums. However, policy makers feared that these options would attract
low risks. In addition to a risk adjustment scheme based on age and sex, they imposed
limits on possible premium reductions. For voluntary deductibles, these are xed per-
centages of the base premium or 80 percent of the additional nancial risk taken by
the consumer (deductible minus 300), whichever is less. The eligible deductible levels
are also regulated, as shown in Table 3.1. In managed-care type contracts, the insurer
1Switzerland is divided into 26 cantons, with population ranging from 1,307,600 (Zurich) to 15,500
(Appenzell i.R.), Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oce, www.bfs.admin.ch.
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must prove that the reduction is justied by eciency gains rather than self-selection
eects. Furthermore, it must not exceed 20 percent during the rst ve years since
the launch of the contract. The same deductible levels apply to managed-care type
and FFS plans.
Table 3.1: Regulation of Deductibles and Maximum Premium Reductions, 2006.
Deductible level in CHF / year 300 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Max reduction in percent of the base premium - 5 15 30 38 43
Max absolute reduction: 0.8 * (Deductible   300) - 160 560 960 1,360 1,760
CHF 1  EUR 0.66.
3.4 Data
The data base consists of individual records of more than 160,000 Swiss adults in-
sured by CSS, a major Swiss insurer, and covering the years 2003 - 2006. It includes
age, gender, residential location, contract choice, and HCE. Individuals who were
not observed over the entire four years are excluded from the analysis, with death
constituting the main cause. While the deathbound are known to cause a consider-
able amount of HCE, they exhibit an idiosyncratic pattern of health care utilization
[see Werblow et al. (2007)], justifying separate analysis. The inuence of closeness
to death also calls for exclusion of individuals who died during 2007, resulting in a
panel comprising some 160,000 individuals.
The supply-side cost sharing variant analyzed here is an IPA. Similar to the
United States, participating physicians (mainly general practitioners) are paid a risk-
adjusted capitation payment designed to cover all services rendered or prescribed up
to a threshold of CHF 10,000 per patient and year. Beyond that limit, the insurer
reimburses 90 percent of cost, as calculated according to the FFS alternative. Capi-
tation payments are adjusted for age, gender, deductible level, hospitalization during
previous year, nursing home stay during previous year, and 21 pharmaceutical cost
groups. The pharmaceutical cost groups are similar to those used in the Dutch risk
adjustment scheme [Lamers and Van Vliet (2003)]. While the insurer does not impose
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guidelines or utilization reviews, many networks run them internally, combined with
quality monitoring by independent auditors in some cases.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics according to contract choice as of 2006. For
simplicity, deductibles are grouped into three categories (minimum: 300, medium:
500, high:  1,000 CHF per annum). More than 70 percent of those who chose
a deductible in excess of CHF 500 opted for the CHF 1,500 level. The other high
deductible levels were only chosen by a small number of individuals each, so including
them separately would have resulted in unstable estimates. Furthermore, observed
HCE across the high deductible levels appeared to be similar.2
According to Panel A of Table 3.2, buyers of the high-deductible FFS plans are
younger and more likely to be male than those with a minimum deductible. Their
mean HCE amounts to CHF 1,057 or 23 percent of the CHF 4,610 pertaining to
individuals with the minimum deductible. Also, their fraction of reporting positive
HCE is 57 rather than 88 percent. If only those with positive HCE are taken into
account, the mean is CHF 1,804 or 34 percent of the minimum-deductible benchmark
of CHF 5,230, respectively. These dierences point to sizeable eects of demand-side
cost sharing (which still need to be corrected for self-selection eects, see below).
Turning to the supply-side cost sharing alternative (Panel B of Table 3.2), one
notices that the HCE values for the IPA plans are lower throughout than for the
conventional FFS plans with the same deductible level. In the minimum deductible
group, average age is similar in the IPA and in the FFS plan. However, the high-
deductible IPA variant is again characterized by a comparatively low mean age and
2For patients with high deductibles, it is questionable how well their HCE are observed. In earlier
work [e.g. Lehmann and Zweifel (2004)], only individuals with the minimum deductible were ana-
lyzed on the grounds that patients have no incentive to submit their claims unless HCE exceeds the
deductible. However, with the advent of electronic billing systems, the lion's share of billings are now
transmitted directly from providers to insurers, who then charge the deductible to the patient. In
some cantons, physicians even decided to abandon direct-to-consumer billings completely. CSS con-
ducted an internal study relating the share of direct-to-consumer billing to HCE below the deductible.
Contrary to expectations, the billing mode interacted with the deductible level had no inuence on
the probability of reporting positive HCE. It also had no signicant impact on explaining positive
HCE. It appears that many individuals submit their bills regardless of their deductible, maybe to
decrease the administrative burden in case of an illness. In the dataset, 24 percent of individuals with
positive HCE had HCE below their deductible.
44 Information Asymmetries and Incentives in Health Care Markets
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics According to Type of Contract, 2006.
Contract N Age Male HCE Share with HCE
HCE > 0 if >0
A. FFS plans
Minimum DED (baseline) 84,053 55 0.4 4,610 0.88 5,230
(18) (0.49) (8,961) (0.33) (9,378)
Medium DED 31,573 54 0.43 3,229 0.81 3,908
(16) (0.49) (6,962) (0.38) (7,522)
High DED 38,386 45 0.54 1,057 0.57 1,804
(13) (0.5) (3,593) (0.49) (4,580)
B. IPA plans
Minimum DED 4,942 54 0.44 2,933 0.85 3,427
(17) (0.5) (5,999) (0.35) (6,355)
Medium DED 1,134 49 0.45 1,686 0.78 2,121
(15) (0.45) (3,654) (0.41) (3,999)
High DED 3,598 43 0.56 834 0.58 1,415
(12) (0.56) (3,431) (0.49) (4,368)
Standard deviations in parentheses, N = 163,686, DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practice
Association, CHF 1 EUR 0.66.
a higher share of men. Average HCE is CHF 834 or 18 percent of the minimum-
deductible, FFS benchmark of CHF 4,610. The share of individuals with positive
HCE is 58 percent rather than 88 percent, while mean HCE conditional on being
positive amounts to CHF 1,415 or 27 percent of the CHF 5,230 benchmark.
In order to get a preliminary indication of the extent to which the cost dierences
may be caused by self-selection eects, it is instructive to compare the HCE of con-
sumers who switch to higher deductibles and IPA plans with the HCE of those who
do not (see Table 3.3). The switchers from a minimum-deductible FFS plan in 2005
to a high-deductible one in 2006 had caused HCE of CHF 826, a mere 19 percent of
the non-switchers. Those changing to a medium-deductible alternative had caused
HCE amounting to CHF 1,916 in 2005, or 44 percent of the non-switchers. Switchers
who moved from a FFS to an IPA plan had HCE amounting to CHF 1,597, or 49
percent of the stayers. These gures point to substantial self-selection eects in both
demand-side and supply-side cost sharing.
Supply-side and Demand-side Cost Sharing in Deregulated Social Health Insurance45
Table 3.3: Prior-year Mean HCE of Switchers and Non-switchers
Switch at the start 2006 FFS, Minimum DED FFS, Minimum DED FFS (all DED)
HCE in 2005 to Medium DED to High DED to Capitated IPA
Non-Switchers 4,315 4,315 3,230
Switchers 1,916 826 1,597
DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practice Association, FFS = Fee-For-Service. CHF 1 EUR 0.66.
3.5 Econometric Model
3.5.1 Developing a Proxy for Unobserved Health Status, 2003 - 2005
The dataset does not contain direct information on health status such as diagnostic
codes, restrictions on activities of daily living, or self-reported health. However, panel
data allows to develop an indicator of health status from prior HCE [see Van Kleef
et al. (2008), Lehmann and Zweifel (2004), Wolfe and Godderies (1991)]. In particular,
Lehmann and Zweifel show how residuals from a random-eects Tobit regression of
prior HCE on exogenous variables can serve as a proxy for unobserved health.
However, in view of considerable heteroscedasticity in the dataset, the two-part
model is preferable over the Tobit. The rst part is a random-eects probit model
predicting the probability of observing positive HCE for individual i in year t [see
Equation (3.1)]. The second part estimates the amount of HCE given that it is
positive. The log transformation serves to reduce the skewness of the dependent
variable. The present panel is unbalanced, as many individuals had positive HCE in
some but not in all years. A Wooldridge test of serial correlation in the error term
[Wooldridge (2002)] rejected the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Therefore,
the feasible generalized least squares procedure proposed for unbalanced panels by
Baltagi and Wu (1999) is applied to gain eciency while avoiding biased estimation
of standard errors. The model for deriving the health status proxy thus reads (all
error terms assumed normally distributed),
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Pr(HCEi;t > 0) = (a+ Xi;t + i + i;t) (3.1)
log(HCEi;tjHCEi;t > 0) = b+ Xi;t + i + i;t (3.2)
with i;t =   i;t 1 + i;t
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are estimated on the rst three years of the dataset, i.e.
2003 to 2005. Explanatory variables are age, age interacted with gender, urbanization,
area of residence, and a year dummy to account for ination. Estimation results are
shown in Table 3.10 of the appendix. Deviations from the expected value of HCE are
averaged over the three years in order to reduce the inuence of transitory health
shocks.3
3.5.2 Endogeneity of Contract Choice, 2006
Even if the proxy derived from Equations (3.1) and (3.2) controls for unobserved
dierences in current health status, there are additional unmeasured variables
that may cause someone opting for the minimum deductible to have a great deal
of HCE, resulting in an overestimation of moral hazard eects. Examples are
private information about probabilities of future illness, general attitude towards
medical care, and previous experience with the health care system. Ignoring these
confounders will lead to omitted variable bias in the HCE equation. Terza et al.
(2008) show that the residuals from an equation modeling contract choice are
good estimators of these confounders. Therefore, these residuals are included in
the HCE equation alongside observed contract choice and the proxy for latent
health (two-stage residual inclusion estimation, 2SRI). The 2SRI method also yields
consistent estimates if the HCE equation is nonlinear. However, it requires equations
3Note that while only individuals with the baseline contract are included here, estimated coe-
cients will be used to predict individual HCE for the whole sample. This has the advantage that the
endogeneity of contract choice does not bias estimators. In order to test robustness, we also calculated
the proxy including all individuals, with little eect on results.
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for contract choice to be specied.
For identication, at least one explanatory variable in the contract choice equation
must not appear in the HCE equation. Five such variables are available.
1. Baseline premium:4 A high baseline premium increases the attractiveness of
higher-deductible and IPA options. At the same time, there is little reason
why premiums should inuence health care consumption. The income eect of
premiums is limited in the Swiss case because low-income individuals (some
30 percent of the population) are eligible for a premium subsidy. Moreover,
preliminary estimations showed that premiums do not inuence HCE when
other factors are controlled for.5
2. Absolute premium reductions for a higher-deductible or an IPA option: While
premium reductions make these contract options more attractive, they should
not inuence health care consumption for the same reasons as described in item
no. 1 above. They were also found to be insignicant in an estimation of HCE.
3. Number of years of CSS membership:6 Long-standing members are known not
to switch contracts, making them less likely to opt for a higher-deductible or an
IPA option. However, loyalty is negatively correlated with health status because
consumers who develop chronic conditions face a premium hike if they sign up
with another insurer for the supplementary component (which they usually
prefer to have from the same insurer to avoid ambiguity as to responsibility for
payment). Nevertheless, preliminary estimations showed it to be insignicant in
the HCE equation when entered in combination with the health status proxy.
It therefore qualies as an identifying restriction.
4Although we use data from only one insurer, premiums dier between regions. In addition, young
persons and individuals who have accident coverage through their employer are eligible for premium
reductions.
5Premium levels were also used as identifying instruments in Schellhorn (2001).
6This variable is truncated at 1999 because retrieving data from earlier years is cumbersome. There
was a change in IT architecture in 1998.
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4. Dummy indicating a bad credit record: This may reect lower income, which is
relevant for contract choice because high deductibles are unattractive to risk-
averse low-income individuals. At the same time, a bad credit record proved
unrelated to HCE once the proxy for health status was included.
5. IPA ocially on oer within the individual's area of residence: The availability
of an IPA importantly favors the choice of the corresponding option. However,
it proved to be unrelated to utilization provided regional dierences were con-
trolled for by dummies.
Modeling the choice of deductible calls for an ordered probit model, while for the
choice of the IPA a probit model is sucient. For the probit, the generalized residuals
were derived by Gourieroux et al. (1987). Let hi be an indicator variable equal to
one if the IPA plan was chosen and zero otherwise, zi a vector of covariates, and ^ a
vector of the estimated coecients. Then, the generalized residuals u^i are given by
u^i = hi 
(z0i^)
(z0i^)
+ [1  hi] 
 (z0i^)
1  (z0i^)
=
[hi   (z
0
i^)](z
0
i^)
[1  (z0i^)](z
0
i^)
; (3.3)
where  denotes the cumulative and , the standard normal density respectively. In
the same spirit, the generalized residuals for multinomial or ordered choice models
have been dened by Vella (1993). Let there be i = 1:::N individuals choosing from
k = 1:::K ordered alternatives, and let dik denote an indicator function taking the
value 1 if individual i has chosen alternative k and zero otherwise. Then, generalized
residuals v^i are given by
v^i = 
K
k=1dik
^ik[dik   ^ik]
[1  ^ik]^ik
(3.4)
with ^ik denoting the estimated cumulative probability that individual i chooses
the k-th alternative and ^ik, the estimated value of the density at that point. These
two quantities are determined as follows. Let ^ be the vector of estimated coecients
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from the ordered probit and ^k, the estimated cut points with ^0 =  1 and ^K =1.
Then,
^ik = (^k 1   z
0
i^)  (^k   z
0
i^) and ^ik = (^k 1   z
0
i^)  (^k   z
0
i^): (3.5)
3.5.3 Specication of the Two-part Model, 2006
The distribution of HCE has a cumulation point at zero. Among the alternatives
available for dealing with this fact, the two-part model is preferred over e.g. the
Tobit model for two reasons. First, the zeroes are perceived as reecting choices
rather than missing values [see Jones (2000)]. Second, both supply- and demand-side
cost sharing are known to aect the decision to use health care at all dierently from
the decision how much care to use.
The rst part of the two-part model is often specied as a probit and estimated by
maximum likelihood. However, with the inclusion of the residuals from the contract
choice equations, its errors are non-normally distributed, causing maximum likeli-
hood to be inconsistent.7 To avoid this problem, a GLM estimation with a probit
link is applied to the HCE data of 2006. This method is consistent as long as E(ljx) =
(x), with l denoting an indicator that equals one if HCE > 0 and zero otherwise.
Normal distribution of the error terms is not required [Cameron and Trivedi (2005)].8
The specication of the second part (HCEjHCE > 0) has been discussed by
Manning (1998) and Manning and Mullahy (2001) (MM hereafter). Because of the
positive skewness of the dependent variable, raw-scale estimates can be imprecise
even in large datasets. The log transformation is often used to mitigate skewness,
with coecients interpreted as (semi-) elasticities of the mean response. However,
Manning (1998) shows that if the error variance is heteroscedastic in a way that is
7The generalized residuals are non-linear transformations of normally distributed variables. These
are not normally distributed. Then, the errors from the two-part model are linear combinations of
several normally distributed variables and one non-normally distributed variable. This combination
is not normally distributed.
8There is no contradiction to Terza et al. (2008), who suggested estimation by non-linear least
squares. Although it goes by a dierent name, GLM is an iteratively reweighted nonlinear least
squares estimator [Hardin and Hilbe (2007)].
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correlated with the covariates, these coecients are no longer consistent elasticity
estimates. Moreover, a retransformation of predicted values is required as soon as
absolute rather than relative savings due to cost sharing are of interest.
Blough et al. (1999), MM and others suggest estimating ln(E[yjx; y > 0]) directly
by a GLM procedure with a log link (i.e. ln(E[yjx; y > 0]) = x) and an appropri-
ate variance function. As MM point out, the GLM estimates are consistent as long
as the mean function is correctly specied, but might lead to imprecise estimates if
the residuals are positively skewed even after transformation to log. Following the
procedure for model selection suggested by MM, we start with a consistent GLM
procedure, the gamma regression. The kurtosis of the 2006 residuals on the log scale
is 3.53. This creates a tradeo between imprecision (GLM) and possible bias (OLS
applied to ln(y)). In this work, GLM is used because taking heteroscedasticity into
account is deemed more important than precision. Given GLM, a Park test is per-
formed to select the variance function. The estimated  is 1.81, which is closest to
the gamma specication.
The residuals from the contract choice equations are estimates rather than obser-
vations. Not accounting for this in the outcome estimation could lead to downward
biased estimates of the standard errors [Heckman (1976)]. Therefore, the standard
errors were obtained by bootstrapping.9
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Eects of Demand-side and Supply-side Cost Sharing
The results for the rst part of the two-part model estimated on HCE data for 2006
are shown in the rst three columns of Table 3.4. The rst column pertains to the full
model. The second column excludes the residuals from the contract choice equation.
The third column corresponds to a naive specication that also excludes the proxy for
9The estimation was repeated 400 times after resampling with replacement (clustered by patient).
In our specic application, the bootstrapped standard errors turned out to be similar to those obtained
in the original estimation.
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health status. For the variables of interest (DED, IPA), marginal eects are calculated
for a representative individual (in italics below the coecients), i.e. a woman at the
age of 52, living in a suburban community in the Zurich region, having the baseline
contract plus accident coverage, and a supplement covering alternative medicine. The
health proxy is taken at its sample average. This individual's estimated probability
of positive HCE is roughly 91 percent. For interaction terms, marginal eects are
calculated according to the formulas provided by Norton et al. (2004).10
Voluntary deductibles are found to progressively reduce the probability of pos-
itive HCE; however, their incentive eect shrinks to 0.7 percentage points for the
medium and 3.7 points for the high deductible category, respectively, according to
the full specication. Quite generally, estimated values are about two to seven times
smaller in the full and restricted than in the naive specication, pointing to consid-
erable self-selection eects based on health status. On the other hand, they cannot
be said to depend on the type of plan (DED * IPA insignicant except in the naive
specication). By way of contrast, membership in an IPA may be associated with a
higher probability of positive HCE (signicant only in the restricted model), possibly
reecting preventive services oered. For example, one large IPA hands out vouchers
for free immunizations against the u in the fall.
Two groups of variables of Table 3.4 are worth a comment. First, supplementary
hospital coverage (mainly for a private room) is associated with a higher probability
of using medical services even after controlling for possible risk-selection eects. The
same is true of supplementary coverage of therapies belonging to the category of
alternative medicine. Second, the squared and the cubic form of the health proxy are
highly signicant as well. The impact of past, time-invariant health status on current
expenditure thus does not appear to be linear over the whole distribution of HCE.
10To be specic, let a and b be the coecients of two dummies, ab the coecient of their
interaction and x0 the inuence of all other variables at representative values. The marginal eect of
the interaction term is (a+b+ab+x0) (a+x0) (b+x0)+(x0). For a dummy without
interaction, the marginal eect is (a + x0)   (x0). As these marginal eects are combinations
of all coecients, their standard errors are calculated by the delta method. The calculations are run
in STATA using the nlcom command.
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results from the Two-part Model, 2006.
P(HCE>0), GLM with probit link HCEjHCE>0, GLM with log link
Full Restricted Naive Full Restricted Naive
Auent community 0.039 0.041 0.056** 0.023 0.025 0.044
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Regional center -0.052** -0.052** -0.036* -0.092** -0.090** -0.084**
(0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Suppl. hospital 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.155*** 0.030* 0.028 0.072***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Suppl. altern. med. 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.085*** -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.063***
(0.01) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Health proxy 0.473*** 0.469*** 0.523*** 0.521***
(0.01) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
(Health proxy)2 -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.085*** -0.085***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
(Health proxy)3 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
v^i DED 0.059 -0.332
(0.145) (0.254)
u^i IPA -0.046*** -0.006
(0.013) (0.019)
Medium DED -0.042** -0.079*** -0.265*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.260***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
ME -0.007** -0.013*** -0.055***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Medium DED * IPA 0.084 0.083 0.122* 0.013 -0.001 0.053
(0.066) (0.061) (0.054) (0.071) (0.078) (0.075)
ME 0.012 0.013 0.025**
(0.008)** (0.008) (0.011)
High DED -0.207*** -0.295*** -0.869*** -0.182*** -0.191*** -0.837***
(0.026) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
ME -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.241***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
High DED * IPA 0.043 0.043 0.126*** 0.066 0.054 0.188***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.071) (0.059) (0.057)
ME 0.011 0.014* 0.034***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)**
IPA 0.072 0.086** -0.066** -0.118* -0.189*** -0.418***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.025) (0.059) (0.035) (0.033)
ME 0.011 0.012*** -0.012*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
AIC 0.676 0.676 0.885 18.088 18.088 18.365
N 163,686 163,686 163,686 128,744 128,744 128,744
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practice Association, Standard
errors in parentheses, ME = Estimated marginal eects. Additional regressors are age, gender, additional
types of municipalities, region specic dummies, regulation on drug dispensing, accident coverage, long term
care coverage, and youth rebate eligibility.
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In the second part of the model, the amount of positive HCE is estimated (last
three columns of Table 3.4). Higher voluntary deductibles are again found to pro-
gressively reduce HCE in the full and the restricted specications, with `true' savings
due to incentive eects amounting to 7 percent (medium deductible) and about 18
percent (high deductible category), respectively. This time, the full and restricted
models point to eects that are about four times smaller than according to the naive
model. Type of contract does not play a role (DED * IPA insignicant except in the
naive specication). Turning to supply-side cost sharing in the guise of an IPA, one
notices a reduction of HCE amounting to 12 percent (full model) and 19 percent
(restricted model) respectively, less than one-half of the 42 percent suggested by the
naive specication.
3.6.2 Estimating Moral Hazard and Risk-Selection Eects
For policy, cost savings in Swiss Francs (CHF) rather than in percent are of interest.
Unlike relative savings, these strongly depend on the expenditure level of the sub-
population who chooses the respective contract. The results are displayed in Table
3.5. For estimate (1), expected HCE according to type of contract is estimated by
predicting the probability of positive HCE times the amount of HCE. For instance,
individuals with the baseline contract had expected HCE of CHF 4,320 (the reference
value), while those with a high deductible combined with the IPA option had CHF
1,100 only. These values are derived from the full specications displayed in Table
3.4, which control for both health-related and other determinants of contract choice.
Note that the value of CHF 1,100 is the estimated average expenditure of the
individuals who actually chose the high-deductible contract. In order to estimate
the expenditure of the same subpopulation assuming they had chosen the baseline
contract, the dummies for deductibles (and IPA plans, respectively) are set to zero
when predicting expected HCE. The results are shown as estimate (2) of Table 3.5.
Since both estimates (1) and (2) pertain to the same subpopulation of individuals,
their dierence represents the inuence of moral hazard.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Cost Reductions in Swiss Francs, 2006.
\HCE according to subpopulations:
Actual choice Simulated Moral Risk
of contract baseline contract hazard selection
(1) (2) (2)   (1) (see text)
A. FFS plans
Minimum DED (baseline) 4,320
(29)
Medium DED 3,180 3,430 250 891
(37) (34)
High DED 1,100 1,422 322 2,898
( 23) (57)
B. IPA plans
Minimum DED 2,985 3,340 355 980
(99) (133)
Medium DED 2,023 2,374 351 1,946
(159) (124)
High DED 843 1,111 268 3,209
(55) (78)
Standard errors in parentheses, DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practice Association.
For instance, the eects of demand-side cost sharing can be deduced from estimate
(2) for the high-deductibles subpopulation in Panel A of Table 3.5. This is the same
subpopulation that gives rise to estimate (1), with determinants of contract choice
held constant. The only dierence is that their predicted HCE is derived by setting
the DED dummy equal to zero. Since treating physicians were confronted with the
same incentives, the dierence of CHF 322 ( = 1,422   1,100) in all likelihood is
caused by the dierence in demand-side incentives.
This estimate can now be compared to the eect of supply-side incentives. In
Panel B of Table 3.5, estimate (1) for the subpopulation in the minimum-deductible
category amounts to CHF 2,985, while estimate (2) amounts to CHF 3,340. Again,
both estimates refer to the same subpopulation, except that the IPA dummy is set
to zero in estimates (2). Since determinants of contract choice are controlled for and
the same minimum deductible is applied to the subpopulation, the dierence of CHF
355 (= 3,340   2,985) can be attributed to the dierence in supply-side incentives.
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When comparing the entries of Panels A and B of Table 3.5, one is led to conclude
that the eects of supply-side and demand-side cost sharing have about the same
magnitude. However, both types of moral hazard mitigation come at the price of
considerable risk-selection eects. They can be estimated as follows. In Panel A of
Table 3.5, the high-deductible subpopulation has an estimated HCE of 1,100, while
the subpopulation with the baseline (minimum-deductible) contract has CHF 4,320.
With the determinants of contract choice not held constant this time, the dierence
of CHF 3,220 is caused by both moral-hazard and risk-selection eects. Mitigation
of demand-side moral hazard has been estimated at CHF 322 above; therefore, the
remainder of CHF 2,898 (3,220   322) needs to be attributed to risk selection. Turn-
ing to supply-side cost sharing in Panel B of Table 3.5, the high-deductible IPA
subpopulation is seen to have estimated HCE of CHF 843, even CHF 3,477 below
the benchmark value of CHF 4,320. However, only CHF 268 of this dierence can
be traced to an attenuation of moral hazard, leaving CHF 3,209 (3,477   268) as
the likely eect of risk selection. A comparison of the entries of Panels A and B of
Table 3.5 reveals that supply-side cost sharing in combination with demand-side cost
sharing seems to go along with even more marked risk-selection selection eects than
demand-side cost sharing combined with FFS.
Overall, the estimates of Table 3.5 point to a conict of interest. If the objective
is simply to reduce HCE, high-deductible plans, preferably combined with the IPA
option, fare best. If however the objective is to achieve a favorable balance between
moral hazard reduction and risk-selection eects, the minimum-deductible IPA op-
tion ranks rst, with a ratio of 355/980, or 1 : 2.76, followed by the medium-deductible
FFS alternative with 250/891 or 1 : 3.56. These ratios are of interest to policy makers
or regulators who wish to introduce voluntary cost-sharing plans in order to mitigate
moral hazard, but at the same time wish to avoid risk-selection eects that lead to
market segmentation and hence high premiums for high risks. If the risk-selection
problem is regarded as severe, plans with low ratios of moral hazard reduction versus
risk selection are preferable.
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3.6.3 Tests of Validity
Two types of validity tests are performed in this section. A rst set contains mod-
ications of the two-part model in terms of observation period, estimation of the
health status proxy, and economic specication. The second type of test focuses on
individuals who switched away from the minimum-deductible plans between 2003
and 2006.
In the two columns (A) of Table 3.6, results are shown for a pooled GLM estimation
over the years 2004 - 2006 rather than just 2006 (standard errors are clustered by
patient). In an attempt to measure variations in health status over time, the proxy
now is calculated per year using data from the respective previous year. Comparison
with the lower part of Table 3.4 shows the estimated incentive eects to be stronger.
For instance, the coecient pertaining to the medium deductible category is -0.137
here, but only -0.042 in Table 3.4. The likely reason is that the incidence of chronic
illness and hence risk selection eects are controlled for to a lesser degree because
only one year of data is used for the calculation of the health proxy in test A.
Columns B of Table 3.6 show the results of pooled estimations over the years 2005
and 2006 only. Here, the health proxy was calculated over two rather than the three
previous years prior to averaging. Again, the estimated moral hazard eects tend to
exceed the ones of the original model, presumably because the two-year proxy is less
eective in controlling for chronic illness than the three-year proxy.
Columns C of Table 3.6 address the fact that prior HCE is inuenced by incentives.
As a consequence, a proxy based on prior HCE may make individuals with high
deductibles or managed-care type plans appear healthier than they are. To gauge the
extent of this potential bias, we recalculated the health proxy by augmenting the
observed HCE of individuals in both types of cost-sharing plans, using the estimated
coecients of the incentive eects (lower part of Table 3.4, full model). As expected,
the resulting moral hazard eects are stronger than in Table 3.4, but not dramatically
so.
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Table 3.6: Specication Tests.a
P(HCE>0), GLM with probit link HCEjHCE>0, GLM with log link FE
Test A B C A B C D
Data for 2PM 2004-06 2005-06 2006 2004-06 2005-06 2006 2004-06
Medium DED -0.137*** -0.097*** -0.058*** -0.117*** -0.074*** -0.091*** -0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Med. DED * IPA 0.055 0.080 0.093 -0.037 -0.047 0.020 -0.154*
(0.043) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.081) (0.079) (0.071)
High DED -0.441*** -0.329*** -0.233*** -0.265*** -0.185*** -0.218*** -0.149***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.033) (0.017)
High DED * IPA 0.093*** 0.070* 0.062 -0.041 -0.077 0.090 -0.091
(0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.049)
IPA -0.100*** -0.061* 0.053 -0.284*** -0.201*** -0.145* -0.108*
(0.022) (0.029) (0.044) (0.048) (0.060) (0.059) (0.043)
N 475,107 325,442 163,686 372,091 256,166 128,744 372,091
a See text for explanation of test A through D. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, Standard errors in
parentheses. Additional regressors are the same as those in Table 3.4.
Finally, a xed eects specication was used for the second part of the two-part
model (column D of Table 3.4). The dependent variable here is the log of HCE
over the years 2004 - 2006. For the high-deductible plan and the IPA, the estimated
incentive eects are close to those in Table 3.4. For the medium deductible, the direct
incentive eect is weaker and insignicant, but the interaction term with the IPA is
stronger.
Still another possibility to test the validity of the results presented in Section 3.6.2
is to track the HCE of individuals who switch between contract types. To an approx-
imation, their personal characteristics are unchanged while contractual incentives
are modied.11 Therefore, it is of interest to compare the dierence in HCE prior
and after the change, covering the years 2003/04, 2004/05, and 2005/06 with the
moral hazard eects displayed in Table 3.5. For simplicity, only switches away from
the baseline (minimum-deductible, FFS) contract are retained (see Table 3.7). The
change in HCE turns out to be symmetrically distributed, permitting estimation of
an untransformed linear random eects model. Attribution of annual HCE to con-
tracts hardly causes problems because switches usually take place at the beginning
11This statement is only approximately true because the determinants of contract choice must have
changed.
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of the year. In order to be able to use several years of data, the health proxy is
calculated using the respective previous year only rather than averaging over three
years.
Table 3.7: Analysis of Switchers, 2003/04, 2004/05, 2005/06.
Switch from baseline contract Numbers of Random eects
switchers coecient SE
A. FFS plans
... to medium DED 2,139 -212.99 (130.06)
... to high DED 13,503 -387.99*** (53.27)
B. IPA plans
... to minimum DED 1,905 -260.27 (111.07)
... to medium DED 88 -189.23 (454.35)
... to high DED 805 -219.12 (161.17)
*p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses. Additional
regressors are the same as those in Table 3.4.
For the switchers from the baseline to a medium-deductible FFS contract, the
estimated HCE reduction amounted to CHF 213, which is similar to the CHF 250
of Table 3.5 (Panel A), indicating the attenuation of moral hazard relative to the
baseline contract. However, the standard error is large due to the small number of
switchers in combination with substantial year-to-year variations in HCE. The switch
from the baseline to a high-deductible contract is estimated to be associated with a
reduction in HCE amounting to CHF 388, which is again comparable to the gure
from Table 3.5 (CHF 322). This group contains over 13,000 individuals, resulting in
a lower standard error and statistical signicance.
In the case of supply-side cost sharing, switches from the baseline FFS contract to
an IPA option are associated with estimated cost reductions that are again compatible
with those evidenced in Table 3.5. As to the one apparent exception in Table 3.4
(transition to the medium-deductible, IPA contract), the number of switchers is too
low to permit statistical inference.
The evidence compiled in this section comes from two sources. The rst consists
of several modications in the estimation of the two-part model. The second source
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is the analysis of changes in HCE that go along with switching contracts. On the
whole, none of the validity tests performed suggests that the eects of supply-side
and demand-side cost sharing presented in Table 3.5 are a mere chance result.
3.6.4 Which Types of Medical Care Are Most Aected by Cost Shar-
ing?
The encouraging outcome of the validity tests presented in Section 3.6.3 motivates a
more detailed analysis of the eects of demand-side and supply-side cost sharing. The
estimation technique described in Section 3.5 (with the specication in keeping with
the full model of Table 3.4) is applied to general practitioners' services, specialists,
drugs, physical therapy, outpatient hospital services, and inpatient hospital services.
Therefore, the estimated coecients reported in Table 3.8 reect incentive eects of
the two types of cost sharing, with selection eects controlled for (coecients of the
control variables are not shown). For each cost-sharing option, the rst line pertains to
the rst part of the two-part model and second line to the second part, respectively.
The interaction terms of deductibles and IPA plans are not shown for brevity. In
line with the four-part model advocated by Duan et al. (1982), the probability of
observing positive hospital inpatient expenditure is estimated only for the individuals
with positive ambulatory care expenditure.
As reported in Table 3.8, demand-side cost sharing in the guise of a medium
deductible signicantly reduces the probability of expenditures on GP services, drugs,
and hospital outpatient services. For specialized medicine, a signicantly positive
inuence is estimated, which contradicts intuition. As to HCE given that it is positive,
there are consistent indications of a reduction eect, which however attains statistical
signicance in the case of GP services and drugs only.
A high deductible does go along with a decreased probability of all types of care.
Moreover, its estimated reduction eect consistently exceeds that of a medium de-
ductible. The impact on hospital inpatient care is surprising as most patients already
have HCE in excess of the deductible when entering a hospital. However, patients
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Table 3.8: Estimation Results from the Two-part Model According to Type of Care.
GP Specialist Drugs Physical Hospital Hospital
Therapy Outpatient Inpatient
Med. DED P(HCE>0) -0.034*** 0.024* -0.076*** 0.004 -0.019* -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
HCEjHCE>0 -0.048*** -0.018 -0.090*** -0.026 -0.045 -0.045
(0.008) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026)
High DED P(HCE>0) -0.270*** -0.143*** -0.340*** -0.107*** -0.092*** -0.039**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015)
HCEjHCE>0 -0.154*** -0.087*** -0.137*** 0.004 0.039 -0.050
(0.011) (0.018) (0.038) (0.021) (0.039) (0.036)
IPA P(HCE>0) 0.088*** 0.103** 0.087* -0.049** -0.058*** -0.066**
(0.016) (0.032) (0.037) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022)
HCEjHCE>0 -0.084*** -0.153*** -0.156** -0.058* -0.088 -0.116*
(0.016) (0.023) (0.053) (0.029) (0.046) (0.046)
AIC: P(HCE>0) 1.042 1.109 0.822 0.820 1.061 0.614
HCEjHCE>0 14.41 15.31 15.233 15.254 16.043 19.751
N: P(HCE>0) 163,686 163,686 163,686 163,686 163,686 128,744
HCEjHCE>0 101,265 86,208 112,941 28,241 46,923 17,205
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Additional regressors are the same as those
in Table 3.4.
with high deductibles are less likely to initiate the whole process of diagnostic testing
and procedures which ultimately may result in hospitalization [Zweifel (1992) found
similar results using German data]. Given positive HCE, there is clear evidence of
moral hazard attenuation for GP services, specialist services, and drugs which again
exceeds the amount found for the medium deductible.
Turning to supply-side cost sharing, IPA plans exhibit an increased probability of
use of GP services, specialist services, and drugs but a decreased probability in the
case of physical therapy and hospital services, as expected for the latter. As to the
second part of the two-part model, the IPA options are associated with a reduction
of expenditure on all types of HCE, with the only exception of hospital outpatient
services. As fees of specialists and hospitals are regulated to be equal for FFS and
IPA contracts, these eects are exclusively due to a reduction in quantity.12
12In order to validate our results, we reestimated the second part of the two-part model by OLS on
log expenditure. The estimates are close and equal in sign to those in Table 3.8. The only exception is
the coecient for hospital outpatient services, which is signicantly negative in the OLS estimation.
It is not a priori clear which estimate is more plausible for this heterogenous patient group. Some
patients are chronically ill and in need of repeated procedures (suggesting no eect), while others visit
the emergency room for relatively minor ailments (where deductibles might well be eective).
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Summing up, the evidence of Table 3.8 suggests that supply-side and demand-side
cost sharing are eective in dierent ways. On the demand side, high deductibles
primarily seem to lower the likelihood of seeing a GP or a specialist and of using
drugs. They also markedly reduce expenditure on GP services, but have no eect
on hospital inpatient expenditure. By way of contrast, supply-side cost sharing in
the guise of IPA plans is even associated with an increased probability of calling on
services of GPs and specialists and of using drugs, presumably due to increased use
of preventive care. Its expenditure-reducing eect is concentrated on specialists and
inpatient hospital services.
These ndings can be compared to the famous RAND Health Insurance Experi-
ment (Manning et al. (1987)). The demand-side cost sharing plans in the HIE required
the patient to pay a percentage of care out of pocket, up to a stop-loss. In line with
the results in Table 3.8, these plans reduced the probability of incurring any medical
expenses, the amount of outpatient expenses, and the probability of inpatient ex-
penses. They did not signicantly alter the expenditure for inpatient services.13 The
HMO plan in the HIE was a prepaid group practice. Compared to a FFS plan with
no demand-side cost sharing, the HMO plan had a markedly lower hospitalization
rate. The eects on hospitalizations are stronger than those measured by this study,
which is likely due to stronger nancial incentives in the HMO analyzed by RAND,
than the IPA analyzed here.
3.7 Discussion
The aim of this section is to discuss the policy implications of our results, relating
them to recent literature. A rst salient point is that the estimated absolute cost
reduction of CHF 250 (see Panel A of Table 3.5) due to a deductible of CHF 500
rather than 300 exceeds the maximum increase in out-of-pocket expenditure (CHF
13The HIE also included a deductible plan. However, this plan is not directly comparable to the
Swiss case because it only applied to outpatient services. It reduced outpatient expenditure and the
probability of medical care, but not the probability or amount of inpatient care.
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200 = 500   300). This is conrmed by two other recent studies using Swiss data
from earlier years when the minimum deductible was CHF 230 and the next lowest,
CHF 400. They both seek to control for risk selection eects. Van Kleef et al. (2008)
estimate that raising the deductible from CHF 230 to 400 (i.e. by CHF 170) would
serve to reduce expected HCE by CHF 382 (see Table 3.9). Gardiol et al. (2005)
take the maximum deductible of CHF 1,500 as their reference point, calculating the
incentive eects from there. The transition from the medium deductible of CHF 400
to the minimum of CHF 230 is estimated to generate `true' savings of CHF 185 (=
697   512), which again exceeds the out-of-pocket dierence of CHF 170. A possible
explanation of this `overshooting' is that patients, who are usually not well informed
about the cost of medical care, do not know when they exceed the deductible.
Table 3.9: Estimated Incentive Eects of Demand-side Cost Sharing on HCE, in CHF.
Deductible levels 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
Eects reported by Van Kleef et al. (2008) -3 -382 -443 -276 -318
Eects reported by Gardiol et al. (2005) +697 +512 +306 +62 0
Deductible levels 300 500 1,000 to 2,500
Eects reported by this study -250 -322
CHF 1 EUR 0.66
The second point relates to risk adjustment (RA). Note from Table 3.5 that es-
timated moral hazard reductions not only fall far short of gross dierences in ex-
pected HCE as indicated by estimates (1) but are markedly plan-specic. As noted
by Van Kleef et al. (2008) and Van Kleef et al. (2006), this varying mix of risk-
selection and moral hazard eects poses a great challenge to regulators in a system
combining community rating with RA. The issue is the extent to which insurers
should be allowed to pass on gross savings to consumers. The appropriate amount
seems to be the amount of `true' savings net of risk-selection eects. Yet, Van Kleef
et al. (2006) show that if only very low risks opt for higher deductibles at rst,
premium reductions reecting `true' savings are too small to create incentives for
choosing these options.14 As a remedy, they propose not to entirely net out risk-
14This reects the Swiss experience after the introduction of voluntary deductibles in 1996.
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selection eects for determining allowable premium reductions. Empirical evidence
by Van Kleef et al. (2008) reveals that the current RA schemes of the Netherlands
and Switzerland do leave room for risk-selection eects in premium reductions. Their
nding is replicated by this study since the maximum allowable premium reductions
for high deductibles range between CHF 560 and 1,760 (see Table 3.1), exceeding by
far the CHF 322 and 268, respectively that can be attributed to the attenuation of
moral hazard (see Table 3.5).
3.8 Conclusions
Managed competition in social health insurance aims at creating incentives for in-
surers to increase eciency and respond to consumer preferences while preserving
solidarity between high- and low-risk types [Van de Ven et al. (2007)]. Therefore, it
is important to know whether contractual innovations such as deductibles or capi-
tated IPA plans achieve `true' cost savings rather than merely serving as a means
for risk selection. This research measures and compares the impacts of demand-side
cost sharing (through voluntary deductibles) and supply-side cost sharing (through
prepaid IPA plans) on individual health care expenditure (HCE), controlling for
risk-selection eects. The data comes from a large panel of Swiss adults covering the
years 2003 to 2006. Since unobserved health status inuences both contract choice
and HCE, a proxy is constructed from HCE during the rst three years of the obser-
vation period, complemented by the residuals from the contract choice equation [the
two-stage residual inclusion method proposed by Terza et al. (2008)].
Higher annual deductibles and IPA plans are both found to achieve marked re-
ductions of moral hazard. An increase in the annual deductible by CHF 200 (some
EUR 133, from minimum to medium) is estimated to decrease the probability of
positive HCE by almost 1 percentage point, while the IPA alternative might even
be associated with an increase. In return, it achieves a reduction of positive HCE by
some 12 percent, compared to only 7 percent of the medium deductible. Increasing
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the deductible by CHF 700 (some EUR 466) reduces the probability of reporting
HCE by about 3.7 percent and the amount of positive HCE by about 18 percent.
However, this eectiveness of demand-side cost sharing comes at the price of sub-
stantial risk-selection eects. Because voluntary cost sharing plans are especially at-
tractive to low risks, such plans might lead to market segmentation and hence higher
premiums for high risks. The most favorable ratio of moral hazard attenuation over
risk selection is achieved by the IPA with the minimum deductible, amounting to 1
: 2.76 (CHF 355 / 980; HCE amounts to CHF 4,610 for the baseline contract). The
next-best alternative is the medium-deductible FFS contract with a ratio of 1 : 3.56
(CHF 250 / 891). According to this criterion, supply-side cost sharing is somewhat
more eective than the demand-side alternative.
Still, this research is subject to several limitations. First, since the data set only
comprises individuals who were with one and the same insurer from 2003 to 2006,
it fails to measure risk-selection eects associated with changes between competing
insurers. Second, even `within' risk-selection eects may not be controlled for per-
fectly. There is no guarantee that the HCE equation is correctly specied for the
three preceding years, a necessary condition for obtaining residuals that serve as
good proxies for unobserved health. The same caveat applies to the residuals of the
contract choice equations. Thus, estimates of expected HCE reductions achieved by
higher deductibles and IPA plans could still be biased. Third, deductible options
have price and income eects. As shown by Nyman (1999), only the former should
be counted as inecient consumption. Finally, results relating to IPA plans have
limited generality as long as they cannot be linked in detail to the incentives faced
by participating health care providers.
Nevertheless, the ndings of this study permit one to draw the conclusion that
allowing insurers to oer plans with both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing
does generate `true' savings in Swiss social health insurance. After controlling for
risk-selection eects, both variants are estimated to achieve marked reductions in
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moral hazard that can be passed on to consumers in the guise of premium reductions
without jeopardizing insurers' solvency.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Estimating a Proxy for Health Status
Table 3.10: Estimation of Equations (3.1) and (3.2).
P(HCEit >0) HCEitjHCEit >0
Random Eects Probit Random Eects AR (1)
Greater Metropolitan Area 0.018 -0.077***
(0.021) (0.010)
Auent Community 0.101* -0.069***
(0.041) (0.020)
Regional Center -0.083** -0.203***
(0.032) (0.017)
Rural, mainly industrial -0.070** -0.173***
(0.025) (0.013)
Rural, agriculture -0.171*** -0.209***
(0.028) (0.015)
Berne city 0.088** 0.037*
(0.033) (0.016)
Lucerne city -0.059* -0.241***
(0.028) (0.014)
Geneva city 0.396*** 0.385***
(0.042) (0.019)
2004 0.007 0.091***
(0.012) (0.005)
2005 0.017 0.089***
(0.012) (0.005)
Constant 1.928*** 6.911***
(0.036) (0.018)
N 253,653 218,208
 .691 .531
 .090
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses. Additional regressors are
age, gender, and additional region-specic dummies.
 : Fraction of error variance due to individual-specic term.
 : Estimated autocorrelation coecient.
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3.9.2 Predicting Contract Choice
Table 3.11: Estimation of Contract Choice in 2006.
Choice of Deductible Choice of IPA
Ordered Probit Probit
Health proxy -0.341*** -0.219***
(0.006) (0.012)
(Health proxy)2 0.042*** 0.055***
(0.003) (0.005)
(Health proxy)3 -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001)
Bad credit record -0.274*** -0.359***
(0.014) (0.027)
Years of CSS membership since 1999 -0.042*** -0.052***
(0.004) 0.007)
Baseline premium 0.018*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
Premium reduction for medium DED 0.008
(0.010)
Premium reduction for high DED 0.015***
(0.003)
Premium reduction for IPA 0.013***
(0.001)
IPA operational in zipcode area 1.436***
(0.058)
Constant -3.926***
(0.287)
Cut points 7.145 / 7.823
Log likelihood -140,618 -27,297
Number of observations 163,686 163,686
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses. Additional regressors are age,
gender, types of municipalities, region specic dummies, accident coverage,
long term care coverage, and youth rebate eligibility.
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their own account (physician dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We estimate a
model of physician drug choice with the help of drug claim data, nding a signi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Chapter 4
Generic Substitution, Financial
Interests, and Imperfect Agency
4.1 Introduction
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution (i.e. the re-
placement of brand-name by generic drugs) in an attempt to reduce the pharmaceu-
tical bill. In the United States for instance, several state policies promote the use
of generic products by Medicaid beneciaries [CMS (2004)]. Similar initiatives exist
in Germany [Leutgeb et al. (2009)], Sweden [Andersson et al. (2007)], Switzerland
[Decollogny and Ruggli (2006)], and Japan [Matsuda (2008)]. To be successful, these
initiatives must be aligned with prescribing physicians' (or pharmacists') incentives.
Generic substitution not only requires eort and time on the part of these profes-
sionals but also entails the risk of meeting with patient resistance. Three components
of prescribers' utility can work to overcome resistance against generic substitution.
First, prescribers may earn higher contributions to income from generic than from
brand-named drugs. Second, acting as agents by taking patients' total (rather than
merely health-related) utility into account, physicians are predicted to prescribe the
generic if the savings accruing to the patient are important enough. Third, in view
of public concern about growing health care expenditure, cost savings accruing to
insurers might motivate physicians to prescribe lower-priced generic drugs.
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In this context, evidence from Switzerland is of considerable interest. In some Swiss
jurisdictions (cantons), physicians are allowed to dispense drugs to their patients on
their own account. This setting will be referred to as `physician dispensing' (PD) in
the remainder of this paper.1 In the remaining jurisdictions, physicians are obliged
to let a pharmacy ll their prescriptions. Thus, both the PD and the non-PD (i.e.
pharmacy-based) setting can be observed under otherwise very similar conditions. PD
may well aect generic substitution provided physicians act as imperfect agents and
given that generic drugs dier from brand-name drugs in terms of their contribution
to physician income.
Retail prices paid by patients are regulated to be equal for all drug sellers (physi-
cians and pharmacies). The contribution to the sellers' income, then, is the dierence
between manufacturers' prices and retail prices. Concerning manufacturers' prices,
there is room for discounts and individual bargaining, causing the eective contribu-
tions to income to be unknown. However, several factors indicate that contributions
to physician income can be higher for generic than for brand-name drugs. First, many
generic alternatives are usually available for the same brand-name drug, leading to
erce competition for access to prescribers among generic producers. Second, the
retail prices of generic drugs are markedly higher in Switzerland than in comparable
European countries, suggesting that generic producers have ample leeway for rebates
to prescribers.2 Third, while there is no public information about such rebates, in-
terviews conducted with Swiss wholesalers and physicians support the notion that
prescribers derive more income from generic than brand-name drugs.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains a short
review of the literature. Section 4.3 describes the institutional setting. Section 4.4
presents a theoretical model of physician prescribing behavior, along with a set of
testable hypotheses. The empirical strategy used for hypothesis testing is explained
1PD is the counterpart of prescribing pharmacists, who exist e.g. in the case of rells in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand [Emmerton et al. (2005)]. In both cases, the
prescriber and the dispenser is one and the same person or institution, respectively.
2The prices for brand-name drugs are also higher in Switzerland, but the markups for physicians
are smaller (see Section 4.3.2).
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in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 contains a description of the data. Results are shown in
Section 4.7, while Section 4.8 rounds o with a summary and conclusions.
4.2 Literature Review
To keep this survey concise, there will be no discussion of research into physician
behavior in general. Rather, focus is on prescribing behavior. An early pertinent
study is the one by Morton-Jones and Pringle (1993), who compare prescription
patterns of PD and non-PD providers in the UK, nding that the share of generic
drugs is lower in the PD segment. Liu et al. (2009) analyze the choice between generic
and brand-name drugs in Taiwan, where PD is the dominant mode. According to
them, nancial incentives markedly inuence this choice. Specically, providers on
a global budget are more likely to prescribe generic drugs than those reimbursed
fee-for-service. Moreover, cheaper brand-name drugs (which in Taiwan contribute
less to physician income, as in Switzerland) are more often replaced by generics
than expensive ones. Using Japanese data on hypertension drug sales, Iizuka (2007)
concludes that markups available to physicians signicantly inuence drug choice.
However, he also nds that physicians take the cost of the drug to their patients
into account. Finally, the 2000 reform in South Korea provides an interesting natural
experiment. At that time, both drug dispensing by physicians and drug prescribing
by independent pharmacists were outlawed. Descriptive statistics presented by Kim
and Ruger (2008) indicate a marked increase in the market share of high-price drugs
in the year following the reform. However, the longer-term eects of the reform could
not be assessed on the basis of their data.
Papers that are methodically related to ours are Hellerstein (1998), Lundin (2000),
and Hellstrom and Rudholm (2010). They analyze the choice between generic and
brand-name drugs in a non-PD setting. Hellerstein argues that physicians bear higher
information costs when prescribing generic rather than brand-name drugs because
they have more personal experience with the brand-name than with the generic drugs.
Contrary to the hypothesis of perfect agency, she nds that prescription is not inu-
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enced by patients' insurance status and hence nancial burden. However, physicians
who predominately treat patients in capitated or Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) settings are more likely to prescribe generics (controlling for individual in-
surance status). Her panel data specication also shows that a large part of the unex-
plained variance is physician-specic, which also holds true of Lundin's contribution.
Interestingly, Lundin argues that physicians may want to honor R&D expenditure
and pioneering eort by innovators, causing them to bear added psychic cost when
prescribing a generic. He nds evidence that higher cost to the patient through copay-
ment increases the probability of generics being prescribed, while higher cost to the
insurer does not. Hellstrom and Rudholm argue that the uncertainty about the qual-
ity of generic drugs incites physicians to prescribe brand-name drugs. Their empirical
evidence shows that physicians are indeed less likely to allow generic substitution for
older (and presumably sicker) patients. However, their measure of uncertainty about
quality came out insignicant in the decision equation.
Another reason why the prescription of generic drugs might require extra eort on
the part of the physician is given by Griliches and Cockburn (1994). They argue that
many patients perceive generic drugs as less safe and of lower quality, making the
patient suer a `putative loss' when using them. Therefore, a physician prescribing
the generic drug needs to convince the patient of its bioequivalence.
To our knowledge, there is no Swiss study that analyzes the eect of PD on the
choice between generic and brand-name drugs. The one exception is Hunkeler (2008)
who presents corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that PD leads to margin
optimization or even margin maximization3 through dispensing packages and dosages
with higher ocial physician margins. These packages are launched rst by companies
entering the generics market; later, they are complemented by additional package
sizes and dosages (for more institutional detail regarding Swiss health insurance, see
Section 4.3). The other studies of PD in Switzerland have focused on its impact
3The dierence between margin optimization and maximization is that in the rst case, PD
providers prescribe several small packages instead of one large package while in the second case,
they prescribe a higher quantity to maximize their income.
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on total physician billings or health care expenditure (HCE), respectively. An early
investigation by Zweifel (1985) concluded that while PD creates incentives to keep
patients out of the hospital (where dierent physicians are in charge as a rule), the
savings achieved through a reduced rate of hospitalization fall short of the extra drug
expenditure induced in ambulatory care. At a more aggregate level, Dummermuth
(1993) compares two otherwise similar neighboring cantons (Lucerne with PD and
Argovia without PD), nding PD to be associated with slightly higher per capita
drug expenditure as well as HCE. This nding is in line with Beck et al. (2004), who
relate per-capita drug expenditure to several properties of cantons, among them,
their PD status. By way of contrast, Vatter and Ruei (2003), who control for a very
comprehensive set of political and socioeconomic covariates, indentify a signicantly
negative eect of the share of PD providers on per capita HCE. More surprisingly
still, Schleiniger et al. (2007) estimate a signicantly negative eect of PD on cantonal
drug expenditure which is robust across several specications.
4.3 Institutional Setting
Basic health insurance coverage in Switzerland written by some 80 competing pri-
vate not-for-prot insurers is mandatory for a broad basket of services and drugs.
Physicians in private practice are mostly paid according to a nationwide uniform
fee schedule called TARMED [see Zweifel and Tai-Seale (2009) for description and
criticism].4 Provision of health care is decentralized and the 26 Swiss cantons (`ju-
risdictions') have considerable say in its regulation, including the regulation of drug
dispensing.
4.3.1 Physicians' Dispensing Rights
Thirteen of the twenty-six Swiss cantons give dispensing rights to all physicians, seven
apply mixed systems while six generally disallow PD. Physicians who dispense on
4A small number of physicians works in managed-care type arrangements, where other modes of
payment are possible.
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average derive about 18 percent of their revenue from PD. This number is higher for
general practitioners (28 percent) and lower for specialists (8 percent) [see Hunkeler
(2008)]. Therefore, the nancial incentives linked with the amount and structure
of PD are substantial. Acknowledging problems of asymmetric information between
physicians and patients, some cantons with PD require physicians to inform patients
about their right to obtain a prescription to be lled by the pharmacy of their choice.
In the context of the present study, an important question is whether cantons that
allow PD attract substantially dierent types of physicians than do non-PD cantons.
Since the data is provided by a health insurer, they do not contain information
about the determinants of locational choice such as regional origin of the physician
and her spouse, or the location of her medical school. This makes an analysis of
physicians' choice of location impossible. Moreover, it is known that young physicians
mainly take over existing practices rather than opening new ones in response to large
administrative hurdles, pointing to a narrowed choice of location. Still, if physicians
who are very susceptible to nancial incentives are disproportionately located in the
PD cantons, our estimates in Section 4.7 might be upwardly biased.5
4.3.2 Contributions to Income from Drug Dispensing
For non-PD practitioners, the contribution to income from dispensing is zero. For
PD practitioners, the contribution earned by selling a specic drug consists of three
components, namely (i) a xed lump sum, (ii) a percentage of the regulated manu-
facturer price, and (iii) discounts that are conceded to physicians by pharmaceutical
companies. The rst two components are regulated by the government and published
in ocial registers. The third component is the outcome of an individual bargain-
ing process between prescriber and sales representative, which is unobservable to
us. However, they ultimately reect the bargaining position of the pharmaceutical
company, about which a few facts are known.
5This may be true although dummy variables for cantons and community types are included in
the estimation in order to control for dierences between regions (see Section 4.7).
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According to Liu et al. (2009), the discount on manufacturers' prices oered in-
creases with market size, competition, and retail price but decreases with marginal
cost. First, market size is small in Switzerland for both brand-name and generic drugs.
With regard to competition, the market usually contains one brand-name drug only
but a large number of generic alternatives (more than 10 in this analysis). There-
fore, producers of generic drugs are more likely to use discounts in their attempt to
increase market share. Next, marginal cost of brand-name and generic drugs can be
assumed equal in the present setting.
In addition, international comparisons of reimbursement prices oer indirect ev-
idence suggesting that generic producers in Switzerland have ample leeway for dis-
counts. For xing the reimbursement price of brand-name drugs, Switzerland uses a
reference group comprising Germany, Denmark, UK, the Netherlands, France, Italy,
and Austria. Reimbursement prices for generic drugs have to be at least 40 percent
lower than those of the original drug. However, this does not imply that generic pro-
ducers earn lower eective margins. In fact, Santesuisse (2009) and IMS (2009) calcu-
late price indexes for drugs with and without patent protection for Switzerland and
the seven countries cited above. The two studies conclude that both prices for band-
name (pb) and generic drugs (pg) are higher in Switzerland, i.e. pb = pb   p
R
b > 0
and pg = pg   p
R
g > 0, where R denotes the average drug price in the reference
group. But they also nd that the international price dierence is larger in the case
of generic than for brand-name drugs (pg > pb). Assuming that producers have
the same cost structure in Switzerland and elsewhere, the extra prot margin earned
in Switzerland is therefore higher for generic than for brand-name producers, i.e.
~m = pg  pb > 0. They can use their net advantage ~m for inducing physicians to
prescribe their products.
In all, manufacturers of generic drugs are likely to oer larger discounts to physi-
cians than brand-name producers. Indeed, interviews conducted with Swiss whole-
salers and physicians support the notion that prescribers derive more income from
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generic drugs, although no market participant is willing to publish the exact discounts
that are oered or accepted.
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the law forbids to
give, promise or accept any monetary or monetary equivalent reward for the prescrip-
tion of a specic drug. Therefore, manufacturers are not allowed to promise rewards
(for example higher discounts) for the achievement of a higher sales volume.
4.3.3 Copayment Arrangements
Prescription drugs are covered by compulsory health insurance, which kicks in when
the annual deductible is exceeded. The minimum annual deductible amounts to
CHF 300 ( US$ 250 at 2007 exchange rates). Voluntary deductibles range from
CHF 500 to 2,500 (US$ 415 to 2,100) and are chosen by the insured at the beginning
of the year. The deductible applies to all health care services except those related
to maternity. When the deductible is exceeded, there is a 10 percent rate of coin-
surance up to a stop-loss of CHF 700 (US$ 580) per year. For instance, a patient
with a deductible of CHF 2,500 would spend a maximum of CHF 3,200 (US$ 2,700)
out of pocket. For certain brand-name drugs, the rate of coinsurance was increased
to 20 percent during our observation period (2005 to 2007). However, producers of
brand-name drugs can escape this increased coinsurance by lowering their prices.
As a consequence of dierent deductibles and changing rates of coinsurance, some
patients have a stronger interest in receiving cheaper drugs than others.
4.4 Theoretical Model of Physicians' Drug Choice
Because of their central role in the resource allocation in health care markets, the
behavior of physicians has spawned a very rich literature (see McGuire (2000) for an
overview). The purpose of this section is to derive testable hypotheses concerning
generic drug substitution from existing theoretical models. Many of these models
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posit patients' health benet as an argument in the physician's objective function.
Thus, a physician (i) who prescribes a drug (d) to a patient (j) at time (t) has utility
Vijdt = i

idt   eijdt

+ i

bjd   jdtpdtu
0fYjtg

  i

(1  jdt)pdt

(4.1)
with idt = fdt + vdtpdt + idt:
Here, idt denotes the contribution to physician income. As explained in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, it consists of a xed lump sum (fdt), a price-dependent component (vdtpdt),
and an unobserved discount that is the outcome of an individual bargaining process
between the physician and the pharmaceutical company (idt). For the reasons listed
in Section 4.3.2, we assume that both discounts and total contributions to physician
incomes are higher for generic than for brand-name drugs.
The eort (in money terms) associated with prescribing is denoted eijdt. In keeping
with the literature cited in Section 4.2, this eort is higher for a generic (d = g) than
a brand-name (d = b) drug. For simplicity, the cost of prescribing b is normalized to
zero (eijbt = 0). The higher prescribing eort for generic drugs stems from two main
sources. First, the physician needs to gather personal experience with the generic
drug, which she has already collected for the brand-name drug during the period of
patent protection. This cost decreases over time, hence the dependence on time index
t. Still, every patient is dierent, making matching patients with drugs challenging
even after an initial information eort. Second, the physician needs to convince the
patient that the lower-priced generic drug is not of lower quality. Otherwise, the
patient might suer a `putative loss' in the sense of Griliches and Cockburn (1994),
which might jeopardize the physician's reputation. This cost also declines over time
as patients become acquainted with the generic drug. The parameter i > 0 in
Equation (4.1) denotes the weight the physician attaches to the drug's contribution
to income. It may well dier between GPs and specialists.
The second term of Equation (4.1) symbolizes net patient benet. Therefore, a
weight i > 0 (with no systematic dierence between GPs and specialists assumed)
reects a consideration for the patient's total utility derived from health benet and
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disposable income [Bradley and Lesu (2006), De Jaegher and Jegers (2000)] rather
than merely for the patient's health benet [Ellis and McGuire (1986)]. Net patient
benet equals health benet bjd minus the drug's out-of-pocket price jdtpdt, with jdt
denoting the patient's rate of coinsurance (which can be drug-specic) and pdt, the
price of the drug. The patient's utility from consuming other goods is ufYjtg, which
is increasing and concave in patient's income Yjt as well as additively separable from
health. Since copayment for a single drug jdtpdt is small in our context, multiplying
it by u0fYjtg yields a good approximation of its impact on patient utility. As low-
income patients have a high marginal utility of income, they suer a particularly high
utility loss from a given drug cost jdtpdt. In the remainder of this paper, there will
be no dierence in health benets between the brand-name and the generic drugs
(bjb = bjg) because bioequivalent drugs are compared (see Section 4.6 for details).
The third term of Equation (4.1) is motivated by agency on behalf of the insurers.
Agency towards insurers can be motivated by fear of sanctions or tighter regulation
in future.6 Both types of threats concern GPs and specialists alike. Moreover, high
and rapidly increasing health insurance premiums are one of the top concerns of the
Swiss population. Therefore, promoting a cost-ecient practice style could create a
warm-glow eect of doing what is good for society. Here, (1  jdt)pdt symbolizes the
cost of the drug treatment falling on the patient's insurer, with i > 0 indicating the
importance of this concern. In view of Equation (4.1), types of (im)perfect agency
can be dened as in Table (4.1).
Table 4.1: Types of (Im)Perfect Agency
Types of agency Parameter values
Perfect agency i = 0, i > 0, i > 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of patients i > 0, i > 0, i  0
Imperfect agency on behalf of insurers i > 0, i  0, i > 0
Lack of agency i > 0, i = 0, i = 0
6The Swiss health insurers' association (Santesuisse) scrutinizes physicians who exhibit inexplica-
bly high cost of treatment compared to their peers and occasionally sues them.
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The generic drug is prescribed if Vijgt > Vijbt, hence
Vijgt   Vijbt = i

igt   ibt   eijgt

+ i

(jbtpbt   jgtpgt)u
0fYjtg

(4.2)
+ i

(1  jbt)pbt   (1  jgt)pgt)

> 0:
Physician agency can now be analyzed with the help of Equation (4.2). To begin with,
non-dispensing physicians do not obtain income from drug prescription (igt = ibt =
0), while dispensing physicians are likely to receive a higher income contribution
from generic than from brand-name drugs (igt > ibt > 0, see Section 4.3.2).
7 PD is
therefore expected to increase the prescription of generic drugs.
Hypothesis 1: Given imperfect or lack of agency, dispensing physicians are more
likely to prescribe a generic drug compared to non-dispensing ones due to its
higher income contribution.
Recall that due to bioequivalence, drug choice aects patient utility exclusively
through dierences in coinsurance. According to Equation (4.2), both perfect and
imperfect patient-related agency thus leads to the prediction that generic drugs are
prescribed more often to patients with a high rate of coinsurance (high jdt) or low
income (high marginal utility of income, u0fYjtg), than to other patients.
Hypothesis 2: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are pre-
scribed more often to patients with higher rate of coinsurance as long as the
brand-name drug is more expensive than the generic, pbt > pgt.
Hypothesis 3: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are pre-
scribed more to patients with lower incomes because of their higher marginal
utility of income.
For the decision whether or not to prescribe a generic drug, only the sign of Equation
(4.2) is relevant. If the rst term of Equation (4.2) is zero (as for all non-dispensing
7In fact, non-dispensing physicians get a fee (TARMED) for prescribing a drug, which however
does not dier between brand-name and generic drugs. This fee is therefore irrelevant to our analysis.
82 Information Asymmetries and Incentives in Health Care Markets
physicians), the second term becomes relatively more important for the determination
of its sign. Therefore, to the extent that agency motivates physicians to prescribe
generic drugs, the eect of patient coinsurance should be more marked for non-PD
providers.
Hypothesis 4: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, patients' rate of coin-
surance is more inuential if the physician does not dispense drugs on his or
her own account.
Many models of physician agency neglect the third term of Equation (4.2). However,
if the inuence of copayment represented by [(jbtpbt   jgtpgt)u
0fYjtg] is low and
(igt   ibt) is zero, as applies to non-PD providers, all that remains is the (extra)
eort of prescribing the generic eijgt. Therefore, non-PD providers who treat patients
with low coinsurance or high incomes should have a very low propensity to prescribe
generics due to their higher cost of eort. It takes agency towards the payers of health
care [i > 0 in Equation (4.2)] to make them prescribe a generic.
Hypothesis 5: Given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe generic
drugs to some degree.
In addition to the standard fee-for-service arrangement, Swiss insurers may also oer
policies with managed care-type restrictions. Most of these arrangements are aimed
at increasing the cost-consciousness of physicians, either by introducing provider
cost sharing or by selectively contracting physicians based on indication of eciency.
In both cases, these arrangements are expected to align the interests of physicians
with those of the insurers, resulting in an increased inuence of the price dierence
(pbt   pgt) on physicians in managed care-settings.
Hypothesis 6: Physicians working in managed care-type settings prescribe more
generic drugs because of their increased consideration of the cost of care.
A limitation of our model is that it focuses on physician utility only. This is justied
to the extent that asymmetric information about treatment options makes patients
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delegate their decision-making authority to physicians. However, this delegation is
unlikely to be complete in practice. If patients play a more active role, observed
choices are the outcome of a bargaining process between them and physicians [Ellis
and McGuire (1990)]. It is important to keep this limitation in mind when interpret-
ing the empirical results in Section 4.7. For example, the patient's rate of coinsurance
may impact drug choice not only because of physician agency (as our model suggests),
but also because of the patients' own actions.
4.5 Econometric Specication
We estimate the choice between brand-name and generic drugs using a binary choice
model. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the physician prescribes g
and zero otherwise. Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the physician's utility
is split into a deterministic and a random component, i.e. Uijdt = Vijdt + "ijdt, where
"ijdt is unobserved by the researcher. A physician prescribes drug g instead of b if and
only if Uijgt > Uijbt. Hence, the probability of physician i prescribing g to patient j
at time t is given by
Pijgt = Pr(Vijgt + "ijgt > Vijbt + "ijbt) = Pr(Vijgt   Vijbt > "ijbt   "ijgt) (4.3)
with Vijgt   Vijbt given by Equation (4.2). If we assume the random term "ijt 
"ijbt   "ijgt to have a logistic distribution, we get the logit choice probability
Pijgt =

1 + e (Vijgt Vijbt)
 1
(4.4)
which permits to derive and interpret odds ratios. The drawback of the logit model
compared to the probit is that no simple estimators are available as soon as a
physician-specic random eect is included. In the probit model, the linear com-
bination of the normal error term and the normal random eect results in a normal
distribution. This is not the case for the logit model [see Wooldridge (2002), Ch.15].
By including a physician-specic error term, we allow for within correlation among
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the observations belonging to the same physician while still assuming independence
of observations across physicians. The physician-specic error captures unobserved
factors that we are not able to control for [see also Lundin (2000)]. Examples of
unobserved factors that may aect drug choice are favorable experience with a spe-
cic drug or the impact of pharmaceutical sales representatives visiting the physician.
Therefore, we extend the random utility model above to allow for a physician-specic
random eect, i.e. Uijdt = Vijdt + i + "ijdt. If   N(0; 
2
) one obtains the one-level
random-eects logit model [see Wooldridge (2002), Ch.15], with the share of total
variance contributed by physician-level variance given by  = 2=(
2
 + 
2
") where
2" denotes the variance of the overall error term. In addition, one could allow for
patient-specic random eects by nesting them with physician-level ones, resulting in
a two-level hierarchical regression model [also called mixed-eects model, see Rabe-
Hesketh et al. (2001)]. While theoretically attractive, the mixed-eects model could
not be estimated due to the complexity of the estimation equation and the size of
the dataset.8 Therefore, we estimated the one-level random-eects model discussed
previously. Testing the importance of the physician-specic error term using a like-
lihood ratio test showed that the one-level random-eects model performed better
than the pooled logit regression.
To estimate the coecients of interest, the systematic component of the utility
function (Vijgt Vijbt) needs to be specied. Unfortunately, it is not possible to unam-
biguously relate the variables of the theoretical model to observed quantities. Still, it
is possible to test all the hypotheses that were stated in Section 4.4. The assignments
are displayed in Table (4.2).
As explained in Section 4.3.2, we cannot observe the true income contribution from
physician dispensing, but we expect it to be higher for generic than for brand-name
drugs [igt ibt > 0 in Equation (4.2)]. Therefore, we can only include a dummy that
indicates whether or not a physician earns an income contribution from dispensing
8The mixed-eects model did not converge using Stata 10.
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Table 4.2: Overview of the Variables Used for Hypothesis Testing
Variable Term No. in Hyp. Exp. Conrmed?
Equation (4.2) No. sign
Physician dispensing (PD) 1 1 + Y (O,A)
General Practitioner (GP) 1 n.a. + Y
Interaction of PD and GP 1 1 + Y
Deductible category (DED2, DED3) 2 2 + Y (O,A)
Interaction of PD and DED2, DED3 2 4 - N
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 2 2 + Y
Interaction of PD and COINS 2 4 - N
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 2 3 - Y
Accident coverage (ACC) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
High income area (HIA) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
Price dierence (P) 3 5 + N (Y for O)
Interaction of PD and P 2,3 n.a. - N (Y for O)
HMO contract (HMO) 3 6 + Y
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 3 6 + Y
Control variables: six area types, 25 cantonal dummies, complementary insurance,
time trend, patient age and sex, dosage, prescriptions per patient,
year of rst prescription
See Section 4.7.
(PDit = 1). We expect the coecient pertaining to the income contribution to be
positive, implying that PD increases the probability of choosing g.
The information cost (eijgt) in Equation (4.2) cannot be measured and thus is
absorbed by the random term. A dummy for general practitioners (GP) is interacted
with PD to test for systematic dierences in i of Equation (4.2), i.e. whether GPs
react in a dierent way to the nancial incentives from PD than specialists do. A
positive interaction eect is expected due to the lower average income of GPs and
hence higher marginal utility of income.
Copayment borne by patients is known from the patient's health insurance policy
on the one hand and the drug-specic rate of coinsurance on the other. As explained
in Section 4.3.3, policies dier in terms of deductibles (DED). Physicians acting as
agents [i > 0 in Equation (4.2)] would want to keep patients' out-of-pocket cost
low. The higher DED, the more they are expected to prescribe the cheaper generic
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(Hypothesis 2). In formulating this hypothesis, DED is viewed as exogenous. Admit-
tedly, high deductibles are typically chosen by higher-income individuals, making jdt
a function of ufYjtg in Equation (4.2). However, the dataset lacks information that
would permit to control for this relationship. Hypothesis (2) can be detailed further.
Before January 2006, drug expenditure in excess of DED was subject to a 10 percent
coinsurance rate regardless of type g or b. A natural experiment is provided by the
policy change of 2006, when the coinsurance rate for (some) brand-name drugs was
increased from 10 to 20 percent while it stayed at 10 percent for generics. Producers
of brand-name drugs can escape the increased rate of coinsurance by lowering their
prices, which is observed in our dataset (see Section 4.6). The eect of the patient's
rate of coinsurance on drug choice can be tested by including a dummy COINS that
is one if the prescribed drug faces the increased rate of coinsurance at the time of
purchase and zero otherwise. In addition, an interaction term PDCOINS serves to
test for the inuence of nancial incentives on physician agency. According to Hy-
pothesis 4, its coecient is predicted to be negative, indicating less additional generic
substitution in the case of physician dispensing.
The hypothesis that generic drugs are prescribed less to patients with higher in-
come due to their lower marginal utility of income (Hypothesis 3) is tested by includ-
ing dummies for residence in a high-income area (HIA), the purchase of extra hospital
insurance (HOSP), and the purchase of accident insurance (ACC). Accident coverage
is inversely related to labor force participation because it is usually provided by the
employer rather than the health insurer. It thus may be interpreted as an indicator
of high income, causing less prescription of generics according to Hypothesis 3.
As to the third term of Equation (4.2), Hypothesis 5 (bearing on i, the role of
agency on behalf of insurers) can be tested using the price dierence between the
brand-name and generic drug (pt = pbt   pgt), to be detailed below. Concerning the
relevance of this agency, the following argument can be made. Beyond the deductible,
the price dierence borne by patients is very small compared to average income. Thus,
it is unlikely that consideration for the patients' coinsurance [second term in Equation
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(4.2)] provides enough motivation for most of non-dispensing physicians to bear the
greater cost of prescribing generic drugs (eijgt). Therefore, the fact that the market
share of generic drugs in our dataset is substantial in the non-PD setting (see Table
4.3) supports the view that i > 0 in Equation (4.2), suggesting that physicians do
consider the cost to insurers when choosing a drug. The interaction term PDP is
used to test whether physician agency is weakened by physician dispensing. As the
price dierence is part of both the second and the third term of Equation (4.2), both
agency on behalf of insurers or agency on behalf of patients could be aected here.
For calculating the price dierence, note that it has to be calculated for each
combination of package size and dosage, with pgt denoting the average price of N
generic products each time. Further, since prices are subject to change, the price
dierence for a specic size-dosage combination has to be calculated for each month
t, i.e. pt = pbt  (
P
n pnt)=N 8n = g. For some of these combinations, only one version
is available and no price dierence can be calculated. These observations are excluded
from the regression analysis. This is not a problem because a prescriber who needs
this specic amount of pills and dose does not have a choice between b and g.
For testing Hypothesis 6, dierences in health insurance policies can be exploited.
Apart from conventional fee-for-service contracts with varying deductibles, con-
sumers can opt for a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a gatekeeping
alternative (GATE). In the HMO setting, physicians are paid by capitation rather
than the usual fee-for-service. The gatekeeping arrangement uses fee-for-service pay-
ments but requires patients to obtain a referral from their general practitioner (chosen
from a list issued by their insurer) before seeing a specialist. Moreover, patients in
a gatekeeping plan are required to ask for generic drugs. Hypothesis 6 states that
both kinds of arrangements should lead to increased consideration of the cost of
care by prescribing physicians [higher i in Equation (4.2)] and hence more generic
drugs being prescribed. However, it is important to note that patients choosing these
contracts are likely less risk-averse and more price sensitive than patients opting
for the standard fee-for-service setting. These dierences relate to the second rather
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than third term of Equation (4.2) yet also contribute to more generic drugs being
prescribed.
We complete the econometric specication by a few control variables. Because we
expect a positive time trend in favor of generic drugs as practitioners get more famil-
iar with them, we include a variable for the time trend. Patient age and gender serve
to control for demographic eects. Also, political attitudes and institutions vary be-
tween cantons. In some, PD is widely accepted or even desired while in others, it is
disputed. Moreover, unobserved detailing eort by pharmaceutical companies likely
diers between cantons. This calls for the inclusion of 25 cantonal dummies, with
Zurich constituting the reference category. Individuals can also purchase comple-
mentary insurance that covers additional procedures (such as traditional Chinese
medicine or otherwise uncovered drugs). These dimensions of complementary insur-
ance likely reect risk aversion on the part of consumers, making them eschew drug
substitution because they are less familiar with the generic alternative.
Drug substitution may also depend on dosage and package size. The reason is
that the unobserved contribution to physician income could vary with these two
parameters. Therefore, total prescribed dose (number of pills times dosage per pill)
is included in the regression. The number of prescriptions per patient controls for
long-run chronic patients. Because there is a high likelihood that a patient initiated
with a given variety of the drug remains with it, two dummies indicate whether the
patient's rst prescription took place in 2006 or 2007, when the higher coinsurance
rate was already in place.
The deterministic part of the utility function is estimated as
Vijgt   Vijbt = b0 + b1PD+ b2GP+ b3PD GP+ b4DED2+ b5PD DED2 (4.5)
+b6DED3+ b7PD DED3+ b8COINS+ b9PD  COINS
+b10HOSP+ b11ACC+ b12HIA+ b13P+ b14PD  P
+b15HMO+ b16GATE+ bxX;
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where the b's are the parameters of interest, X denotes the vector of control variables,
and bx the vector of coecients of the control variables.
4.6 Data
4.6.1 Chemical Agents Selected
The data was provided by a major Swiss health insurer covering about 15 percent
of the Swiss population. They relate to the years 2005 to 2007. The chemical agents
selected for analysis are omeprazole (O), amlodipine (A), and ciprooxacin (C).9
Omeprazole is used to treat gastric and duodenal abscesses; amlodipine is a calcium
channel blocker for the treatment of angina; ciprooxacin is used to treat specic
bacterial infections. Their choice can be justied on the grounds that they have
many bioequivalent generic competitors that are available on the Swiss market.10
Furthermore, these agents belong to the therapeutic categories with substantial sales
volume, causing the number of prescriptions in the data to be high. We observe
183,874 (O), 143,358 (A), and 95,580 (C) prescriptions where exactly one package
was sold.
The shares of the three brand-name drugs in the sample are depicted in Figure
(4.1) for 33 months, starting from March 2005. They dropped throughout 2005,
quite likely because prescribing physicians anticipated the increase of coinsurance for
certain brand-name drugs from 10 to 20 percent eective January 2006. The new rate
was to apply to brand-name drugs whose sales price was 20 percent higher than the
cheapest therapeutically equivalent generic.11 During the rst months of 2006, this
was the case for all three agents. However, the brand-name producers of amlodipine
and ciprooxacin lowered their prices in month 20 (August, 2006) in order to avoid
the extra copayment. In month 29 (May 2007), the producer of the brand-name for
9ATC-code: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), ciprooxacin (J01MA02). For more
details about the investigated agents see www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
10Number of generics available on the Swiss market (20052007): omeprazole (11), amlodipine (12),
ciprooxacin (11).
11This is regulated by national law (specically paragraph Art.38a KLV).
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Figure 4.1: Share of brand-name drug between March, 2005 and December, 2007
omeprazole lowered its prices as well, but only for the most commonly prescribed
dose (10 mg).
As to amlodipine, the brand-name drug (Norvasc R) went o patent in the spring
of 2005, causing it to lose its monopoly position. Since then, the generic Amlodipin-
Mepha R has expanded its share in the sample from 18 to 37 percent (2006) and to
38 percent (2007), respectively.
Table 4.3: Sample shares and sales volumes of generic and brand-name drugs, March
2005 - December 2007
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprooxacin
PD Non-PD PD Non-PD PD Non-PD
Sample share of generics 94% 89% 82% 66% 86% 79%
Sales of generics (in CHF, mn.) 6.3 9.2 3.7 3.5 2.0 1.7
Sales of brand-names (in CHF, mn.) 1.0 2.8 1.5 3.1 0.4 0.6
4.6.2 Physician and Patient Descriptors
In the data set, there are 7,441 physicians prescribing O, 5,995 prescribing A, and
7,693 prescribing C, respectively (the three subsets are overlapping); the share of PD
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varies between 43 and 54 percent from March 2005 to December 2007. With 78 to 88
percent, the majority of the prescribers are GPs rather than specialists.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics, mean (MN), median (MD), and standard deviation
(SD)
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprooxacin
MN MD SD MN MD SD MN MD SD
Physician dispensing 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.54 1.00 0.50
General practitioner 0.84 1.00 0.37 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.78 1.00 0.42
Patient's deductible 406 300 297 386 300 246 477 300 413
Increased rate of coins. 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40
Extra hospital insurance 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Accident insurance 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.68 1.00 0.47
High-income area 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.17
Urban area 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.49
Suburban area 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Average price dierence 102 71 75 28 11 30 12 8 9
HMO contract 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14
Gatekeeping contract 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.24
Complementary insurance 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.90 1.00 0.31
Patient's age (in years) 62 64 17 70 72 12 58 61 19
Patient's sex (male=1) 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.49
Total dosage (in 100 mg) 9.99 11.20 5.90 6.20 5.00 2.80 61.26 50.00 28.60
Prescriptions per patient 7.84 6.00 7.55 8.05 8.00 4.02 2.83 2.00 3.78
First prescription in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
First prescription in 2007 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2007 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48
Note: The prescription is the unit of observation.
The median deductible is the lowest possible (CHF 300). During the study period,
about 70 percent of omeprazol prescriptions were subject to the increased rate of
coinsurance while this share was lower for amlodipine and ciprooxacin with shares of
21 and 20 percent, respectively. The share of consumers with extra hospital coverage
lies between 22 and 27 percent. The majority of physicians have their practice in
urban (36-40 percent) or suburban (25-27 percent) areas while only 3 percent are
located in high-income areas. The average savings per prescription for a patient or
insurer due to the substitution of the brand-name by a generic counterpart is highest
for O with CHF 102, followed by CHF 28 and CHF 12 for A and C, respectively.
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The share of insured with an HMO policy varies between 2 and 3 percent, of those
with a gatekeeping policy, between 5 and 6 percent. In contrast, between 87 and
90 percent of the insured had signed up for at least one voluntary extra option to
broaden the scope of reimbursed services. High shares of 68 and 83 percent have
purchased accident insurance. Both the 61,825 patients receiving O and the 27,080
patients receiving C have an average age of about 60 years, and 40 percent are male.
The 58,489 patients obtaining A have an average age of 70 years, and 48 percent
are male. Ciprooxacin is prescribed with an average total dosage per prescription
of 6,126 mg, compared to a dosage of 999 mg for O and 620 mg for A. On average,
a patient receives 8 prescriptions if in need of O or A. In contrast, C is prescribed
three times per patient on average. Observations are distributed equally over the
three years, with about one third of prescriptions taking place per year. Also, the
number of patients starting medication is roughly constant over the years.
4.7 Estimation Results
The odds ratios12 (ORs) and standard errors resulting from the random-eects logit
model described in Section 4.5 are displayed in Table (4.5). The physician-specic
variance component contributes 50 to 70 percent of the total error variance, and a
likelihood-ratio test clearly speaks in favor of the random-eects specication. The
physician-specic variance component is higher than the 40 percent reported by
Lundin (2000) and 29 percent reported by Hellerstein (1998). A possible explanation
is that some physicians in our dataset only have a small number of patients, the data
coming from one insurer only. Moreover, the available information does not permit to
distinguish between part-time and full-time, female and male, and younger and older
physicians. Coscelli (1998) also mentions considerable physician-specic components
in unexplained variance.
12The concept of odds ratios and their calculation in the presence of interaction terms can be found
in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
Generic Substitution, Financial Interests, and Imperfect Agency 93
4.7.1 Testing for the Inuence of Physician Dispensing
Hypothesis 1 predicts that physician dispensing (PD) increases the likelihood of
generic prescription. It is tested by Model 1, with physician and patient characteris-
tics controlled for. Additional hypothesis testing calls for interaction terms involving
PD and patient characteristics which are added in Model 2 (to be discussed in Sec-
tion 4.7.2). Therefore, the coecient of PD in Model 1 shows the average OR across
physician and patient groups. In the case of O, it amounts to 3.0 (2.6, 3.4), with the
parentheses indicating its 95% condence interval.13 For a detailed discussion of its
calculation, see Norton et al. (2004) and Garrett (1997). The OR indicates that if the
drug is sold on the physician's own account, the odds of generic substitution are three
times higher no matter whether the prescriber is a GP or a specialist. For all three
agents, the likelihood of generic substitution is around twice as high among GPs than
among specialists. Moreover, the interaction between PD and GP yields a positive
and signicant coecient in the case of A and C. This could be a sign that GPs
with their lower average income, hence higher marginal utility of income, are more
inuenced by the income contribution of PD than their specialized colleagues. In the
case of O, the interaction of PD and GP was insignicant and therefore excluded
from the estimation.
The eect of (PDGP) cannot be inferred from the interaction coecient directly
but needs to be calculated according to the dierent categories [see Norton et al.
(2004)]. In present case, it is given by exp(^PD) for specialists and exp(^PD+^PDGP )
for GPs.14 For amlodipine, PD has an OR of 2.4 (1.9, 2.9) for specialists and 3.7
(3.4, 4.1) for GPs, indicating that physician dispensing has a much stronger eect
among GPs than among specialists. In the case of C, the discrepancy between GPs
and specialists is even stronger. Dispensing specialists reveal a negative PD eect
13The 95% condence interval is calculated according to CI = exp(^  1:96 dSE(^)), where ^ is
the logit coecient. Because Table (4.5) shows ORs, the reader can calculate the necessary quantities
according to ^ = ln(dOR) and dSE(^) =dSE(dOR)=dOR using the values from the table.
14The standard error of this expression is dSE(^PD + ^PDGP ) =qdV ar(^PD) + dV ar(^PDGP ) + 2dCov(^PD; ^PDGP ), and the condence intervals for the odds
ratios are calculated by CI = exp(^PD + ^PDGP  1:96 dSE(^PD + ^PDGP )).
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with an OR of 0.7 (0.6, 0.8), while GPs again exhibit a positive PD eect on generic
substitution with an OR of 2.9 (2.6, 3.3). All the OR values discussed have condence
intervals that do not include 1 and thus are signicant.
In summary, Hypothesis 1 receives a good deal of support, permitting one to
conclude that physician dispensing increases the likelihood of generic substitution
due to its higher contribution to physician income. This conclusion holds regardless
of whether prescribers are GPs or not and for all of the three chemical substances
analyzed, with the one exception of specialized physicians prescribing C. However,
it should be noted that there may be additional reasons for dispensing physicians
to choose the cheaper generic drug. First, storage entails capital user cost, which
is lower for cheap generics. Second, dispensing physicians may be better informed
about availability and prices of generics than non-dispensing physicians because of es-
pecially targeted marketing activities. Unfortunately, these eects cannot be analyzed
with the available data. Still, PD is associated with increased generic substitution. It
contributes to lower pharmaceutical expenditure as long as it does not go along with
an increase in drug use through supplier-induced demand. This qualication is not
addressed here but is analyzed in other recent work. In particular, Rischatsch (2011)
analyzes whether dispensing physicians optimize their income contribution from drug
dispensing by selling smaller packages, while Chapter 5 of this thesis discusses the
impact of physician dispensing on total expenditure for drugs, general practitioners'
services, specialists' services and hospital services.
4.7.2 The Role of Physician Agency on Behalf of Patients
To the extent that physicians take the consequences of their prescriptions for the
utility of their patients into account, Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship
between copayment and generic substitution. Patients with a higher deductible face
a higher expected level of copayment; therefore, they should be more likely to re-
ceive the generic alternative. The empirical evidence comes from the coecients of
DED2 and DED3 in Model 2 of Table (4.5). In the case of O, the ORs for DED2
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and DED3 indicate that a higher deductible increases the likelihood of generic sub-
stitution. Patients with a deductible in excess of the legal minimum are two times
as likely to receive a generic drug, which supports Hypothesis 2. A stronger eect
for DED3 compared to DED2 could not be found for O, however. For A, the ORs
increase from the lowest to the highest deductible category, but only the OR for
DED2 is statistically signicant. The tendency is the same for C but the eect is
insignicant. The dummy variable indicating the 2006 increase in coinsurance for
expensive brand-names (COINS) is strongly positive for all chemical agents, again
supporting Hypothesis 2 (see Table 4.2).
Hypothesis 3 revolves around patient income, stating that richer patients are less
likely to receive the generic drug. In Table (4.5), three indicators are used, viz. the
purchase of extra hospital insurance, accident insurance, and residence in a high-
income area. As to the rst indicator, the OR values are consistently below one,
indicating that generic drug substitution indeed is less likely. The same is also true
for patients with accident insurance and from high-income areas in two of the three
cases (C is the exception with a negative but insignicant eect). Therefore, there is
some supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3 (see Table 4.2 again).
Hypothesis 4 predicts that patients' rate of coinsurance is less inuential in the PD
mode than in the pharmacy mode. To test it, Model 2 contains interactions between
the DED dummies and PD. The interaction terms are generally negative, but only
the medium category for O is signicant, giving some support to Hypothesis 4. Here,
the OR for DED2 is 2.2 (1.8, 2.7) for non-PD and 1.6 (1.1, 2.1) for PD. Evidence
contradicting Hypothesis 4 comes from A, where the interaction eect PDDED2 is
positive and signicant but the main eect DED2 is insignicant, leading to the con-
clusion that non-PD providers do not react to a higher deductible but PD providers
do. This dierence vanishes again at the highest deductible level since PDDED3
does not reach statistical signicance.
A second test of Hypothesis 4 is provided by the interaction of PD with COINS.
However, the evidence is inconclusive. For omeprazole, PDCOINS is highly signif-
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icant and positive with an OR of 1.9 (1.7, 2.0) among non-PD providers and 2.6
(2.3, 2.8) PD providers, respectively, while for ciprooxacin, it is weakly signicant
but negative, suggesting that PD providers react less to the increase in the rate of
coinsurance than their non-PD colleagues. No signicant dierence could be found
for amlodipine. Hence, the evidence does not permit to either conrm or reject the
notion that drug dispensing weakens physician agency on behalf of the patient.
4.7.3 The Role of Physician Agency on Behalf of Insurers
Hypothesis 5 states that given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers pre-
scribe generic drugs in spite of higher information cost. Therefore, we expect a higher
dierence between brand-name and generic prices (pbt   pgt) to be positively related
to the probability of prescribing the cheaper generic drug. While the estimates for O
support Hypothesis 5 with a weak positive eect in favor of generics, the estimates
for A and C do not because an increase in the price dierence lowers the probability
of generic substitution slightly. However, there is other evidence hinting at agency on
behalf of insurers. In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table (4.3) show that, for the
three selected agents, the share of generic drugs is 66-89 percent in our dataset even
in the non-PD market. Recall that non-PD providers do not benet nancially from
drug choice, while patient coinsurance beyond the deductible is rather limited com-
pared to average income in Switzerland. Therefore, the high share of generic drugs
shows that some physicians choose the lower-priced alternative even in situations
when neither they nor their patients derive signicant nancial benet from it. It
takes agency toward the insurers to motivate physicians to prescribe generic drugs
despite higher information cost.
Table 4.5: Odds Ratios of Random-eects Logistic Regression of Drug Choice (De-
pendent Variable: Generics)
Omeprazole (O) Amlodipine (A) Ciprooxacin (C)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Physician dispensing (PD) 2.99 3.34 2.36 2.24 0.71 0.74
(0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07)
General practitioner (GP) 2.12 2.13 1.91 1.92 2.21 2.21
(0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Interaction of PD and GP 1.58 1.56 4.09 4.08
(0.18) (0.17) (0.42) (0.42)
Deductible category DED2a) 2.01 2.22 1.15 1.06 1.02 1.07
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Interaction of PD and DED2 0.70 1.26 0.90
(0.13) (0.17) (0.08)
Deductible category DED3a) 1.95 2.50 1.25 1.42 1.12 1.20
(0.39) (0.66) (0.18) (0.25) (0.11) (0.16)
Interaction of PD and DED3 0.51 0.71 0.85
(0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
Increased coinsurance (COINS) 2.04 1.89 4.52 4.58 2.14 2.26
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11)
Interaction of PD and COINS 1.35 0.97 0.88
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.93 0.93
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.89 0.97 0.97
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-income area (HIA)b) 0.47 0.48 0.57 0.57 0.91 0.91
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17)
Price dierence (P, in 10 CHF) 1.03 1.04 0.82 0.81 0.94 0.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction of PD and P 0.97 1.02 1.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
HMO contract (HMO)c) 1.94 1.91 1.99 1.99 1.37 1.37
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Gatekeeping contract (GATE)c) 2.43 2.37 1.63 1.64 1.35 1.35
(0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Complementary insurance 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.17 1.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time trend (in months) 1.03 1.03 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient age (in 5 years) 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient sex (male=1) 1.26 1.26 1.14 1.14 1.02 1.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Total dosage (in 100 mg) 0.93 0.93 1.09 1.09 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prescriptions per patient 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
First prescription in 2006 1.33 1.32 1.21 1.21 1.23 1.23
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
First prescription in 2007 1.38 1.37 1.04 1.04 1.09 1.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Log-likelihood at convergence: -35,970 -35,918 -51,481 -51,473 -29,390 -29,388
Observations/Physicians: 183,874/7,441 143,358/5,995 95,580/7,693
Additional regressors: Six area and 25 cantonal dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. a) DED2 = CHF 1,000 or 1,500, DED3 = CHF 2,000 or 2,500.
b) basis category is urban area, c) reference category is basic insurance.
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The interaction PDP is again used to test whether the nancial incentives attached
to PD weaken physician agency. The price dierence being part of both the second
and the third term of Equation (4.2), both agency on behalf of the patient and on
the behalf of the insurer can be aected. For O, the price dierence has an OR of 1.0
(1.03, 1.05) for non-PD physicians and an OR of 1.01 (1.00, 1.02) for PD physicians,
pointing to a weakly negative association of PD and agency. The opposite is observed
in the case of A, where the OR pertaining to non-PD providers is 0.81 (0.80, 0.82) and
the OR pertaining to PD providers is 0.83 (0.82, 0.83). For C, no signicant dierence
between non-PD and PD providers is observed, with ORs amounting to 0.93 (0.88,
0.99) and 0.94 (0.88, 1.00), respectively. Therefore, the evidence with regard to the
interaction of PD and agency is inconclusive.
With respect to Hypothesis 6, the managed-care variables `HMO' and `gatekeep-
ing' reveal an increasing likelihood of generic substitution for all three chemical
agents, with ORs between 1.4 and 2.0, as predicted (see Table 4.2).
4.7.4 Control Variables
The control variables lead to the following conclusions. In Model 2 of Table (4.5),
there is evidence for the expected positive time trend towards generic drugs, a higher
likelihood of generics being prescribed to men compared to women, no evidence
of the total amount of dosage prescribed having inuence on the choice of drug
version, and a negative eect of number of prescriptions on the likelihood of generic
prescription. Finally, the year when the patient's medication started is important for
drug choice and signicant for all three chemical agents. Patients who received the
rst prescription in 2006 are between 1.2 and 1.3 times more likely to be prescribed
a generic. In the case of amlodipine and ciprooxacin, the likelihood for 2007 is
higher than for 2005 but lower than for 2006. This could reect the fact that the two
pertinent brand-name producers lowered their price in the interest of a decreased
coinsurance rate, enabling them to regain market-share. By way of contrast, the
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brand-name producer of omeprazole waited until 2007, causing it to lose market
share in both years.
One might criticize that dispensing physicians do not react to an individual pa-
tient when choosing between g and b because they have already decided what phar-
maceuticals to have in their portfolio. However, they are likely to make this choice
anticipating the kind of patients they will face from past visits, causing them to store
the drugs that best match their clientele.
4.8 Conclusions
This research analyzes the role of physicians' and patients' nancial incentives in the
choice between generic and brand-name drugs. Prescribing the generic alternative
takes more eort on the part of the physician for two main reasons: First, she needs
to acquire information about new drugs which enter the market only after patent
expiration of the brand name. Second, she needs to convince the patient that the
cheaper generic is not of lower quality. The physician is willing to make this eort
only if the benet from choosing the generic is suciently high. Generic drugs have
higher benet because of three reasons, namely nancial benets, agency towards
the patient, and agency towards insurers. The inuence of these three components is
estimated using a large set of drug claims data from Switzerland.
Regarding nancial incentives, this data is ideal for analysis because some  but
not all  Swiss physicians have the right to dispense drugs on their own account.
Physicians with this privilege derive a signicant part of their income from the sale
of drugs, causing nancial incentives associated with drug dispensing to be sub-
stantial. Physician dispensing is found to be associated with a higher likelihood of
prescribing generic drugs, which is likely due to a higher contribution to physician
income in comparison with that of brand-name drugs (Hypothesis 1; see also Ta-
ble 4.2). A limitation of our analysis is that we are unable to separate this eect
from other dierences between dispensing and non-dispensing physicians. In partic-
ular, information costs for prescribing generic drugs might be lower for dispensing
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physicians as they are targeted by sales representatives and may therefore be better
informed about availability and prices of drugs than their non-dispensing colleagues.
Additionally, dispensing physicians have to nance and manage storage, tying up
capital and causing opportunity costs.
Turning to agency towards patients, we test whether physicians respond to the
nancial burden caused by copayment. Choosing the lower-priced generic drug serves
to decrease this burden without aecting the quality of medication due to bioequiva-
lence of the generic substitutes studied here. We nd that the likelihood of receiving
the generic increases for patients with a higher deductible (Hypothesis 2). In addi-
tion, the rate of coinsurance (which applies when the deductible is exceeded) was
increased for certain brand-name drugs during our observation period. Although this
change caused but a small additional burden per patient compared to income, it does
go along with a strongly increased use of generic drugs. A likely contributor is that
the government's initiative to promote generic substitution alloyed concerns about
quality on the part of both prescribers and patients.
The variation in deductibles and coinsurance permits to study the interaction
between physicians' nancial incentives and their patient agency. Given imperfect
agency on behalf of patients, dispensing physicians are predicted to respond less
strongly to a hike in copayment than non-dispensing ones (Hypothesis 4). However,
the evidence found in our data is mixed, failing to support the notion that drug
dispensing weakens physician agency, as argued by pharmacists' lobbying groups
and some Swiss politicians.
Moreover, most of the odds ratios pertaining to proxies of patient income (res-
idence in a high-income area, purchase of extra hospital and accident insurance)
suggest that wealthier patients have a higher probability of receiving brand-name
drugs because the price dierence between them and the generic substitute has less
of an eect due to lower marginal utility of income of the wealthy (Hypothesis 3).
Consideration of the savings for insurers might provide an additional motivation
for the prescription of the cheaper generic alternative (Hypothesis 5). However, this
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eect could be conrmed for only one drug in the econometric estimation (see Table
4.2 again). Nevertheless, the high willingness of non-dispensing physicians to pre-
scribe generic drugs points to some degree of agency towards insurers. Last but not
least, physicians working in managed care-type arrangements are found to prescribe
more generic drugs than their colleagues, pointing to an increased cost awareness in
the managed care setting (Hypothesis 6).
In sum, nancial incentives, agency towards the patient, and agency towards insur-
ers are all found to markedly inuence generic substitution. Moreover, government
initiatives to promote generic drugs can be eective even in the presence of weak
nancial incentives because they may reassure physicians and patients of the safety
and high quality of generic drugs. However, if government were to try to markedly re-
duce generic prices, it might weaken the incentives for generic substitution, at least
for dispensing physicians. The reason is that physicians' nancial incentives may
encourage rather than undermine generic substitution.
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Abstract: Several countries (Canada and the US amongst others) have recently
expanded pharmacists' rights to authorize prescriptions. This amounts to a partial
lifting of the traditional separation between the prescription and the sale of drugs.
This separation exists in some Swiss jurisdictions but not in others, where physicians
have the right to dispense drugs on their own account. Using individual patient
records and a standard two-part model specication, this article nds no evidence
that dispensing by physicians has a signicant eect on either drug expenditure or
total health care expenditure. However, dispensing by physicians is associated with
an increased use of primary care services and slightly fewer referrals to hospitals.
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Chapter 5
Prescribers' Responses to Financial
Incentives - Theory and Evidence
5.1 Introduction
Agency relationships in health care occur because of information asymmetries be-
tween prescribers, patients and insurers. Patients are generally unaware of the possi-
bilities and consequences of treatment, causing them to delegate medical decisions to
prescribers. During the decision-making process, prescribers gain considerable knowl-
edge that cannot be shared with insurers at a reasonable cost [`specic knowledge' in
the sense of Jensen and Meckling (1992)]. Therefore, insurers cannot fully verify pre-
scribers' decisions even by hiring medical personnel. This provides prescribers with
a considerable level of independence. If prescribers sell medical services with positive
markups, their monetary self-interest is frequently in conict with the other parties'
interest for cost-eective care. For this reason, supply conditions of medical care are
strictly regulated even in countries claiming to be market economies [Arrow (1963)].
It is however dicult to empirically quantify the extent of this agency problem or
the success of the regulation addressing it.
The market for pharmaceuticals is no exception. In most Western nations, drugs
cannot be prescribed and dispensed by the same professional because dispensing
prescribers may be inclined to prescribe too many, too expensive, or even clinically
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inappropriate drugs. However, should a professional be qualied to carry out both
tasks, the combination of the two roles has potential advantages for the patient.1
First, it increases patients' choice of drug provider, thereby increasing competition
and responsiveness to patients' preferences. Second, it saves the (time) cost of visiting
a second provider. Third, using the same personnel and infrastructure for both tasks
may well serve to reduce prices.2 Fourth, outpatient care providers who earn margins
from drug dispensing might have an increased incentive to treat patients instead of
referring them to hospitals [Zweifel (1985)]. These advantages must be gauged against
the agency problems that have been previously described.
This paper analyzes the consequences of giving physicians the right to dispense
drugs on their own account (Physician Dispensing, PD). The data originates from
Switzerland where some jurisdictions allow PD while others do not. Physicians who
dispense earn a marked proportion of their revenue from this activity, reecting
substantial nancial incentives pertaining to prescribing. The innovation in this study
is that I am analyzing the impact of PD not only on drug expenditure but also on
expenditure for other types of medical care. In a rst part, a model of physician
decision making serves to formulate three hypotheses. These are then tested using
patient-level data of about 240,000 Swiss patients.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 starts o with
a short description of the literature. Section 5.3 contains a description of the policy
setting. In Section 5.4, a theoretical model of physician decision making is presented
and testable hypotheses on the inuence of PD on health care expenditure are de-
rived. The estimation strategy is described in Section 5.5, while data and descriptive
statistics are provided in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 discusses estimation results while
section 5.8 rounds o with a summary and conclusions.
1The question of necessary qualications is not addressed by this paper. It is assumed throughout
that there exist drugs that could be dispensed by physicians or prescribed by pharmacists without a
reduction of quality or safety.
2In a recent report on pharmaceutical regulation, the Swiss government stated the opinion that
physicians face lower dispensing cost than pharmacists do [BAG (2009)]. The report concluded that
it would be `unfair' to pharmacists to allow both dispensing channels to compete on prices.
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5.2 Literature Review
Several countries recently reformed the division of labor between physicians and
pharmacists. In the Anglo-Saxon world, regulators have extended the right of phar-
macists to prescribe drugs. Amidst a growing shortage of primary care providers,
these reforms are aiming at a better use of pharmacists` skills. In the US for exam-
ple, at least 25 States grant pharmacists the right to prescribe on the basis of written
guidelines issued by the treating physician (`protocol-based prescribing'). Even more
States allow pharmacists to issue prescription rells [Emmerton et al. (2005)]. In
the United Kingdom, pharmacists have recently been authorized to prescribe drugs
to patients who joined a clinical management plan that ensures good communica-
tion between the pharmacist and the treating primary care physician [Guillaume
and Cooper (2008)]. Furthermore, cooperations between pharmacists and physicians
or practice groups are emerging in the US, Canada and Australia [Emmerton et al.
(2005)]. The impact of these changes has not yet been analyzed empirically.
In contrast to the Anglo-saxon world, many countries in South East Asia are
strengthening the separation between prescribers and sellers of drugs. In traditional
Chinese medicine, a formal separation of the two roles was unknown. Indeed, charg-
ing fees for personal services was deemed immoral; thus physician remuneration was
technically related only to drugs [Ikegami and Cambell (1995)]. In the year 2000
health reform in South Korea, the dispensing of drugs by physicians and drug pre-
scription by pharmacists was outlawed. Descriptive statistics presented by Kim et al.
(2004) indicate that the reform was associated with an increase in drug spending,
due to the fact that physicians substituted lower-priced, home-grown, generic drugs
by more expensive, imported, brand-name drugs. An explanation is that physicians
were alienated by the reform and had little incentive to keep health care expenditure
low. In Taiwan, Liu et al. (2009) found that clinics on global budgets are more likely
to prescribe generics than clinics reimbursed fee-for-service. Iizuka (2007) nds that
markups signicantly inuence the choice of anti-hypertensive drugs by Japanese
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physicians. His simulations suggest that reducing prescribers' markups to zero could
reduce expenditures in this drug class by as much as 15 percent.
In Switzerland, several studies have analyzed the eects of physician dispensing
using aggregate data. Dummermuth (1993) compares two otherwise similar neighbor-
ing cantons (Lucerne with PD and Argovia without PD), nding PD to be associated
with slightly higher per capita drug expenditure. This nding is in line with Beck
et al. (2004), who relate per-capita drug expenditure to PD regulation and other
characteristics of cantons. A dierent result is obtained by Vatter and Ruei (2003),
who control for a very comprehensive set of political and socioeconomic variables.
They identify a signicantly negative eect of the share of PD providers on per capita
HCE. More surprisingly still, Schleiniger et al. (2007) estimate a signicantly nega-
tive eect of PD on drug expenditure which is robust across several specications.
An early study using physician level data is Zweifel (1985), who nds that physicians
who dispense drugs had lower hospital referral rates. However, cost savings pertaining
to reduced referrals were not enough to oset the increased cost of drugs. According
to a recent study by Busato et al. (2010), PD-physicians bill less services per patient
than others, likely due to reduced incentives to generate additional income. Last but
not least, it was found in Chapter 4 of this thesis that generic substitution is more
common among dispensing physicians than among pharmacists. This is probably due
to generic drugs oering higher contributions to income.
5.3 Policy Setting
5.3.1 Swiss Health Insurance
Health insurance in Switzerland is mandatory for a rather comprehensive `basic' bas-
ket of medical services and pharmaceuticals, written by some 80 non-prot insurers
competing in a regulated market. Insurers must accept all applicants during semi-
annual open enrollment periods. Premiums can be dierentiated by area of residence
but not by age or health status. Low-income individuals are eligible for premium
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subsidies that are funded from general tax revenue. The baseline contract grants in-
sured individuals unlimited access to all licensed physicians and most hospitals in
their region of residence. They face a minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 (some
EUR 200 as of 2005) and a coinsurance rate of 10 percent up to a cap of CHF 700
(EUR 470) per year. While this system is generally found to ensure access to compre-
hensive health care to all citizens, it is criticized for high and rapidly increasing HCE,
lack of co-ordination between providers, and lack of information on quality and e-
ciency [OECD (2006)]. In response to these problems, insurers have been granted the
right to oer managed-care type options (since 1994) and higher deductibles (since
1996) in return for lower premiums.
5.3.2 Regulation of Physician Dispensing
Physician dispensing (PD) is regulated on the cantonal level. Therefore, a variety
of regulations can be observed within Switzerland. In French and Italian speaking
regions, PD is unknown except in emergencies and for complicated treatments. In
German speaking regions, only one canton has such a rigid regulation (Basel City,
BS). Many of the remaining cantons allow physicians to dispense on their own ac-
count, while others allow it under specic conditions (for example limited access to
pharmacies).
In regions that allow PD, physicians gain on average 18 percent of their revenue
from drugs. This amount is higher for general practitioners (28 percent) and lower for
specialists (8 percent). Despite these marked nancial gains, only 60 - 85 percent of
physicians who are entitled to dispense on their own account actually choose to do so
[Hunkeler (2008)].3 Although summary statistics can be misleading, it is interesting
to consider Table 5.4 in Appendix 5.9.1. Cantons that rely on PD seem to have lower
drug expenditure on average than cantons with pharmacy-based systems. In this
study, special attention will be given to Lucerne (LU), Zurich (ZH), Bern (BE), and
Argovia (AG). These four cantons are all German speaking and similar in mentality,
3In the denition by Hunkeler (2008), a physician dispenses on his own account if his drug turnover
exceeds CHF 25,000 per annum.
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yet have diering laws regarding PD. Lucerne is the most PD-friendly, granting the
right to dispense to all physicians. Zurich (ZH) allows PD except in the two largest
cities (Zurich and Winterthur), whilst the canton of Berne (BE) grants permission
to dispense to physicians in communities where not more than two pharmacies are
located. The canton of Argovia (AG) does not allow PD, except to physicians who
practice in underserved municipalities. Lucerne and Argovia are very comparable in
terms of socio-economic status, so comparing them in Table 5.4 seems appropriate.
Drug expenditure and total health care expenditure are shown to be lower in PD-
friendly LU. Physician density is similar in the two cantons, but Lucerne has a greater
share in primary care.
5.4 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to build a model of physician behavior from which
testable hypotheses can be derived. The model is tailored to general practitioners
(GPs), who account for the lion's share of dispensing physicians in Switzerland [Hun-
keler (2008)]. It is assumed that patients who arrive at the GP dier in their need
for a referral, denoted (). The GP knows the distribution F () ex ante. Before see-
ing patients, the GP xes a level (^) up to which she will treat the patient. If the
patient's severity  is below her (^), she decides about the amount of drug (d) and
non-drug GP care (hereafter: treatment, t) that the patient will consume.
In order to simplify the analysis, no bargaining process between the GP and the
patient is modeled. It is instead assumed that the physician takes patient utility into
account when she makes her treatment decisions. The model can be split into two
decision stages:
1. The GP xes a level of patient severity (^) up to which she will treat the patient
rather than referring him.
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2. Patients arrive at the GP. If their  is above ^, the GP refers the patient to a
hospital. If the  is below ^ the GP decides on the quantity of drugs (d) and
treatment (t) that the patient will consume.
When taking the referral decision, the GP anticipates the optimal amounts of d
and t that she will choose if she decides to treat the patient herself. Therefore, the
second stage is discussed rst.
5.4.1 Second Stage: Optimal Levels of Drugs and Treatments
If the GP treats the patient herself, she chooses the amount of drugs (d) and treat-
ment (t) that the patient will consume.4 For each unit d or t, she earns a fee denoted
by d or t respectively. In addition to the monetary prot, the GP derives utility
from generating benet to the patient. The relative weight she attributes to patient
benet compared to monetary prot is denoted by the agency parameter  [see also
Ellis and McGuire (1986)]. For simplicity, the two types of care are modeled as perfect
substitutes. Patient utility from using drugs is denoted V d(d) and assumed increas-
ing and concave

@V d(d)
@d
> 0; @
2V d(d)
@d2
< 0

, and the analogous holds for treatment t
@V t(t)
@t
> 0; @
2V t(t)
@t2
< 0

.
In keeping with DeJaegher and Jegers (2006), it is assumed that the GP considers
the health benet generated to the patient as well as the nancial burden imposed
on him by copayments. The patient is partly insured and pays a share () of the cost
of care, up to a stop-loss (). To simplify the analysis, the stop-loss is reached if and
only if a referral is made.5 The prices for a unit of drugs or treatments are assumed
to be equal and are normalized to 1.
Both services have positive and convex cost to the GP, thus @C(d;t)
@d
> 0, @
2C(t;d)
@d2
> 0,
and the analogous for t. Furthermore, resources spent on one type of care cannot be
spent on the other, so @
2C(t;d)
@d@t
> 0. For later use, it is also assumed that the second
4This section draws upon the model presented by Eggleston (2005).
5The simplication is justied as only 15 out of over 240,000 patients reached the stop-loss without
a referral in the data. Among those with a referral to a hospital, around 60 percent reached the stop-
loss.
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order cross derivative of the cost function is not larger than the single second order
derivative @
2C(t;d)
@d@t
 @
2C(t;d)
@d2
and @
2C(t;d)
@d@t
 @
2C(t;d)
@t2
. The GP's maximization problem
is thus
UGP jNo Referral = tt+ dd+ 
h
V t(t) + V d(d)  (t+ d)
i
  C(t; d): (5.1)
FOC:
0 = d + 
"
@V d(d)
@d
  
#
 
@C(t; d)
@d
(5.2)
0 = t + 
"
@V t(t)
@t
  
#
 
@C(t; d)
@t
(5.3)
Dispensing physicians earn substantially higher revenues per drug quantity pre-
scribed than non-dispensing physicians. Therefore, the right to dispense drugs leads
to an exogenous increase in the prots from drugs (d ") while the prots from physi-
cian treatments remain constant (t). The impact of this exogenous increase can be
calculated by taking the total dierential of the rst order conditions.6 Using matrix
notation, this reads
264 @2V d(d)@d2   @2C(t;d)@d2  @2C(t;d)@d@t
 @
2C(t;d)
@t@d
@
2V t(t)
@t2
  @
2C(t;d)
@t2
375
264 d
t
375 =
264  1
0
375d (5.4)
The matrix on the left hand side of Equation (5.4) is the Hessian matrix of Equa-
tion (5.1). With jHj denoting the determinant of the Hessian, applying Cramer's rule
yields
d
d
=
@2C(d;t)
@t2
  @
2V t(t)
@t2
jHj
=
(+)
(+)
> 0: (5.5)
6Amongst others, see Simon and Blume (1994) Ch. 15.3.
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For a local maximum, the determinant of the Hessian must be positive and the
rst leading principal minor, negative. Equation (5.5) leads to the hypothesis that
physician dispensing increases drug expenditure.
Hypothesis 1: PD increases drug expenditure.
If the physician agency parameter  increases, the denominator of Equation (5.5)
increases faster than the numerator. In consequence, d
d
becomes smaller. It is intu-
itive that high-agency GPs react less to the nancial incentives from drug dispensing
than low agency GPs.
Due to the fact that time spent on one service cannot be spent on another service,
increased drug prescriptions make the provision of physician treatments more costly
[see also Eggleston (2005)]. Using Cramer's rule once more, one obtains
t
d
=  
@2C(d;t)
@d@t
jHj
=  
(+)
(+)
< 0 (5.6)
Hypothesis 2: PD lowers the amount spent on physician treatments.
5.4.2 Referrals
Patients who arrive at the GP dier in their need for a referral (), which is between
[0,1] and drawn independently from distribution F ().7 If a referral is made, the
patient receives a xed amount S of hospital care. The benet vs( S) that is generated
to patient health depends linearly on , i.e. vs( S) =  S. Because the referral was
made, the patient's copayment equals the stop-loss of .
The GP is assumed not to earn money for a referral, but she cares about patient
benet. The GP's utility from a referral is thus
UGP jReferral = [ S  ]: (5.7)
The critical value for a referral (^) is set ex ante, based on expected utility. When-
ever an individual  is above ^, the GP's utility is given by Equation (5.7). When
7See Iversen and Ma (2010) for a similar specication.
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 is below ^, it is given by the maximization of Equation (5.1). With d and t
denoting the values of drugs and treatment that maximize (5.1), the expected utility
maximization problem reads
EUGP =
Z ^
0
U(d; tjNo Referral)f()d +
Z 1
^
[ S  ]f()d:(5.8)
FOC:
@EUGP
@^
= U(d; tjNo Referral)f(^)  ^ Sf(^) + f(^) = 0 (5.9)
! U(d; tjNo Referral) = [^ S  ] (5.10)
Although the utility level in absolute terms is not determined by the model, it can
be stated without loss of generality that the extra income from physician dispensing
increases physician utility

d "; U(d; tjNo Referral) "

, hence
UPD(d; tjNo Referral) > UNON PD(d; tjNo Referral): (5.11)
For Equation (5.10) to hold after an increase in the left-hand side, the physician must
increase her ^. Therefore, fewer cases are referred to hospitals.
Hypothesis 3: PD lowers the number of referrals.
5.4.3 Physician Income, Demand Inducement, and Agency for the
Patient
Two implicit assumptions behind Equation (5.1) deserve attention. First, the physi-
cians' marginal utility of income is assumed to be constant. This assumption implies
that the physician's interest in supplying more services is independent from her to-
tal income,8 which contradicts some widely applied models of physician behavior.
Indeed, the `target-income-hypothesis' [Evans (1974)] or its `income-eect' specica-
tion [McGuire and Pauly (1991)] assume that physicians have a strong interest in
providing more services (eg. by inducing demand) as long as their income is low.
When their income is higher, their interest in providing services becomes weaker. In
8Due to the convexity cost function, it is not independent of the total amount of services supplied.
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the present setting, PD-physicians earn more income per case compared to non-PD
physicians. Therefore, the `income eect' concept of physician behavior leads to the
hypothesis that PD lowers the amount of physician treatments provided. It thereby
supports Hypothesis 2.
The second implicit assumption is that the agency parameter  is exogenous and
independent from the other parameters in the model. This is a standard assumption
in health economic papers, nevertheless, it is often challenged in the political discus-
sion in Switzerland, notably by pharmacists and their lobbying groups, who argue
that the extra income from drug dispensing is likely to weaken physician agency for
the patients. Although endogenizing the degree of physician agency is beyond the
scope of this paper, the argument will be reconsidered in the empirical section.
5.5 Econometric Specication
The hypotheses (1) to (3) from the theoretical model are tested using a large, patient-
level claims data set. Two main econometric issues have to be addressed. First, the
distribution of health care expenditure is truncated at zero and highly skewed to the
right. This is addressed by the application of a two-part model (see Section 5.5.1
and 5.5.2). Second, health care expenditures vary between regions for many reasons,
which might be confounded with the eects of PD. This calls for the inclusion of
region specic xed eects (see Section 5.5.3).
5.5.1 Modeling Health Care Expenditure Data
The distribution of health care expenditure data is typically characterized by two
facts: First, a considerable part of the population does not use any health care within a
given period. Second, the positive spending is strongly skewed to the right with a long
tail of few individuals needing very expensive care. An extensive debate in the health
economics literature revolves around the estimation approach best suited to this
distribution. The most prominent candidates are hurdle models such as the original
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Tobit model, sample selection models (SSM) as suggested by Heckman (1979), and
the two-part models (2PM) suggested by Duan et al. (1982).
In this application, the two-part model is considered most appropriate. The To-
bit model is known to be inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which
is strong in our data set. The SSM does not require the error terms in the utiliza-
tion equation to be normally distributed [Olsen (1980)], but it suers from multi-
collinearity if the same set of variables is used in the selection and the utilization equa-
tion. Several studies use Monte Carlo simulations to show that high multi-collinearity
can lead to poorer predictive power of the SSM compared to the 2PM [Manning et al.
(1987), Hay et al. (1987), Leung and Yu (1996)].9 Moreover, Leung and Yu (1996)
show that the multi-collinearity problem is aggravated if the censoring is high (ie. if
there are `many' zeros). In appendix 5.9.2, I show test results for multi-collinearity
based on the variance ination factor. In the case of less frequently used types of
health care such as hospital care, applying the SSM indeed leads to very severe
multi-collinearity problems in our dataset.
The 2PM approach separates the probability of using care from the amount of care
if positive. With y representing the outcome variable (health care expenditure) and
X representing a matrix of independent variables, the expected value of the outcome
becomes
E(yjX) = P (y > 0jX)  E(yjX; y > 0): (5.12)
The probability P (y > 0jX) is commonly estimated by a probit model. In the
second part, Duan et al. (1982) transformed the dependent variable by the log and
applied OLS. However, Manning (1998) notes that retransforming the expected value
of the logarithmic outcome variable back to raw scale is very challenging in the
presence of heteroscedasticity. Alternatively, the second part can be estimated by a
generalized linear modeling approach with a log link [Manning and Mullahy (2001)].
9The results by Hay et al. (1987) are particulary relevant here because the authors generated their
data to mirror Swiss health care expenditure data.
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For the specication of the variance function, the two authors proposed a Park test.
Applying this test to our data indicated that the error variance is proportional to
the squared conditional mean (the gamma structure).
5.5.2 Marginal Eects in the 2PM
In order to assess the marginal eect (ME) of a variable on the expected outcome,
the two parts have to be combined. As both equations are nonlinear, the size of the
marginal eects depends on the values of all control variables. Let x1 be a binary
variable of interest and X a vector of additional independent variables. In the absence
of interaction terms, the marginal eect can be calculated using,
E[yjX]
x1
= [(1 +X)exp(1 +X)  (X)exp(X)]: (5.13)
If interaction terms are present, calculating the marginal eects is more compli-
cated. For the case of probit or logit models, interaction terms are derived by Ai
and Norton (2003) and sketched in the appendix. Following their method, the cor-
respondent formulas for the two-part marginal eects are derived by Frondel and
Vance (2009). Let x1 and x2 be two interacted dummy variables and X a vector of
additional independent variables. Then, the interaction term is [see appendix 5.9.3
for more detail],
2E[yjX]
x1x2
= (1 + 2 + 12 +X)exp(1 + 2 + 12 +X)
 (1 +X)exp(1 +X)  (2 +X)exp(2 +X)
+(X)exp(X): (5.14)
The standard errors of expression (5.13) are obtained by bootstrapping.10 As Ai and
Norton (2000) point out, bootstrapping might yield more accurate estimations in
10To be specic, 1000 new samples of equal size as the original are drawn with replacement.
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nite samples than analytical methods which are based on asymptotic distributions.
In addition, bootstrapping is easier to program.
In Appendix 5.9.5, results are also shown for an alternative specication using
OLS on an untransformed outcome variable. The advantage is that the coecients
are directly interpretable as marginal eects.
5.5.3 Separating the Eects of PD from Other Regional Dierences
The most important challenge is to avoid confounding the eects of PD with other
variations between regions. In a rst step, the analysis is restricted to four cantons
(Argovia, Bern, Lucerne, and Zurich) which are similar in socio-economic status and
mentality. This serves to greatly limit unobserved regional variation. The total area
selected measures only around 10,585km2 (which is smaller than Connecticut, one of
the smallest states of the US).
In addition, region-specic xed eects are added to the estimation. The entity
here is the `premium setting region' which is dened by the Swiss federal health
authority (FOPH) as having limited within variation in health care expenditures.
Insurers are allowed to dierentiate premiums between, but not within these regions.
The bottom lines of Table 5.1 display the regional distribution of individuals. Even
in areas dominated by PD, many individuals use the pharmacy, and vice versa.
Therefore, it is possible to include these xed eects without creating the problem
of perfect multi-collinearity with the PD variable.
Admittedly, it is still debatable whether physicians in the PD regions react in
the same manner to nancial incentives as physicians outside the PD regions. If
physicians who are `strongly attached to money' practice mostly in PD regions, the
estimated eect of PD might be biased upward.11 Unfortunately, a detailed analysis
of physicians' choice of location is beyond the scope of this study. Data to conduct
such an analysis would be very dicult to obtain for two main reasons. First, anec-
dotic evidence suggests that a physician's private situation and personal relationship
11Longitudinal data is frequently used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, this ap-
proach could not be followed here because the use of PD is fairly constant over time.
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with her predecessor are crucial factors for her choice of location. Second, due to
dierent ages of physicians, either a very long stream of data or surveys on physi-
cians' personal histories would be necessary. It is argued here that the regional xed
eects in combination with the selection of a small area within Switzerland serve to
suciently attenuate the problem of endogenous choice of location.
5.6 Data
Patient level data of about 240,000 individuals was provided by CSS, the largest
Swiss insurer. In addition to sociodemographic variables, information is available on
expenditure for four dierent types of medical care. The variable of main interest -
the main supplier of drugs - is represented by a dummy indicating that an individual
has purchased 66 or more percent of her drugs from physicians rather than from
pharmacists. A sensitivity analysis indicated that the results do not markedly change
in response to a variation of the threshold. For individuals with no pharmaceutical
spending, the market share of physician-dispensed drugs in their municipalities is
used instead of the individual value.
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics by sector. Health care expenditure per per-
son is measured with very large standard errors. Given these standard errors, the
dierence in raw means between the two sectors is far from signicant for all types
of care. However, mean HCE are lower for individuals who purchase from the physi-
cian. Surprisingly, monthly drug expenditure is also about ten percent lower in the
physician dispensing group; however the standard errors are again very high. In the
case of physician services, descriptive statistics indicate that PD is associated with a
higher use of primary care but a lower use of specialists' services.
Now turning to the shares of individuals for whom positive amounts of care are
observed, these are higher in the PD sector. It seems that individuals in the PD
regions are more likely to visit their doctors at least once within a period of time (1
year). A possible explanation is the increased availability of primary care physicians
in the PD regions (see Table 5.4).
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics in Non-PD/PD Sector, Year 2005 (* 2007 election).
Non-PD Sector PD Sector
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Consumption of Health Care Services in 2005
Health Care Expenditure (HCE) per month 287.128 (728.416) 250.919 (654.441)
Drug Expenditure (Cdrug) per month 64.977 (184.1) 56.086 (211.743)
Primary Care Expenditure (CGP) 25.980 (47.337) 29.315 (50.986)
Specialist Expenditure (CSpec) per month 35.743 (90.049) 28.982 (85.438)
Hospital Expenditure (CHosp) per month 78.964 (476.25) 61.000 (371.839)
Dummy for HCE = 1 0.752 (0.432) 0.795 (0.404)
Dummy for CDrug = 1 0.634 (0.482) 0.705 (0.456)
Dummy for CGP = 1 0.557 (0.497) 0.665 (0.472)
Dummy for CSpec = 1 0.502 (0.500) 0.497 (0.5)
Dummy for CHosp = 1 0.113 (0.316) 0.096 (0.295)
Community Characteristics
Urban center 0.277 (0.447) 0.140 (0.347)
Suburban municipality 0.341 (0.474) 0.354 (0.478)
Socio-economic status index (community) 51.707 (6.276) 49.985 (7.286)
Share voters conservative (SVP) 33.360 (8.957) 31.010 (8.830)
Share voters center left (CVP) 11.495 (7.186) 20.887 (14.331)
Share voters left (SP) 19.754 (6.409) 14.133 (6.745)
Individual Characteristics
Age 48.381 (17.822) 48.454 (17.957)
Share Male 0.449 (0.497) 0.464 (0.499)
Deductible Minimum 0.555 (0.497) 0.560 (0.496)
Deductible Medium 0.216 (0.411) 0.215 (0.411)
Deductible High 0.230 (0.421) 0.226 (0.418)
Individual is in one or more PCG 0.225 (0.418) 0.185 (0.388)
Number of individuals in each premium region12
Argovia Region 1 57,215 8,283
Zurich Region 1 11,491 1,728
Zurich Region 2 15,146 16,404
Zurich Region 3 9,009 17,250
Berne Region 1 9,402 2,560
Berne Region 2 10,845 6,925
Berne Region 3 2,465 3,359
Lucerne Region 1 2,207 23,310
Lucerne Region 2 956 16,538
Lucerne Region 3 1,435 26,263
Observations 120,193 122,620
PD = 1: The individual has bought at least 66 percent of her drugs from a physician.
Considering the explanatory variables, individuals who buy at a pharmacy are
more likely to live in urban or suburban areas, in comparison with individuals who
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buy their drugs from physicians. This is intuitive given the higher availability of
pharmacies in urban areas. Socio-economic status is slightly higher among individu-
als who buy drugs at the pharmacy. Dierences in mentalities among communities
are captured by the share of voters for three of the four largest parties in the par-
liamentary election of 2007. Table 5.1 shows that PD-patients are more likely than
non-PD patients to live in communities with strong support for CVP, a center-left
party with catholic roots. The leftist, social-democrat SP is stronger in the non-PD
areas, while the conservative, right-wing SVP is quite strong in both sectors. One
large party, the center-right, pro-market FDP, has been excluded in order to avoid
multi-collinearity.
In terms of personal characteristics, individuals in both sectors are quite similar.
The average age is roughly 48 in both sectors and the share of males is below 50
percent. The deductible is the amount of health care expenditure that an individual
has to pay out of pocket before the insurance kicks in. Chosen by the patient, it
is a good indicator for self-assessed health status. Table 5.1 shows no dierence
between individuals who choose dierent drug providers. The presence of chronic
illness is described by 21 pharmaceutical cost groups.13 These groups are considerably
more frequent in the pharmacy sector, which probably reects better reporting by
pharmacies rather than their true prevalence.14
5.7 Results
The testing of Hypotheses (1) to (3) is discussed in Sections (5.7.1) to (5.7.3). Table
5.2 displays the results of both parts of the two-part model. For each type of health
care expenditure (ie. drugs, GP care, specialist care, and hospital inpatient care)
the respective left column contains the marginal eects from a probit estimation
13The denition of these groups is similar to the ones described by Lamers and Van Vliet (2003).
14Pharmacies commonly bill insurers directly by electronic transmission. In contrast, some physi-
cians choose to bill the patients, who then send the bills to insurers for reimbursement. As the direct-
to-patient bill is not transmitted electronically, detailed drug information is often lost. Therefore, the
PCG cannot always be determined.
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of the probability of observing this type of expenditure. The marginal eects are
evaluated at the median of the explanatory variables.15 For dummy variables that
describe mutually exclusive groups (such as deductible levels or community types),
the most frequent group is set to one while all others are set to zero. In the case of
interactions, the marginal eects are calculated according to the formulas provided
by Ai and Norton (2003) (see Appendix 5.9.3). The respective right column displays
results of a GLM estimation of the log drug expenditure, conditional on observing a
positive amount of drugs.
5.7.1 Hypothesis 1: Physician Dispensing and Drug Expenditure
The coecient of main interest pertains to the fact that an individual buys most her
drugs from a physician. It increases the probability of buying drugs by almost 16
percentage points, speaking strongly in favor of Hypothesis (1). Interestingly, results
in the second column show that once drug use is initiated, the expenditure level is
markedly lower in the PD sector. This eect can be caused either by lower drug
quantities (thereby contradicting Hypothesis 1), or cheaper drugs being prescribed
by dispensing physicians. The latter is in line with ndings presented in Chapter 4
of this thesis that dispensing physicians sell signicantly more generic drugs than
pharmacies do.
15For dummy variables, the marginal eects reect a change from 0 to 1.
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It is often argued by pharmacists and their lobbying groups that nancial incen-
tives pertaining to PD weaken physician agency for the patient. Patients with high
deductibles have an increased interest in keeping their health care expenditure low.
Therefore, the interaction between PD and a high deductible (Buys from physician
 DED high) can serve as a test of physician agency.16 If the interaction between PD
and the deductible level is signicantly positive, PD providers are less responsive
to patient interest, pointing to imperfect agency. The results in the rst column of
Table (5.2) conrm this notion. Patients with high deductibles have a higher proba-
bility of drug use in the PD than in the non-PD sector. However, this eect may be
caused by the compliance behavior of patients rather than the prescribing behavior
of physicians. It is also likely that individuals in the pharmacy sector often do not
buy the prescribed drugs, while patients in the PD sector feel more urged to do so.
Once drug expenditure are initiated, the interaction of a medium deductible with
PD is negative, contradicting lower agency. The interaction of the high deductible is
insignicant. Overall, the evidence concerning agency is inconclusive.
5.7.2 Hypothesis 2: Physician Dispensing and Primary Care Services
Hypothesis 2 states that PD reduces the amount spent on physician treatments be-
cause physicians reallocate their resources to drug prescriptions. Surprisingly, the
opposite association is observed in the case of primary care services. As shown in
Column (3) and (4) of Table 5.2, patients who buy drugs from physicians have a
markedly higher probability of primary care expenditure and also a larger expected
amount of expenditure than individuals who buy from pharmacies.
A possible explanation for the theoretical model's failure to predict the increase
in spending for primary care is that it focuses on only one period. In a more dynamic
setting, providing physicians with dispensing rights is likely to increase the supply
16It is important to note that the coecient of the deductible level cannot be interpreted directly
because it is composed of two components, the `self-selection eect' (healthier individuals are more
likely to choose a high deductible) and the `incentive eect' (higher deductibles reduce moral hazard).
For an econometric separation of the two eects see Van Kleef et al. (2008), Gardiol et al. (2005), and
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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of primary care physicians. In fact, by reducing the income gap between them and
better paid specialists, dispensing might motivate more young physicians to involve
themselves in primary care supply. Furthermore, those regions that allow dispensing
might attract general practitioners from other regions. The numbers displayed in
Table 5.4 in the appendix point in this direction because the PD regions have a greater
share of physicians in primary care when compared to the Non-PD regions. This
nding is potentially interesting for countries such as the US who are experiencing
a shortage of primary care physicians [Goroll et al. (2007)]. However, an analysis of
the dynamics of physicians' choice of eld and location is beyond the scope of this
text.
The interaction term of buying from physicians and having a high deductible
indicates that the likelihood of positive primary care expenditure for individuals
with high deductibles is greater in the PD than in the pharmacy sector. However,
this cannot be attributed to physician behavior because the decision of whether or
not to visit a physician is taken by the individuals themselves. On the second stage
of the model, the interaction term is negative and does not conrm the notion of
reduced agency by dispensing physicians.
5.7.3 Hypothesis 3: Physician Dispensing and Referrals
Hypothesis 3 states that physician dispensing reduces the number of referrals be-
cause the treatment of patients with severe illness is more protable to primary care
physicians. Table 5.2 provides some evidence for this hypothesis, as the association
of buying drugs from physicians with hospital expenditure is negative in both parts
of the two-part model.
The case of specialist physicians is more complicated, as patients in the dataset
may visit specialists without referrals. Frequently visited specialists such as ophthal-
mologists or gynecologists are usually seen without prior consultation by a primary
care physician, while `highly specialized' specialists such as endocrinologists are not.
Table 5.2 shows a positive association of PD and specialists' expenditure on the rst
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part of the two-part model. This is likely being driven by the frequently visited spe-
cialists who show the same patterns as primary care physicians. By way of contrast,
the second part of the two-part model is likely being driven by the `specialized spe-
cialists', whose services are often related to chronic illness. Here, the association with
PD is negative, indicating that primary care physicians in the PD sector provide a
larger share of the care for the chronically ill than in the non-PD sector. It is intu-
itive that the increased income from PD motivates primary care physicians to expand
their knowledge in relation to chronic illness.
5.7.4 Physician Dispensing and Health Care Expenditure
For policy, the impact of a piece of regulation on actual expenditure is often of greater
interest than the relative impact. To evaluate this, Table 5.3 shows the combined
incremental eect calculated according to Equation (5.13). In the rst bloc, the eect
of buying from a physician on drug expenditure per month is displayed. The mean
reduction is statistically signicant, but of limited size (CHF - 5 or EUR - 3.33 per
patient and month). Contrary to the expectations of economists, drug dispensing by
physicians does not increase drug expenditure in our data.
In the case of primary care expenditures, the incremental eect is signicantly pos-
itive (roughly CHF + 7 per patient and month), pointing at an increased utilization
by individuals who buy their drugs from physicians. For specialist physicians, the
incremental eect is insignicant, while hospital expenditures seem to be lower for
individuals who choose to buy their drugs from physicians than for other individuals.
Last but not least, results are discussed for health care expenditure in general.
For brevity, the results of the two-part model are shown in the appendix (Table 5.6).
Physician dispensing increases the likelihood of positive health care expenditure. This
is unsurprising given our previous nding that PD increases the use of primary care
and drugs. These two types of care are frequently used for relatively minor ailments
and are most likely to be substituted by self medication (no formal care). However,
physician dispensing is associated with a sizeable decrease of the amount of care that
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Table 5.3: Combined Incremental Eects and Their Bootstrapped Standard Errors.
Incremental Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
E. in CHF Std. Err. 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
Drug Expenditure
Buys from physician -5.357 (1.461) -7.799 -3.010
Buys from physician * DEDmedium -0.371 (1.210) -1.546 2.379
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 5.958 (1.507) 3.491 8.348
Primary Care
Buys from physician 6.736 (0.231) 6.364 7.132
Buys from physician * DEDmedium -0.691 (0.201) -1.028 -0.374
Buys from physician * DEDhigh -1.092 (0.218) -1.445 -0.729
Specialists
Buys from physician -0.861 (0.377) -1.631 -0.328
Buys from physician * DEDmedium 1.326 (0.384) 0.711 2.055
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 4.031 (0.441) 3.426 4.868
Hospitals
Buys from physician -15.439 (2.067) -18.894 -12.049
Buys from physician * DEDmedium -2.498 (2.232) -6.175 1.147
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 9.992 (2.621) 5.687 14.481
Health Care Expenditure
Buys from physician -14.858 (3.826) -21.280 -8.662
Buys from physician * DEDmedium 0.663 (3.411) -4.960 6.359
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 25.903 (4.287) 18.863 32.874
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
1 CHF  0.66 EUR at 2005 exchange rates.
is used. This could be a mixed eect of the use of cheaper generic drugs and fewer
referrals thanks to more primary care. Many authors, notably in the USA, argue that
an increased use of primary care generates cost savings in other types of care [Goroll
et al. (2007), Bodenheimer (2006)].
The combined incremental eect (Table 5.3) is about negative 15 CHF per month,
with the 95 percent condence interval reaching from CHF - 21 to - 8 CHF. It in-
dicates that PD leads on average to lower health care expenditure in these Swiss
cantons, but the eect is not particularly large. From these results, it seems un-
likely that outlawing physician dispensing, as it is proposed by pharmacists and
their lobbying groups, would markedly inuence health care expenditure per capita
in Switzerland.
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These ndings contradict opinions stated by many physicians as well as opponent
opinions stated by pharmacists and their lobbyists. Physicians often argue that they
are motivated intrinsically and are completely immune to nancial incentives. This is
not conrmed because the PD variable is signicant in most estimates. On the other
hand, pharmacists often argue that nancial incentives are so inuential that the
income earned by drug dispensing necessarily leads to higher health care expenditure
per capita. This has also not been conrmed.
5.7.5 Robustness Check
In order to test the robustness of our results against the econometric specication,
Table 5.7 in the appendix shows the results of an OLS regression applied to the
untransformed data. The advantage of this specication is that the coecients can
be directly interpreted as marginal eects. OLS yields consistent estimates of the
coecients if the number of observations is large enough. The standard errors need
to be adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
Except for drug expenditure, the OLS coecients have the same sign and roughly
the same magnitude as the average marginal eects estimated by the 2PM. For drug
expenditure, the eect of PD switches from being around CHF - 5.35 to being around
CHF + 3.70. Therefore, the OLS estimates conrm Hypothesis (1) stating that drug
dispensing by physicians increases drug expenditures. However, the estimated eect
is still quite small, and thus its economic relevance is limited.
5.8 Conclusions
Markets for medical care are strictly regulated even in nations that claim to be
market economies. The reason is the information advantage of medical professionals
vis-a-vis patients and insurers. This paper analyzes the case of drug prescribers. Most
OECD countries prevent prescribers of drugs from dispensing, fearing that nancial
incentives will lead to ineciently high drug expenditure. Exceptions are countries
in Southeast Asia where the physician and the pharmacist were traditionally the
Prescribers' Responses to Financial Incentives - Theory and Evidence 129
same person. Switzerland is one of the few countries where both arrangements are
observed, which enables comparison of expenditure in both settings. While several
previous studies have examined this subject, their conclusions point in dierent di-
rections. Unfortunately, no study has yet analyzed the dierences in health outcomes,
a limitation which is also true for this research.
From a theoretical model of physician decision making, three main hypotheses
are derived. Hypothesis (1) states that allowing prescribers to dispense on their own
account is associated with increased quantities of drugs being prescribed. Hypothesis
(2) states that allowing prescribers to dispense reduces their incentive to provide
treatments because some treatments can be substituted by more protable drugs.
Hypothesis (3) states that due to higher incomes earned per case, dispensing pre-
scribers have less incentives to refer patients to hospitals and specialists.
These three hypotheses are tested using patient-level data of over 240,000 Swiss
patients. It has been found that patients who buy most of their drugs from physicians
have a higher likelihood of using drugs than patients who buy at pharmacies, giving
support to Hypothesis (1). However, if positive drug expenditure is observed, this
will be lower for patients who buy from physicians. Combining the two eects results
in a moderately negative association of physician dispensing with drug expenditure.
Therefore, this research fails to conrm increased drug spending by patients who buy
drugs from physicians, which is at odds with microeconomic theory. Hypothesis (2)
must also be rejected because patients who buy drugs from physicians consume more
primary care services than patients who buy drugs from pharmacies. Hypothesis (3)
is conrmed by the fact that patients who buy drugs at the physician's oce use
lower hospital services on average than patients who buy drugs at the pharmacy.
Turning to total health care expenditure, this research nds a negative associa-
tion between physicians selling drugs and total health care expenditure per capita,
which is statistically signicant but only of a moderate size. Therefore, it fails to
provide supporting evidence for the claim that banning physicians from dispensing
drugs would markedly reduce health care expenditure. In this situation, it might be
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sensible to liberalize the separation between prescribers and sellers of drugs (either
by allowing pharmacists prescribe or physicians dispense a selection of drugs). In
this way, competition among drug providers is increased, which enhances respon-
siveness to patient preferences and decreases drug mark-ups (unless prevented by
regulation). Moreover, it could be used as a means to increase the supply of primary
care providers in regions where these are at a premium.
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5.9 Appendix
5.9.1 Regulation of Physician Dispensing in the Swiss Cantons
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics per Canton (`State'), year 2006.
Cantons Language Regulation HCE Drug Cost % Drug Turnover Physician % GPs Pharmacy
on PD 2006 2006 sold by physicians density1 density2
AI G 1 1,821 347 0.86 1.19 0.33 6.61
NW G 1 2,057 398 0.79 1.14 0.36 5.08
AR G 1 2,149 395 0.83 1.87 0.4 11.48
OW G 1 2,176 411 0.86 1.17 0.56 11.97
UR G 1 2,191 407 0.89 1.19 0.44 5.78
ZG G 1 2,233 410 0.74 1.82 0.33 12.11
LU G 1 2,287 443 0.82 1.49 0.37 9.49
SZ G 1 2,306 448 0.79 1.35 0.43 8.69
GL G 1 2,321 469 0.86 1.45 0.51 5.26
SG G 1 2,335 466 0.8 1.63 0.38 10.58
TG G 1 2,355 402 0.77 1.34 0.42 9.75
GR G/I 2 2,398 498 0.39 1.75 0.41 20.37
VS F/G 2 2,463 568 0.05 1.75 0.33 37.5
AG G 2 2,484 541 0.14 1.51 0.32 19.03
FR F/G 2 2,572 551 0.08 1.55 0.32 25.02
SH G 2 2,611 567 0.35 1.99 0.4 17.49
SO G 1 2,691 552 0.65 1.65 0.39 10.5
JU F 3 2,713 631 0.07 1.69 0.35 27.93
ZH G 2 2,725 528 0.43 2.31 0.29 16.91
BL G 1 2,856 565 0.52 2.01 0.31 15.05
NE F 3 2,951 710 0.07 2.08 0.26 33.65
BE G/F 2 2,984 560 0.42 2.13 0.3 19.34
VD F 3 3,144 682 0.03 2.46 0.25 35.74
TI I 3 3,287 707 0.06 2.04 0.27 54.8
BS G 3 3,585 751 0.09 3.81 0.18 36.25
GE F 3 3,625 773 0.04 3.29 0.17 38.88
Languages: G=German, I=Italian, F=French
Regulation of Dispensing: 1=PD allowed to all physicians, 2= Mixed Systems, 3=PD not allowed
BS and GE are `city states' and more urban than the other cantons.
LU and AG are interesting because they are similar in urbanisation, but have diering laws on PD.
1 Number of physicians per 1,000 population, 2 Number of pharmacies per 100,000 population
5.9.2 Testing Multi-collinearity in the Sample Selection Model
The variance ination factor (VIF) is used to test the severity of the multi-collinearity
problem in the SSM. The outcome variables are transformed by the log before apply-
ing the standard SSM. Because of high collinearity of age and age squared as well as
the interacted gender variables, the mean VIFs are calculated excluding the age and
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gender variables. For comparison, the mean VIF is also shown for an OLS regression
excluding inverse mills ratio. Table 5.5 clearly supports the notion by Leung and Yu
(1996) that the multi-collinearity problem is severe if censoring is high. For rarely
used types of care such as specialized physicians or hospitals, the SSM is not appli-
cable unless there are exclusion restrictions. Although the VIF of the inverse Mills
ratio is high throughout, the SSM is a valuable alternative if censoring has a weak
eect.
Table 5.5: Test for Multi-collinearity Based on the VIF.
HCE Drugs Primary Care Specialized Physicians Hospitals
VIF inverse mill ratio 9.07 9.33 36.83 68.53 999.94
Mean VIF SSM 2.35 2.33 3.42 4.17 29.96
Mean VIF OLS 2.15 2.13 2.17 2.13 2.31
5.9.3 Interaction Eects in Probit Models
In nonlinear models such as the probit, the marginal eect of changing two interacted
variables is not equal to the marginal eect of just the interaction term [Norton et al.
(2004)]. Instead, the marginal eect is found by taking the cross derivative, if the
two interacted variables are continuous, or the double discrete dierence, if they are
dummies. For example, let x1 and x2 be two interacted dummy variables, X a vector
of additional independent variables, u = 1x1 + 2x2 + 12x1x2 + X, and F (u) a
continuous and dierentiable function. The double discrete dierence reads
2F (u)
x1x2
=
fF (1 + 2x2 + 12x2 +X)  F (2x2 +X)g
x2
= F (1 + 2 + 12 +X)  F (2 +X)
 F (1 +X) + F (X) (5.15)
The standard errors of the marginal eects can be approximated using the delta
method [Cameron and Trivedi (2005)]. Let g(^) be a column vector of marginal
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eects. For example, if there are two interacted dummy variables and one additional
control variable (xi), g(^) reads (
F (u)
x1
; F (u)
x2
; 
2F (u)
x1x2
; F (u)
xi
). Now, let there be a
matrix (G(^)) of partial derivatives of @g(^)/@0. In the aforementioned example of
two interacted dummy variables and one additional control variable, G(^) reads
G(^) =
266666666664
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With V^() denoting the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the probit esti-
mation, the variance of the marginal eects V^(g(^)) is obtained by,
V^(g(^)) = G(^)V^()G(^)0 (5.16)
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5.9.4 Results for Health Care Expenditure
Table 5.6: Two-Part Results for Health Care Expenditure.
Pr(HCE >0) HCEjHCE> 0
Marg. Eect Coecients
Buys from physician 0.111*** -0.138***
(0.003) (0.017)
Buys from physician * DEDmedium 0.018*** -0.063*
(0.003) (0.028)
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 0.074*** 0.112***
(0.004) (0.031)
DED Medium -0.067*** -0.175***
(0.004) (0.020)
DED High -0.243*** -0.662***
(0.004) (0.023)
Male -0.318*** -1.017***
(0.019) (0.085)
Age -0.007*** -0.016***
(0.000) (0.002)
Age squared -0.005*** 0.272***
(0.000) (0.020)
Male * age -0.119* 0.036***
(0.002) (0.003)
Male * age squared -0.231*** -0.280***
(0.021) (0.032)
Suburban community 0.010* 0.044
(0.004) (0.023)
Auent community 0.024*** 0.020
(0.007) (0.046)
Suburban - mixed community -0.006 -0.024
(0.005) (0.030)
Industrial community -0.009* 0.050
(0.005) (0.029)
Rural & commuter community -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.030)
AIC 210,527 2,471,028
N 242,641 187,821
Additional regressors are the same as those in Table 5.2.
Standard Errors in Parentheses,*p<0.05,** p<0.01,***p<0.001
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5.9.5 Robustness Check Using OLS
Table 5.7: OLS Results (Robustness Check).
Drug Primary Specialists Hospitals HCE
Care
Buys from physician 3.742* 8.326*** -2.547*** -16.694*** -8.363
(1.645) (0.332) (0.701) (3.101) (5.012)
Buys from physician * DEDmedium 0.512 -1.305** 3.121*** -3.425 1.168
(1.782) (0.473) (0.907) (4.571) (6.619)
Buys from physician * DEDhigh 4.220** -1.389*** 9.237*** 17.069*** 38.831***
(1.289) (0.355) (0.639) (3.440) (4.945)
DED Medium -14.881*** -3.514*** -6.414*** -4.531 -50.624***
(1.116) (0.324) (0.649) (3.873) (5.217)
DED High -28.937*** -11.850*** -22.887*** -29.822*** -126.526***
(0.801) (0.255) (0.495) (2.433) (3.487)
Male 0.293 -10.449*** -4.652* -26.313* -239.739***
(4.016) (1.286) (2.118) (11.567) (18.451)
Age 0.907*** -0.333*** 1.346*** -3.007*** -19.659***
(0.105) (0.043) (0.065) (0.354) (0.599)
Age squared -3.616*** 5.908*** -14.688*** 35.550*** 243.562***
(1.075) (0.448) (0.646) (3.590) (6.352)
Male * age -0.014 -0.161** -0.463*** -0.141 8.639***
(0.184) (0.061) (0.096) (0.561) (0.885)
Male * age squared 1.679 3.553*** 8.188*** 14.893* -72.858***
(1.850) (0.651) (0.985) (6.126) (9.576)
Suburban community 1.714 1.247*** 0.289 11.526** 19.302***
(1.471) (0.331) (0.641) (3.739) (5.327)
Auent community 4.934 -0.655 4.834** 4.053 14.637
(3.263) (0.766) (1.613) (7.394) (10.962)
Suburban - mixed community -1.145 0.402 -3.979*** 4.227 3.954
(1.861) (0.452) (0.796) (4.345) (6.467)
Industrial community 1.853 -0.244 -3.104*** 12.475** 25.141***
(1.678) (0.389) (0.705) (4.536) (6.446)
Rural & commuter community 1.340 -0.930* -2.735*** 8.064 11.934
(1.857) (0.405) (0.802) (4.294) (6.301)
Share voters conservative (SVP) -0.013 -0.000 -0.026 -0.507* -0.790*
(0.117) (0.022) (0.040) (0.218) (0.328)
Share voters left (SP) -0.031 0.055** -0.117*** -0.584*** -0.714**
(0.092) (0.019) (0.030) (0.177) (0.274)
Share voters centre left (CVP ) 0.088 0.018 -0.002 -1.236*** -1.383**
(0.158) (0.032) (0.061) (0.331) (0.500)
Socio-economic status 0.147 0.174*** 0.400*** 0.222 0.995**
(0.089) (0.024) (0.039) (0.211) (0.313)
R2 0.247 0.168 0.083 0.033 0.185
N 242,813 242,813 242,813 242,813 242,813
Additional regressors: 10 Premium Region Fixed Eects, 21 Pharmaceutical Cost Groups, 2 Additional
Community Types, Population of the Community, Standard Errors in parentheses, *p<0.05,** p<0.01,***p<0.001.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
This section summarizes the main policy implications of the thesis and discusses
possible extensions of each essay.
This thesis analyzes dierent examples of how market mechanisms can be useful
to allocate resources in health care markets   in spite of considerable information
asymmetries. However, if markets are regulated with the aim of achieving social goals,
regulation has to be carefully designed in order to avoid giving unintended incentives
to market players. Results of Chapter 2 demonstrate that community rating on its
own cannot ensure equal access to chronically ill individuals in health insurance mar-
kets. In order to mitigate the insurers' incentives to `chase the low risks', community
rating has to be combined with health-based risk adjustment. Although such schemes
can never be perfect because the regulator has an information disadvantage vis-à-vis
health insurers, results in Chapter 2 indicate that eective formulas can be designed
using readily available health indicators.
Policy implication 1: If community rating is imposed in health insurance markets,
health-based risk adjustment is a necessity.
Designing an eective risk adjustment scheme is challenging if insurers are granted
the freedom to oer plans with dierent coverage designs. Empirical evidence from
Chapter 3 suggests that both supply-side and demand-side cost sharing plans attract
mainly healthy individuals. However, both options also achieve marked reductions of
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moral hazard. Cost reductions due to reductions of moral hazard (`true' cost reduc-
tions) that are attained by such plans depend on the expenditure level of the group
who chooses the respective plan because healthy individuals have lower potential for
cost savings than sick individuals. The question, then, is to what extent insurers
should be allowed to pass on gross savings to consumers. It seems undisputed that
the `true' cost savings should be passed on. Indeed, if `true' cost savings are punished
by higher contributions to the risk adjustment scheme, incentives for oering such
contracts are reduced [Lehmann and Zweifel (2004)]. Currently, these considerations
are not part of the political debate on risk adjustment. However, they should be
taken into consideration in case future amendments of the risk adjustment scheme
are envisaged.
Policy implication 2: If contract dierentiation is possible, the risk adjustment for-
mula should account for plan-specic cost savings.
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that both types of cost sharing plans dispropor-
tionately attract healthy individuals. However, the selection eects are stronger in
the case of demand-side cost sharing. It might be undesired that cost sharing plans
are chosen by very healthy individuals only, due to their limited potential for cost
reductions. Results in Chapter 3 imply that if insurers wish to attain a favorable
ratio of risk-selection and moral hazard eects, promoting supply-side cost sharing
seems to be a more promising strategy than promoting demand-side cost sharing.
Policy implication 3: If the ratio between risk-selection and moral hazard eects is
taken as a criterion, supply-side cost sharing is more eective than demand-side
cost sharing.
The estimations in Chapter 4 imply that a change in the coinsurance rate from
10 to 20 percent for brand-name drugs was very eective in promoting generic sub-
stitution. The magnitude of the eect is surprising given that the average additional
cost per patient was low compared to income. It seems that physicians and patients
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reacted to the fact that they had to pay `additional' copayment, without necessarily
considering its amount. Furthermore, the increase in the coinsurance rate for brand-
name drugs likely was interpreted as government advice to use the generic alternative,
helping to convince patients and physicians of its safety and quality. This experience
should be kept in mind for other instances when treatment alternatives with little
dierence in documented eectiveness but considerable dierence in prices are avail-
able. A hefty increase in the rate of coinsurance for the more expensive treatment is
sure to meet with resistance from patient lobbying groups and leftist political parties.
However, small increases in the coinsurance rate might be quite eective and easier
to implement.
Policy implication 4: Introducing treatment-specic rates of coinsurance can success-
fully promote cost-eective treatment modes even if the additional burden for
the patient is limited.
Chapter 5 analyzes the cost implications of giving physicians the right to dispense
drugs on their own account. The analysis does not only include expenditure on drugs,
but also expenditure on services provided by general practitioners (GPs), specialists,
and hospitals. It is found that, although drug dispensing does not directly inuence
reimbursement of other types of care, quantities of such services are markedly af-
fected. In particular, drug dispensing by physicians is associated with an increased
use of GP services but a decreased probability of using hospital services. Therefore, if
regulators wish to reduce hospitalizations, a redesign of the reimbursement schemes
for GPs could be envisaged.
Policy implication 5: Increasing general practitioners' earnings per case may serve to
reduce referrals to hospitals.
This thesis could be a starting point for various extensions. To start with empirical
issues, Chapter 2 contains an analysis of insurers' incentives to select risks, assuming
a mid-term planning horizon. Using even more years of data, it would become pos-
sible to assess to what extent risk proles are equalized `by nature' in the long-run
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(meaning that some of the ill become healthy and vice versa). Should the `natural'
risk equalization be strong in the long run, risk selection problems could be mitigated
by increasing contracting periods (as long as consumers accept to be `locked into'
their insurance contracts).
Chapter 3 demonstrates that supply-side cost sharing is associated with marked
cost reductions. However, these results have limited generality unless the mechanism
behind the cost reductions are identied. To this end, a deeper analysis of the internal
incentive structure of the independent practice association (IPA) would be required.
Furthermore, analyzing cost savings by subgroups of patients could be instructive.
In particular, the deceased would make an interesting study group. Werblow et al.
(2007) found that spending patterns of the deceased dier from those of survivors.
Unfortunately, the number of deceased in the IPA plans in our data set was too
small for such an analysis. Another interesting study group are patients with specic
chronic conditions. More often than not, patients who suer from chronic conditions
are treated by a number of dierent health care providers. These patients might
strongly benet from increased coordinating eort by their general practitioner. Such
an analysis would allow to derive practical guidelines on how eciency in health care
delivery can be improved. According to Beck et al. (2009), the Swiss market currently
lacks such guidelines.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 consider physicians' choice of location exogenous, with
regional level xed eects controlling for dierences between regions. This is justied
as long as the physicians who practice in PD regions do not react to nancial incen-
tives in a systematically dierent manner than physicians in non-PD regions do. If
physicians who have a `high valuation for personal income' systematically select into
the physician dispensing regions, the estimated eects of PD are possibly overrated.
By analyzing physicians' choice of location, it would become possible to separate self-
selection eects from the `true' eects of dispensing. Unfortunately, data to analyze
physicians' choice of location does not (yet) exist in Switzerland.
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Another extension of Chapters 2, 4, and 5 is to account for competition between
insurers, or physicians respectively. In Chapter 2, the cost of risk selection is not ex-
plicitly modeled. In order to estimate it, the strategic behavior of competing insurers
would have to be taken into account because the cost of attracting low risks increases
if many insurers compete for them (provided that the share of low risks in the popu-
lation is not augmented by risk selection, which is certainly true in the short run). In
Chapters 4 and 5, the patient passively accepts the treatment decisions taken by the
physician on his behalf. A more realistic model would consider a bargaining process
between the two, as proposed by Ellis and McGuire (1990). Furthermore, increased
competition likely puts pressure on physicians to respond to patients' preferences.
The results of Chapters 2 and 3 lead to policy implication 2, suggesting that plan-
specic cost savings should be accounted for in the risk adjustment formula in order
to avoid the dilution of incentives for eciency. However, implementing this idea is
tricky and no `best practice' approach has yet emerged. On the contrary, Schokkaert
and Van de Voorde (2009) showed that if the health care expenditure function is not
additively separable into morbidity and eciency variables, it is impossible (even in
theory) to perfectly oset incentives for risk selection without mitigating incentives
for eciency at all. In practice, the regulator can never perfectly oset incentives
for risk selection due to information asymmetries (see Chapter 2). Therefore, second
best approaches need to be developed. In the US, the risk-adjustment formula that is
applied by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to pay Medicare
Advantage plans is calibrated using only individuals in traditional (fee-for-service
based) Medicare [Pope et al. (2011)]. However, this approach is only valid as long
as the steepness of risk proles in the two sectors is not too dierent. Two possible
approaches to amend these problems were discussed by Van Kleef et al. (2010). The
rst approach entails calculating risk adjustment payments within plan types. This
is possible only if the number of individuals per risk group is large enough within all
plan types. The second approach is to augment observed expenditure in cost sharing
plans by estimated `true' cost savings. This approach requires the availability of an
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universally trusted method of estimating `true' cost savings, even for plans with small
numbers of enrolles. The conditions for both approaches are currently not fullled
in Switzerland. In order to provide practical guidance on the eective design of risk
adjustment schemes in the case of contract dierentiation, further research is needed.
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